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From the Formation of the Ad Hoc Com:mi ttee on Irish Affairs to 
the Atkins Initiative. 1977-1979. 
The increasing success of constitutional nationalists put 
a severe strain on the activities of republican groups in 
America. Noraid lead.ers today accept that the st. Patrick's 
Day statement by the Four Horsemen was a set-back to their 
efforts to win Irish-American support. The Irish National 
Caucus was similarly alarmed by the carter statement. It 
showed that constitutional nationalists had the power to 
influence the President. compared to this significant 
breakthrough, the small successes of the I.N.C. on Capitol 
Hill seemed singularly unimpressive. Republican groups, 
therefore, began exploring new methods by which they could 
make their influence more effective. 
Father Sean McManus and I.N.C. officials felt that the 
best way to counteract the Four Horsemen was to establish a 
formal group of supporters in Congress. Noraid leaders backed 
this plan because they hoped such an association would be more 
effective in raising Irish human rights issues in Washington. 
They believed a tightly organized group of Congressmen could 
influence the government to issue American visas for top 
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r.R.A. person~el and to convene formal Congressional Hearings 
on Northern Ireland. 1 
The initial moves towards establishing this new 
congressional group were taken by the leaders of the I.N.C. 
and the Ancient Order of Hibernians. A joint delegation from 
, 
these two organizations approached Congressmen who had worked 
for the republican cause and gauged their enthusiasm for the 
proposed initiative. Jack Keane, the outgoing President of the 
A.O.H. and also a chairman of the.I.N.C., played a key role in 
this process. He contacted Mario Biaggi and asked him to 
establish the new group. Biaggi responded enthusiastically and 
on September 27, 1977, he announced the formation of the Ad 
Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs. 
The American republican groups immediately hailed the 
formation of the Ad Hoc Committee as a major breakthrough. 
Irish-American newspapers reported on the group's activities, 
printing full lists of members as new congressmen joined. ~ 
Irish People, in particular, praised the new group as "the 
Congressional voice of the suffering people in British-
occupied Ireland" and asked Irish-Americans to urge their 
political representatives to join: 
Let us each call our Congressman and ask him 
to join the Irish Congressional Committee. 
Tell him of the suffering and horror of 
British occupation. Ring him again and again. 
Make an appointment to talk to him personally. 
Remind him that it is the same army which 
burned the Capitol and the city of Washington 
- the same army which is torturing the noble · 
people of Ireland .•• Hurry up! Tomorrow may 
be too late. Who knows how many Irish children 
I' .I 
!:t 
will die tonight at the hands of these British 
murderers . 2 
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Mario Biaggi became chairman of the new Congressional 
committee. He had many personal characteristics which 
attracted support from Irish republicans in America. During 
his 23-year service with the New York Police Department, 
Biaggi was highly decorated. He developed a strongly 
conservative attitude to law and order, epitomized by a ~areer 
in which he shot fifteen people and killed two. The 
Congressman maintained that it was during his police service 
that he developed an interest in Ireland. He recalls that one 
of his colleagues, an Irish-American cop named Pat McMahon, 
had passed on an encyclopedic knowledge of Irish history. The 
two would discuss Irish affairs while on their "beat" 
together. It was this background that pushed Biaggi to make 
statements in Congress on the Ulster problem and to strongly 
criticiz British policy over internment and the Bloody Sunday 
killings. He soon forged strong links with the Irish-American 
republican organizations. 
From his first associations with the Ulster conflict, 
Biaggi's critics accused him of merely playing for the Irish-
American vote. The Italian-American Congressman was always 
angered by this suggestion and continually stated that his 
interest lay in the desire to see human rights in Northern 
Ireland. He asked: 
Why does nobody ever question why Ted Kennedy 
is in this? Last time I looked, he was Irish, 
Catholic, white, but be's involved with 
blacks, Jews and Puerto Ricans. My 
constituency is only 6% Irish but I say, human 
rights for all human beings. 3 
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Biaggi emphasized that his constituency was mainly 
Italian-American and that he was continually re-elected with 
large majorities. He said that this proved he was concerned 
with Ulster not merely as a ploy to win Irish-American votes. 
The Congressman's opponents could, however, point out that he 
had aspirations towards a seat in the Senate. In 1973 Biaggi 
also ran for Mayor of New York.- Irish-American votes could 
greatly help these ambitions.' 
Whatever the motivations behind Biaggi's involvement in 
the Ulster conflict, he did prove very successful in 
recruiting congressmen to the Ad Hoc Committee. There were 
seventy members by the end of October 1977. Membership 
increased steadily to a peak of one-hundred and thirty by 
1979. Constitutional nationalists have always claimed that 
these numbers were misleading and that the Ad Hoc Committee 
was basically a "paper organization" -- many congressmen who 
joined took no active part in its activities, it met 
infrequently, and achieved very little. Critics of the group, 
such as Garret FitzGerald, further claimed that new 
Congressmen were "joiners" and signed up as members partly to 
oblige a colleague and partly to create an impression of 
involvement in a wide variety of issues. 5 
Members of the Ad Hoc Committee encompassed the entire 
ideological spectrum of American politics. However, the 
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majority were democratic representatives from eastern 
constituencies, particularly New York. The core of the 
committee consisted of Mario Biaggi, Hamilton Fish (R.,N.Y.), 
Benjamin Rosenthall (D. ,N. Y.), Lester Wolff (D.N. Y.), Benjamin 
Gilman (R. ,N. Y.) Norman Lent (R. ,N. Y.) and Joshua Eilberg 
(D.,PA). The fact that none of this activist core were Irish-
American invited constitutional nationalist accusations that 
the Ad Hoc Committee was merely a vehicle for Italian and 
Jewish Congressmen to win some Irish votes. 5 
Prominent members of the Ad Hoc Committee began 
sponsoring bills on Northern Ireland and publicizing alleged 
violations of human rights. Mario Biaggi, in response to 
President Carter's promise of financial aid in the event of a 
political solution, introduced a bill granting economic 
assistance to Ulster. The proposed legislation stipulated, 
however, that U.S. assistance should only be granted after a 
British withdrawal. Most of these bills received very little 
backing and usually "died" after the initial attempts to lobby 
support. 
Ad Hoc committee members had more success in working for 
individuals accused of republican activities in Northern 
Ireland. Joshua Eilberg began supporting Pearse Kerr, a 17-
year old Philadelphian who had moved to Belfast in 1972. Kerr 
was arrested by the R.u.c. in August 1977 and charged with 
membership of the junior I.R.A. and possession of a firearm. 
American republican groups claimed the youth was tortured in 
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Castlereagh interrogation center and forced to sign a 
confession to these charges. 7 
Joshua Eilberg, with the support of the Ad Hoc Committee 
members in Congress, began pressing the British Embassy in 
Washington for an explanation of why Kerr was being held 
without bail. He accused the British of inflicting "inhuman 
treatment" and demanded Kerr's immediate release. 
Eventually British authorities dropped the charges 
against Kerr. He was freed on November 23, 1977. Eilberg and 
the Ad Hoc Committee immediately claimed it was their 
influence which secured the victory, while British officials 
maintained they lacked sufficient evidence for a successful 
conviction. The Ad Hoc Committee exploited the issue, 
achieving a publicity coup when they organized a large welcome 
home ceremony for Pearse Kerr in Philadelphia. A pipe band and 
hundreds of republicans greeted Kerr as he got off the 
airplane and he was formally received by Mayor Frank Rizzo.a 
The Ad Hoc Committee also worked on the case of Damian 
Eastwood, a Californian lecturing at the Ulster Polytechnic in 
Jordanstown. on December 21, 1977, Eastwood and an accomplice, 
Linda Quigley, were arrested after a police patrol found a 
bomb in their automobile. Eastwood cooperated with the R.U.C. 
and told them that two gunmen were holding his wife and 
children hostage and forced him to drive the bomb to the 
Culloden Hotel in Hollywood. When police arrived at Eastwood's 
; ; 
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house there was no trace of the gunmen but his wife 
corroborated the story. 
Eastwood was held in Crumlin Road Jail before his trial 
and immediately the Ad Hoc committee began publicizing his 
case in Washington. Mario Biaggi joined with congressmen from 
California and charged the F.B.I. of complicity in Eastwood's 
detention. They accused the bureau of supplying the R.U.C. 
with files on Eastwood and of carrying out wide scale 
harassment of Irish-Americans in.California. 9 
In September 1978, Damian Eastwood was tried before Lord 
Chief Justice Sir Robert Lowry in Belfast. Lowry concluded 
that the prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Eastwood had not acted under duress. All charges against 
the defendant were dropped. The Ad Hoc Committee claimed, as 
in the Kerr case, that their· activities in Washington had 
forced the British to accept standard legal procedures and 
adhere to the rule of law. 10 
In conjunction with work on behalf of u. s. citizens 
arrested in Ulster, the Ad Hoc Committee also increased 
efforts to win American visas for Irish republicans. In August 
1978, Joshua Eilberg and Hamilton Fish traveled to Britain and 
Ireland to investigate the issue. During their week-long 
visit, they met with United States Consular officials in 
London and Belfast. The two Congressmen also interviewed a 
delegation of leading republicans who had been refused entry 
into America. 
280 
When they returned to Washington, Fish and Eilberg 
compiled an officiaL report and presented it to the Committee 
on the Judiciary. They concluded that the state Department was 
acting "unfairly and unjustifiably in denying or revoking 
visas" and that officials "dealt with applicants in an 
unsympathetic and high-handed manner. " The two Congressmen 
also urged the State Department to reevaluate all the cases in 
which it had denied visas to republicans. 11 
While they were in Ireland, Fish and Eilberg held a 
series of press conferences for the purpose of attacking what 
they saw as the denial of human rights in Ulster. Upon their 
return to the United States, they delivered a much publicized 
letter to President Jimmy Carter which stated: 
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Powers) Act of 
1973 and its various subsequent amendments 
enacted by the British parliament have greatly 
eroded the basic common law principle of due 
process. The people of Northern Ireland are 
being subjected to warrantless searches and 
arrests, prolonged detention without charges, 
harsh interrogation methods, and non-jury 
trials in which a single judge sits alone 
imposing long-term sentences. Frankly, Mr. 
President, we were appalled at these 
conditions and by the armed camp atmosphere we 
encountered. 12 
Although the carter administration ignored Fish and 
Eilberg's report, the two politicians did create a substantial 
amount of publicity for the human rights. and visa issues. 
Their criticisms of the British government and State 
Department were given extensive media coverage that 
embarrassed officials in London and Washington. 
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The Irish National Caucus encouraged and financed similar 
"fact finding" trips by American politicians to Ireland. 
caucus leaders also conducted similar "investigative" trips 
themselves. In 1979, a Caucus delegation led by Father Sean 
McManus, Fred Burns O'Brien, and Rita Mu!len toured Northern 
Ireland. During the visit, McManus infuriated unionist 
politicians and the Northern Ireland Office by his accusations 
that the R. u. c. was being used as a training force for 
loyalist paramilitaries . 13 
While in Ireland, McManus held extensive discussions with 
Sean McBride, a founder of Amnesty International and a 
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize as well as the Lenin Peace 
Prize. McBride agreed to become chairman of a new group called 
the Irish National Caucus of America Liaison (I.N.C.A.L.), 
which would be based in Dublin." The I.N.C.A.L.'s function was 
to provide information on Ulster to the caucus and Ad Hoc 
Committee. It would also publicize the activities of American 
republican groups to the Irish public. 
Prominent members of the I .N .C.A.L. included former Irish 
cabinet minister Kevin Boland, and Michael Mullen, General 
Secretary of the Irish Transport and General Worker's Union. 
Neil Blaney T.D. was also associated with the group and in 
December 1979 conducted a tour of America to promote the 
Caucus and Ad Hoc committee. 
The formation of the I.N.C.A.L. and the support given by 
these prominent Irish politicians gave added publicity and 
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prestige to republicans working in Washington. It increased 
the I.N.C.'s ability to receive information on Ireland and 
created a trans-Atlantic link through which alleged British 
human rights violations could be exposed. 
Undoubtedly, the most ambitious and optimistic initiative 
taken by the Ad Hoc Committee and the I.N.C. was the attempt 
to form a "peace forum" for Northern Ireland. In October 1978, 
a delegation composed of caucus officials and leaders of 
Irish-American societies met with Mario Biaggi. They 
suggested he could mastermind a peace forum on Ulster by 
calling on all the participants to come together and discuss 
their differences. The concept of this peace forum originated 
from Father Sean McManus and Fred Burns O'Brien. They 
envisioned Biaggi performing the role of "honest broker" 
between unionist and nationalist representatives. 
Biaggi was convinced the scheme could be successful. He 
agreed to lead the initiative and began exploring ways to 
bring Ulster's contending factions together. The congressman 
insisted that his motivation for taking on the role of 
mediator came from a humanitarian desire to try any scheme 
which might achieve peace in Northern Ireland. Some of 
Biaggi 's critics, however, contend he was swept up by the idea 
of emulating President Carter's recent success at the Camp 
David agreement between Egypt and Israel. They alleged his 
primary motivation was the prestige and political recognition 
a successful peace mission in Ulster could bring. 14 
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one of the main sources of hope that a peace forum could 
succeed was the growing politicization of Ulster loyalist 
groups, particularly the Ulster Defence Association. In the 
mid-1970s, loyalists began supporting the establishment of an 
independent Ulster. They envisaged an important role for the 
United States in this new political formula. Consequently, 
their traditional attitudes towards American involvement in 
the Ulster conflict changed radically. 
In the early 1970s, Ulster l~yalist groups had condemned 
American politicians and Irish-American groups who were active 
in supporting the nationalist cause. Both the Ulster Volunteer 
Force and U.D.A. 's newspapers attacked Irish-Americans as 
anti-Protestant bigots who were financing a war of genocide 
against them. They reserved particularly scorn for Senator 
Edward Kennedy and Paul O'Dwyer who were generally 
characterized as carrying a deep malicious hatred for Ulster 
loyalists. 
These verbal criticisms sometimes carried over into 
physical threats. ' When Congressman Lester Wolff visited 
Northern Ireland in 1972 he reported that a group of loyalists 
told him they would kill Ted Kennedy if he ever came to 
Belfast. 15 The u. v. F. also held news conferences at which 
they produced lists of Noraid members and warned the 
individuals concerned that they were legitimate targets for 
assassination. 16 
284 
Partly as an attempt to counteract Irish-American 
republican groups, loyalist organizations began establishing 
a support network across the Atlantic. They naturally 
concentrated on Canada where significant numbers of Ulster 
Protestants had emigrated in the 1950s and 1960s. In Toronto 
and nearby Hamilton, there were a number of Orange Lodges and 
social groups composed of Ulster exiles. The area became the 
center of the loyalist network in North America. A group 
called the Canadian Ulster Loyalist Association formed in 1971 
and began raising funds for the families of U.V.F. 
prisoners. 17 A Canadian branch of the U.D.A. also emerged and 
by 1975 had sent $30, ooo to the groups headquarters in 
Belfast. 
The U.V.F. and u.o.A. also organized gun-running networks 
based in Canada. The first evidence of this came in 1975 when 
British agents intercepted a cache of rifles and explosives on 
board a freighter which had sailed out of Nova Scotia. A 
leading official in the Canadian U.D.A. was later jailed for 
masterminding the scheme which was intended to provide his 
comrades in Belfast with continuous supplies of modern 
weapons. 18 
Although Ulster loyalists concentrated on building their 
overseas support network in Canada, they did establish a chain 
of contacts in the United States. In 1972, the u.o.A. command 
issued a statement alleging that American loyalists who .had 
fought in Vietnam were in Belfast training volunteers in 
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guerilla warfare. 1.9 This sparked of a series of exaggerated 
rumors that reached a peak when some Irish-American groups 
claimed members of the U.D.A. had undergone training by the Ku 
Klux Klan and survivalist groups in the southern United 
states . 20 
The most industrious loyalist supporter in the U.S. was 
Harold Alexander. He was born in Belfast in 1930, but 
emigrated to Philadelphia and became an American citizen in 
1969. In 1976, he founded an organization called the Alexander 
International Development Consultants aimed at promoting the 
loyalist cause in America. The group registered under the 
F.A.R.A. as the U.S. arm of the U.D.A •• Alexander also listed 
over ten other loyalist and unionist groups as his 
associates. 2 i 
Alexander and his wife were the only registered members 
of the group, yet from 1976 onwards they conducted a wide 
range of activities in support of Ulster loyalism. He appeared 
on television and radio to oppose Noraid spokesmen and .made 
contacts with politicians and government officials in 
Washington. Alexander also arranged American tours for 
prominent loyalists and made frequent visits to Northern 
Ireland to meet with U.D.A. and U.V.F. commanders. 22 The most 
important function he performed was publicizing the loyalist 
ideal of an independent Ulster. 
The concept of Ulster independence had its origins in the 
mid-1970s when the U .D.A. formed a "think tank'' to formulate 
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political policy. The group called itself the New Ulster 
Political Research Group (N.U.P.R.G.) and gradually proposed 
that Ulster should be an independent state. One of the major 
problems of independence was how the new state could survive 
economically. In an attempt to solve this problem, members of 
the N.U.P.R.G. went to Libya in 1974 in order to secure the 
promise of financial aid from Colonel Ghaddafi. 
This attempt to get Libyan financial assistance failed 
and, from 1975 onwards, the N.U.P.R.G. increasingly 
concentrated on the possibility of American aid. As the group 
developed the practical means for independence they emphasized 
an important role for the United States. The loyalists 
suggested that the political institutions of an independent 
Ulster should be modeled on America, with a President, a Bill 
of Rights, and a Congressional style committee system drawn 
from an elected legislature. Some even suggested that the 
United states could provide external defense and that the 
administration of justice could be supervised by a Supreme 
Court Judge. The N.U.P.R.G. felt that this provision would 
instill confidence in the legal system from both 
communities. 23 
From the key role proposed for the United States in their 
political scheme, the N.U.P.R.G. began to dilute their 
traditional aversion to the Irish-American dimension. Some 
felt that if contacts were made with Irish-American groups, 
such as the Irish National Caucus, they could win support in 
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congress for Ulster independence. Fortunately for the loyalist 
plan, the I.N.c. were concurrently contemplating the peace 
forum at which all sides in the Ulster conflict could come 
together to discuss their differences. The Caucus was thus 
receptive to the possibility of talks with the loyalists. 
After initial contacts were made, a group from the Ulster 
Independence Association, led by George Allport, met with Fred 
Burns O'Brien in Washington. The loyalists were enthusiastic 
about O'Brien's suggestion of a peace forum and both agreed it 
could be used to explore the conditions under which 
independence would be acceptable to nationalists. Later in the 
spring of 1978, Andy Tyrie, leader of the u.o.A., publicly 
supported the idea of a peace forum. In a complete reversal of 
earlier attitudes, he suggested Edward Kennedy would be a good 
mediator, because; 
we believe that Senator Kennedy is the one man 
who would be acceptable to both communities. 
He is a catholic, but the Protestant community 
believes in his integrity and credibility. 2 • 
Ted Kennedy declined the off er to mediate and said that 
negotiations were better left to the conflicting parties 
themselves. The cross-Atlantic contacts continued, however, 
and when Hamilton Fish and Joshua Eilberg were on their tour 
of Ireland in August 1978, they met leaders of the N.U.P.R.G. 
in Belfast. At this meeting u.o.A. commanders Andy Tyrie and 
John McMichael, along with Glen Barr, told the congressmen 
that they were tired of bein<:f manipulated by unionist 
politicians such as Ian Paisley. They outlined their proposal 
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for Ulster independence and said they were ready to sever the 
link with Britain. 25 
Throughout these discussions, Glen Barr, the N. U. P.R. G. 's 
most articulate spokesman, adopted a conciliatory tone. He 
attacked sectarian violence and continually emphasized that 
catholic rights would be guaranteed in an independent state. 
He also told the Congressmen his organization would welcome 
the opportunity to participate in a peace forum organized from 
America. 26 
Hamilton Fish and Joshua Eilberg were greatly impressed 
by the loyalist delegation and concluded that their proposal 
was "a most significant change and the best possibility of 
progress there has been for some time." The two politicians 
met with Mario Biaggi in Washington and convinced him that the 
N.U.P.R.G.s attitude; 
demonstrated clearly that the loyalist 
paramilitaries were disenchanted by continued 
British domination and were actually seeking a 
political solution by negotiation with the 
republican groups, independent of Britain. 27 
Encouraged by these reports, Biaggi decided to tr.ave! to 
Ireland and test support for a peace mission. In November 
1978, he and congressman Ben Gilman met with over twenty-five 
different groups. They were encouraged by the enthusiasm of 
the loyalist paramilitaries and received qualified support 
from Sinn Fein. When Biaggi returned to the United States he 
announced that the peace forum would convene in Washington on 
May 14, 1979. 
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Irish-American republican groups were divided in their 
attitude to the loyalist political program. Most of the 
leading figures in Noraid refused to accept negotiations with 
people they regarded as bigots and sectarian murderers. 
Others, principally members of the I.N.C., were very 
enthusiastic and wanted to explore the possibility of an 
independent Ulster. They were especially attracted by the 
loyalist willingness to cut their ties with Britain. 
Consequently, support grew for a·1oyalist tour of America so 
that the N.U.P.R.G. could discuss their political views and 
give impetus to Biaggi's peace forum. 
In December 1978, the Minnesota Irish National Caucus 
invited the N.U.P.R.G. to come to the United States. The group 
accepted, and on January 18, 1979, a loyalist delegation 
embarked on a two-week tour. The most prominent members of the 
group again included Glen Barr, Andy Tyrie, as well as Tommy 
Little and Harry Chicken. Harold Alexander organized their 
itinerary which consisted of a series of public lectures, 
discussions with political groups, and media appearances. 2• 
The tour was one of the most unusual events of the 
current troubles. The loyalists, noted for their traditional 
militancy and association with sectarian killings, impressed 
nearly everyone they met with their willingness to accommodate 
the aspirations of the nationalist community. The group held 
discussions about the status of Catholics in an independent 
Ulster with Archbishop Roche, Vice Chairman of the American 
290 





the N.U.P.R.G. for 
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One of the most unexpected supporters of the loyalist 
tour was Paul O'Dwyer. He and Liam Murphy of the A.O.H. hosted 
the N.U.P.R.G. a~leantion in New York and th~v nll became 
was so impressed by the loyalists that he provided them with 
free legal service to draft a constitution for an independent 
Ulster. The loyalist group published this constitution in a 
pamphlet entitled, Beyond the Religious Divide. It contained 
'NlduJ.y JH.t1 l.tH::!l1 l1y poJ LL.lcul 11nttlytJtH rtti d ti.lncere and 
thoughtful attempt to break the logjam of Ulster politics. 31 
The success of the loyalist tour, however, did not help 
the rising problems faced by the peace forum. Mario Biaggi had 
hoped to fund the forum with cash contributions from U.S. 
corporations and peace foundations. This money never 
materialized and Biaggi could not afford to bring the various 
Ulster groups to Washington. The peace initiative was also 
scuttled by the refusal of all constitutional parties to 
participate. British and Irish government officials plus the 
nationalist and unionist constitutional parties flatly refused 
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to get involved in discussions with "terrorists." Biaggi was 
therefore forced to postpone the initial meeting date of the 
peace conference. 
In the summer of 1979, Biaggi tried to get the American 
government involved, hoping that this would give the peace 
conference more legitimacy and thus attract the main unionist 
and nationalist parties. On August 7, he met with Jimmy Carter 
and tried to persuade him to take over the position of 
mediator. carter flatly refused·to get involved, realizing 
that such a move would contradict the wishes of both the 
British and Irish governments. 
Following Carter's negative reaction, Biaggi, in a last 
desperate attempt to save the peace initiative, decided to go 
to Northern Ireland and bring the conflicting groups together. 
He arrived in Belfast with a group of I.N.C. officials and 
immediately sent out invitations for all political factions to 
attend a conference in the Europa Hotel. The N.U.P.R.G. were 
the only loyalist group to attend, and continued to believe 
the meeting might further plans for Ulster independence. 32 
Although republicans were extremely skeptical of the 
initiative, Sinn Fein agreed to participate and sent 
Gerry Adams, Oaithi O'Connaill, and Ruairi O'Bradaigh as 
representatives. 
When the two delegations arrived at the Europa Hotel, 
they occupied separate conference rooms. Mario Bi~ggi 
attempted "shuttle diplomacy" between the groups and tried to 
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persuade them to call a ceasefire. Jack Holland contended that 
aiaggi was no Henry Kissinger. Despite four hours of moving 
between the republican and loyalist delegations, he achieved 
no aqreements • 33 
Apparently, the loyalists were quite flexible during the 
talks, but the republican delegation remained intransigent. 
Gerry Adams in particular was uninterested in constructive 
dialogue and completely refused Biaggi 's suggestion of an 
I.R.A. truce. The conference eventually disintegrated and hope 
for a Camp-David style settlement in Northern Ireland ended. 
The failure of Biaggi's peace forum was a serious blow 
. . 
for the N.U.P.R.G. It represented the end of American interest 
in their scheme for Ulster independence. Apart from this the 
group's ideals never received significant support within the 
unionist community. The vast majority there believed that an 
independent Ulster would be economically inviable and that 
breaking the link with Britain would only lead to eventual 
absorption by the Republic of Ireland. Independence remains a 
political option which attracts only minimal support. 
The collapse of peace negotiations also had detrimental 
consequences for Irish-American nationalism by exacerbating a 
conflict which had been festering between the I.N.C. and 
Noraid. When the Caucus formed in 1974, Father Sean McManus 
made clear that the group endorsed the "armed struggle" of the 
I.R.A •. He soon realized, however, that congressmen did not 
want to be associated with an organization which supported 
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violence in Ireland. Consequently, McManus began to deny that 
the Caucus had links with the I.R.A., refused to send funds to 
Ireland, and adopted the dove of peace as its emblem. In 1977, 
he told reporters: 
The I.N.C. has no connection whatsoever with. 
the I.R.A. or indeed with any other group in 
Ireland. We are an exclusively American based 
organization dedicated to the non-violent 
pursuit of human rights, justice and peace. 
The I.N.C. is logically and necessarily 
opposed to British policy in Ireland because 
the British government historically, 
currently, and par exc~llence uses violence to 
achieve political objectives. But the caucus 
is opposed to all forms of violence whether it 
be British or Irish, state or civilian. The 
Caucus believes totally in the philosophy of 
non-violence. 34 
Noraid was incensed by this shift within the Caucus. The 
group accused the I.N.C. of hypocrisy because it was making 
money by appealing to Irish-American sympathy for the for 
Ulster Catholics yet was sending no money to alleviate their 
suffering. Personal animosities also grew between McManus and 
Michael Flannery who was incensed by what he called I.N.C. 
attempts to encroach on Noraid fund-raising. In 1978, just 
before the annual Noraid dinner, McManus organized his own 
function and began soliciting republican supporters for $25 
donations. Flannery strongly condemned this action, believing 
it reduced potential donations which Noraid would have 
collected.~ 
Noraid leaders also condemned the Caucus for maintaining 
dialogue with Ulster loyalists. After Fred Burns O'Brien met 
leaders of the Ulster Independence Association in 1977, 
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Michael Flannery accused him of being an agent for the 
American government. The Noraid chief conveyed this suspicion 
to Provisional Sinn Fein in Belfast which then issued a 
statement accusing Burns O'Brien of scheming with the C.I.A. 
to undermine Irish-American groups. They declared him persona 
non grata with the republican movement and warned to keep out 
of Ireland. 36 
Fred Burns O'Brien immediately denied the accusations 
against him. He was supported by Fr. Sean McManus, who issued 
a statement condemning the Sinn Fein allegations. This 
conflict with the leadership of the republican movement in 
Ireland alarmed some members of the caucus who had opposed 
McManus's more moderate line. Irish National Caucus chapters 
in New Jersey, Illinois, Connecticut and Pennsylvania 
condemned the central leadership in Washington. These chapters 
attacked the discussions with Ulster loyalist groups and 
eventually broke away to form independent organizations. 37 
The feud between Sinn Fein, Noraid and the Caucus 
increased after the failure of the "peace forum" conference at 
the Europa Hotel in 1979. The I.N.C. accused the republican 
delegation of inflexibility and issued an article in ~ 
Andersonstown News attacking Sinn Fein for wrecking "a great 
opportunity for political progress. 113• 
Sinn Fein quickly responded by accusing the Caucus of 
furthering the aims of British propaganda. Gerry Adams stated 
that because the peace forum did not include British 
295 
officials, it gave credence to the perception that the Ulster 
conflict was purely sectarian. An article in 
fhoblacht/Republican News outlined this view and concluded: 
The British government for the last decade has 
justified its presence in the six counties as 
one of security forces keeping religious 
communities apart. For republicans to sit down 
and talk with loyalists (in a peace forum 
which by def ini ti on means a meeting of the 
antagonists) positively helps the British in 
projecting their role as a peace keeping force 
instead of an occupation force. 39 · 
Noraid fully supported Sinn.Fein and intensified its own 
condemnations of the caucus. In October 1979, a series of 
articles ap~eared in The Irish People which personally 
attacked Fr. Sean McManus and accused the caucus of fomenting 
divisions within the republican network in America.'0 
J 
Journalists~reporting on the conflict between Noraid and 
the Caucus concluded the feud had detrimental affects on 
American republicanism. Bernard Weinraub produced an extensive 
analysis of the split in which he supported the contentions of 
Irish government officials that fund-raising for republican 
groups had been seriously impaired. Republican publicity 
efforts also declined as Noraid and the caucus devoted their 
energies to mutual criticism. Weintraub concluded that despite 
the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, republicanism in 
America was in total disarray by the beginning of the 
1980s. 41 
Apart from the adverse effects of internal squabbling, 
American republicanism also continued to suffer from the 
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actions of the I .R.A .. Between 1977 and 1978, the Provisionals 
began a series of fire bomb attacks. Some analysts alleged 
that this campaign was launched because of the decline in 
Irish-American funding. The I.R.A. could not afford to buy 
large amounts of explosives so they switched to incendiary 
devices. These only required a small amount of explosives 
attached to a can of petrol. When the device exploded, it sent 
a ball of fire bursting into the target. 
In February 1978, the I.R.A. detonated a fire bomb such 
as this at the La Mon House Hotel near Comber, County Down. 
The bar was packed with people who were engulfed in a sheet of 
blazing petrol. The explosion killed twelve people while 
twenty-three received appalling burns. The incident produced 
front page reports in the main American newspapers and 
editorials describing the I.R.A. as "savage monsters." N.B.C. 
television news broadcast pictures of the charred remains of 
victims and implied this was the consequence of money donated 
to Noraid. 42 
In 1979, republicans also launched a series of attacks on 
British politicians and members of the "establishment." In 
March, an I.R.A. team assassinated Sir Richard Sykes, the 
British ambassador to Holland. Eight days later, the I.N.L.A. 
planted a bomb which killed Airey Neave, Conservative Party 
spokesman on Northern Ireland, as he drove out of the House of 
Commons parking lot. These killings increased American 
criticisms of Irish republicanism, but the condemnations 
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reached unprecedented levels after the attack on 
Lord Louis Mountbatten. 
On August 27, 1979, the I .R.A. detonated a bomb on 
Mountbatten's fishing boat off the west coast of Ireland. The 
explosion killed Mountbatten, his grandson Nicholas and a 
local boat boy. The elderly dowager Lady Bradbourne, a 
passenger on the boat, died of her injuries the next day while 
Lord and Lady Bradbourne were both seriously injured. 43• 
The killing of Lord Mountbatten created an.international 
wave of revulsion against the I.R.A •• The attack was seen as 
particularly callous against a figure whose long and 
distinguished military career had never brought him near 
Ireland. During the Second World War, many American troops had 
served under Mountbatten and he had earned the admiration and 
respect of many. Throughout · the United States, the attack 
became the primary news item and hundreds of editorials 
described the I .R.A. as everything from "fanatical terrorists" 
to "psychopathic murderers."'' Typical of the response in the 
United States media was the commentary given by The Atlanta 
Constitution: 
It is tempting to de.scribe the I .R.A. 
terrorists who killed Lord Mountbatten as 
animals, but that's demeaning to animals. It 
would be more accurate to describe them as 
savages, but at least savages can be excused 
because of ignorance • • • It is a terrible 
shame that a man of such talents and 
achievements can be killed by cowards so low. 
They are truly the dregs of humanity. 45 
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Irish-American republicans responded to this universal 
condemnation of the I.R.A. in the media by issuing statements 
justifying the attack. They said the killing was justified 
because Mountbatten was a member of the British ruling class. 
Typical of these was the reaction of Noraid spokesman Tom 
Duffy: 
The I.R.A. is waging a war on behalf of the 
Irish nation. All members of the enemy are 
legitimate targets ..• I think the killing -
not the murder - was just part of the war that 
is going on. He should not be more immune than 
anyone else. We wonder why the sympathy and 
tears are so selective. They worry about a 79-
year old man, but they haven't said a word 
about all the young Irish people that have 
been killed over the years.'6 
These statements by republicans did not change the 
American media perception of the Mountbatten killing. On the 
contrary, a number of newspapers attacked Noraid's "callous 
view" of the killing and issued editorials urging Irish-
Americans not to fund the group. Many newspapers also appealed 
to the Carter administration to clamp down on I.R.A. 
gunrunning. 47 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to Irish-American 
republican groups in this period, apart from the extremely 
adverse publicity in the media and their own internal 
conflicts, was their continued harassment by constitutional 
nationalists. The Four Horsemen continued their work against 
Noraid and the I. N. c. These politicians further increased 
their prestige by persuading the British to launch new policy 
initiatives in Ulster. 
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In Ireland, constitutional nationalists also maintained 
their attacks on Irish-American republicanism. Following the 
formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Irish government and 
s.o.L.P. condemned Mario Biaggi and accused him of giving 
encouragement to the I .R.A .• In February 1978, Irish Taoiseach 
Jack Lynch sent a much publicized open letter to Biaggi. 
Lynch attacked the Congressman for his "public identification 
with supporters of violence in Ireland" and strongly condemned 
the Irish National Caucus. This letter was sent to every 
member of Congress in the hope that it would discourage 
membership of the Ad Hoc Committee. Lynch also wanted to 
embarrass Biaggi in the American media. Jack Holland claimed 
that this objective was particularly successful and concluded: 
Edi tori al after editorial poured scorn and 
derision on the Bronx politician for thinking 
he knew anything about Northern Ireland. He 
was generally held up to ridicule as a dupe of 
clever pro-I.R.A. manipulators or abused as a 
cynical politician playing for Irish-American 
votes. 48 
The Lynch administration launched similar attacks on the 
republican network in America from 1978 onwards. The Irish 
Foreign Minister, Michael O'Kennedy, persistently attacked 
Noraid while members of the Irish diplomatic corps worked to 
isolate the Ad Hoc Committee in Congress. Irish officials also 
kept linki~g the I.N.C. with support for violence, despite the 
group's continued claims to the contrary. 49 
The Irish government further strengthened its links with 
constitutional nationalists in America. It assisted the Four 
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Horsemen in their condemnations of republican groups. Irish 
diplomats encouraged these leading Irish-American politicians 
to pressure the British government into political change. 
Eventually this activity produced results which enhanced the 
prestige and influence of the "Big Four" and eclipsed the 
relatively unsuccessful attempts of republicans to influence 
political events in Ulster. 
After their 1977 St. Patrick's Day statement, the Four 
Horsemen had fully expected the British government to launch 
a new political initiative in Northern Ireland. They believed 
they had made a bold and imaginative move in attacking the 
republican network in America and felt they deserved a reward. 
What they wanted was a renewed effort by the British to 
construct a political framework which would give the 
nationalist community real power. 50 
Although the British government warmly welcomed the 1977 
St. Patrick's Day statement, it did not want to take any new 
political initiatives in Ulster. The dismal failure of the 
constitutional convention in 1976 had convinced the Callaghan 
administration that the best way to govern the province was to 
continue direct rule for an indefinite period. The British had 
also introduced the twin policies of Ulsterization and 
Criminalization and believed their success depended on a long 
period of political stability. 51 They therefore opposed new 
political initiatives which would be likely to increase 
conflict and tension in Ulster. 
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British Secretary of State Roy Mason, therefore, made no 
further attempts to reach a political agreement in Northern 
Ireland. In contrast, the Four Horsemen felt that a new 
political initiative was the minimum reward they deserved for 
attacking American republicanism. When the "Big Four" realized 
that the British were not going to make any major move in 
Ulster, they became increasingly critical of the Callaghan 
administration. Their growing anger and frustration was 
compounded by a series of official reports in 1978 which 
confirmed the British had committed a series of human rights 
violations in the province. 
The origins of these official reports dated back to 
December 1971, when the Irish government had filed complaints 
with the European commission on Human Rights. The complaints 
alleged that British troops had used five illegal 
interrogation techniques on internees. The five methods 
consisted of a series of sensory deprivation techniques, which 
included exposing suspects to continuous "white noise" and 
covering their heads with black hoods for extended periods of 
time. In September 1977, the European Court on Human Rights 
found Britain guilty. The judges concluded that the five 
techniques, while not constituting torture, were "inhuman and 
degrading." 
The leaders of constitutional nationalism in America 
responded to the verdict of the European court and the lack of 
political activity in Ulster by sharply criticizing the 
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British in their 1978 St. Patrick's Day statement. Fourteen 
major politicians including Senators Joe Biden, Gary Hart, 
George McGovern and Congressman Tom Foley, joined the Four 
Horsemen in their condemnation. The joint statement continued 
to criticize Irish-Americans who supported the I.R.A., but 
also attacked the British government and unionists for 
blocking political progress. 52 
The criticisms of British political inactivity in Ulster 
increased throughout 1978. Tip O'Neill, speaking at an Ireland 
Fund dinner in May, alleged that the Callaghan 
administration's lack of commitment to a political settlement 
was contributing to the continued death and destruction in 
Northern Ireland. 53 Senator Edward Kennedy concentrated on 
the abuse of human rights and on June 11 called for the 
appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations 
of brutality by the R. U. C. 54 Hugh Carey showed his 
displeasure at British policy by refusing to attend a dinner 
honoring Prime Minister Callaghan in New York. 55 
In December 1978, Senator Daniel Moynihan traveled to 
London in an attempt to assess the effects of this increased 
criticism on British officials. He met with Roy Mason and 
Foreign Secretary David owen. The Senator told them that the 
campaign of constitutional nationalists against republican 
groups in America would be ineffective unless there was 
political progress in Ulster. Mason and owen explained that a 
new political initiative, in a situation in which there was no 
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basis for consent, would only make the problem worse and 
intensify violence. This casual attitude infuriated Moynihan 
who told reporters: 
I came away absolutely dazed; he (Mason) had 
no intention of doing anything about Northern 
Ireland except keeping British troops there. 
The question of Northern Ireland never ever 
came up at conferences of the two leading 
British political parties. There is no 
political will to settle. 56 
When Moynihan returned to the United States, he gave 
details of the London meeting to his constitutional 
nationalist colleagues. They were similarly outraged at the 
British attitude and determined to increase their efforts for 
a political initiative in 1979. Their resolve was further 
heightened by the continued evidence exposing misconduct by 
Ulster's security forces.~ 
In the summer of 1978, Amnesty International conducted an 
inquiry into allegations of police brutality during the 
interrogation of terrorist suspects. The Amnesty report 
provided strong evidence of seventy-eight cases in which 
suspects suffered serious physical injury while being held at 
Castlereagh Interrogation Center. 
The British government responded to these findings by 
calling an independent inquiry to examine interrogation 
procedures. Harry Bennett, an English crown Court Judge, led 
the investigation in early March 1979. The subsequent Bennett 
Report confirme~ ~nat R.U.C. detectives physically mistreated 
terrorist susp~.ct:s during questioning and recommended the 
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installation of closed-circuit televisions to monitor 
interrogations. The report also called for regular physical 
examinations to be carried out on suspects in order to detect 
physical abuse. 
The Bennett Report's findings of R.U.C. misconduct 
contributed to the severity of criticisms contained within the 
1979 St. Patrick's Day statement by the Four Horsemen. The 
message accused the British government of "negligence" and 
"acquiescence" in the face of ,,gross violations of human 
rights" and called for a more extensive investigation into the 
ill-treatment of suspects. It renewed the demand for a fresh 
political initiative in Ulster and received full endorsement 
from Irish Foreign Minister Michael O'Kennedy. 58 
John Hume encouraged the Four Horsemen to increase their 
pressure on the British government and suggested to Tip 
O'Neill that he could lead a political delegation to Ireland. 
Hume felt that such a trip, timed to coincide with the British 
general elections in April, could convince both the 
Conservative and Labour parties to give more consideration to 
a political solution .in Northern Ireland. 59 
Tip O'Neill, convinced by Hume's suggestion, led a 
delegation of fourteen leading Democrats and Republicans to 
Ireland in the Spring of 1979. O'Neill held discussions with 
leaders of the s. D. L. P. , and also with Harry West of the 
Official Unionists and Ian Paisley. He was reportedly very 
impressed by the sincerity of the two Unionist leaders and the 
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talks increased his optimism about the success of new attempts 
to establish political dialogue. 
O'Neill also traveled to London to meet leaders of the 
main political parties. Al though Prime Minister Callaghan 
suggested there might be a new Ulster initiative if the 
political climate changed, O'Neill felt there was no real 
intent for such a move. He was further infuriated by a 
political deal Callaghan had reached with the Unionist M.P.s 
at Westminster. The Prime Min-ister, leading a minority 
government, had agreed to increase Unionist representation in 
exchange for continued support of Labour policies in the House 
of Commons. 
O'Neill condemned the Labor/Unionist deal and accused 
both British parties of using Ulster as a "political 
football." On April 20, ·he issued his strongest attack on 
British policy and stated: 
I have been deeply concerned by the lack of 
political progress in Northern Ireland over 
the last few years ..• together with all sides 
in Ireland we insist that Britain bears a 
heavy responsibility for the failures of 
recent years on the political front. We have 
been concerned that the problem has been 
treated as a political football in London or 
has otherwise been given a low priority ••• we 
insist on an early, realistic and fresh 
initiative on the part of the incoming British 
government, so as to get negotiations moving 
quickly. 60 
This statement caused an immediate political controversy 
in Britain. Shirley Williams, the Education Secretary, and 
former Prime Minister Harold Wilson attacked Irish-Americans 
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for their ignorance of the Ulster conflict. Margaret Thatcher 
re-emphasized these criticisms while Robert Adley 
condescendingly observed, "There are few more nauseating 
sounds than ignorant Irish-American politicians visiting 
Dublin and grubbing around for votes in the United States by 
venting their spleen on Britain."61 
British television and newspapers carried O'Neill's 
remarks as the lead story on April 20, 1979. The major 
tabloids ran banner headlines advising the House Speaker to 
"Keep Your Nose out of British Affairs!" The "quality press" 
issued editorials which were equally abrupt. The Daily 
Telegraph commented: 
Mr. O'Neill's observations were both brief and 
confused, and probably intended primarily for 
the Irish electorate in America, but Americans 
would be best . advised to do their 
electioneering at home What makes Mr. 
O'Neill's speech a scandal rather than a 
trivial impertinence is the effect which it is 
likely to produce in Ulster itself. There it 
will both encourage the I.R.A. in its new 
campaign of murder and harden Protestant 
militancy. 62 
This critical reaction from British politicians and the 
media was strongly condemned by constitutional nationalists in 
Ireland. Both the Irish government and s.D.L.P. defended 
O'Neill. Garret FitzGerald sent a widely publicized letter to 
The Daily Telegraph describing him as; 
a man of outstanding political courage 
and statesmanship. A man who has shown 
that his only concern with our affairs is 
to work for peace, regardless of what it 
may cost him in votes from Irish-American 
extremists. 63 
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On April 22, Vice-President Walter Mondale met with Irish 
Foreign Minister O'Kennedy in Washington. After hearing 
O'Kennedy's views, Mondale defended Tip O'Neill and said the 
House Speaker had acted out of a genuine concern felt at the 
highest levels of the United States government about what was 
happening in Northern Ireland. Michael O'Kennedy implied that 
Jimmy Carter fully supported O'Neill's remarks. One day ;later, 
however, White House aides distanced the President from the 
controversy and said the House Speaker's remarks did not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Carter administration. 6 ' 
Hugh Carey delivered the strongest reaction to the 
British attacks on Tip O'Neill. The New York governor issued 
a joint article with Dr. Kevin Cahill, his adviser on Northern 
Ireland. The article appeared in major newspapers throughout 
America and defended O'Neill's remarks. It re-emphasized the 
call for a new political initiative and proposed that if 
Britain refused to act it should be made an "international 
outcast" and the United States should impose economic 
sanctions: 
If political encouragement and financial 
incentives do not succeed in strengthening 
Britain's willingness to initiate moves 
towards peace, then the American congress 
should seriously consider applying the same 
economic sanctions that are employed against 
Rhodesia, Russia, and other nations for 
violations of human rights. 65 
Despite this American pressure, the new British 
government, now headed by Margaret Thatcher, gave no 
308 
indications that it would change the Ulster policy that had 
been followed by the Callaghan administration. Constitutional 
nationalists, therefore, re-doubled their efforts. In May 
1979, Taoiseach Jack Lynch met Margaret Thatcher in London and 
expressed his strong desire for a fresh political move. In 
America, Senator Kennedy qave an extensive interview to ~ 
Belfast Telegraph in which he re-emphasized that the American 
government would give extensive financial aid to support an 
agreed political framework in Northern Ireland. He also warned 
that if a new political initiative was not taken, this would 
strengthen republican groups in America and undermine the 
ability of the Four Horsemen to block funding for the I.R.A •• 
He said that the lack of political progress in Ulster; 
makes it more difficult for the moderate 
forces and voices that have spoken and 
condemned the kind of support that Noraid has 
provided in search of a more violent solution. 
It makes our job more difficult. The Speaker 
is representing the moderates, and we are 
having difficulty in holding a consensus. I 
personally feel extremely strong about the 
need to condemn violence and terror. But our 
ability to influence and convince people that 
there is a better way would be diminished if 
nothing happens. 66 
Daniel Moynihan re-emphasized Kennedy's argument in an 
interview with B.B.C. television on June 2, 1979. He denounced 
the I .R.A. as "a band of sadistic murderers" but told 
reporters that the U.S. wanted a united Ireland and would not 
be "endlessly patient" in waiting for this. He also accused 
the British government of abusing the successful efforts of 
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the Four Horsemen against I.R.A. fund-raising in America, by 
adopting a complacent attitude to the Ulster problem. 67 
The Thatcher government reacted to these renewed 
criticisms with the traditional off-hand dismissals of Irish-
American ignorance about Ulster. surprisingly, Dr. Conn9r 
cruise o' Brien supported the British response. The former 
Irish cabinet minister wrote an open letter to Daniel Moynihan 
which appeared in the American press. o' Brien stated that 
Irish-American pressure would achieve nothing except make 
Unionists more intransigent and encourage the I .R.A.. He 
further issued a strong personal attack on Moynihan's lack of 
knowledge about Ulster and accused him of being motivated by 
an "ethnic anglophobia:" 
When you and I last talked about Ireland, it 
struck me that you knew little about the 
subject. But iri your manner, as we talked of 
Ireland, there was something odd: a vague, 
muffled stubborn certainty ••• Where does that 
certainty come from? Not from study, nor from 
personal experience. But it comes easily from 
the level of the mind which is dominated by 
the confident intuitions of ethnic tradition 
.•• (Which has) taken over your own thinking 
process. And even more unfortunately, your 
speaking process. 68 
This letter led to an exchange of critic isms between 
O'Brien and the Four Horsemen in the press and in periodical 
journals. The conflict grew so intense that Tip O'Neill was 
reported as describing the former minister as "a silly son of 
a bitch. 1169 Although members of the Irish government and 
S.O.L.P. did not articulate similar opinions in public, they 
made it clear that they fully welcomed Irish-American 
310 
political support. John Hume published an article in Foreign 
Affairs in which he criticized O'Brien's views and pointed 
out: 
The support for violence from the United 
States has been contained and has in fact 
dropped. That this should have been maintained 
during the past years of political vacuum in 
Northern Ireland is an extraordinary 
achievement. There are many men, women and 
children who are alive today, I am convinced, 
because of the political courage and concer~ 
of these men (Four Horsemen) . 70 
Constitutional nationalists qrew increasingly frustrated 
by the lack of British response to their calls for political 
change. The Four Horsemen eventually concluded that the only 
way their appeals would be given serious consideration was to 
take punitive measures. The opportunity for such action 
presented itself in the summer of 1979. 
Since the early 1970s, the Royal Ulster Constabulary had 
purchased a significant number of weapons from American arms 
manufacturers. In 1979, the R.U.c. placed an order for 3,000 
.357 Magnum handguns and 500 rifles with the Connecticut arms 
manufacturers, Sturm, Ruger and Company. Following previous 
government policy, the United States State Department had 
permitted the sale of arms to the police in Northern Ireland. 
The Irish National caucus received information about this 
arms shipment and Fr. Sean McManus pushed Mario Biagqi to 
reverse State Department policy. Biaggi attacked the arms sale 
on two grounds. He contended that by permittinq the sale of 
United States weapons to the R.U.C., the state Department was 
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supporting one particular faction in Northern Ireland and 
could not claim its policy was neutral and impartial. The 
Bronx Congressman also pointed out that both Amnesty 
International and the European Court had found the R.u.c. 
guilty of human rights abuses. He contended that it would be 
a massive contradiction for the Carter administration to claim 
its foreign policy was guided by a desire to protect "human 
rights, " yet supply weapons to a proven violator. Biaggi 
announced that when the annual Appropriations Bill for the 
Department of State came through Congress in July, he would 
sponsor an amendment designed to halt further weapons sales to 
the Ulster police. 71 
In June, Tip O'Neill issued a statement in which he 
supported the ban on sale of arms to the R.U.c •. He hoped that 
the threat of his support for such an amendment would persuade 
the Thatcher government to take the call for a new political 
initiative seriously. Instead, the new Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, Humphrey Atkins, condemned O'Neill as 
irresponsible in criticizing the sale of weapons which the 
R.U.c. would use "to defend the community and themselves from 
attacks by mindless assassins." In Washington, deputy British 
Ambassador Peter Jay, met with O'Neill and conveyed his 
government's regret and displeasure at the Speaker's 
remarks. 72 
When the state Department Appropriations Bill came before 
Congress on July 12, 1979, Biaggi proposed his amendment. 
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After a short debate, the House voted in support of Biaggi and 
in early August, the State Department announced it would 
suspend its license for arms sales to the R.U.C., pending a 
review of policy. Tip O'Neill played a vital role in this 
.decision. He could have easily blocked Biaggi's amendment. As 
speaker of the House, he controlled the flow of legislation on 
the floor of Congress. But on this occasion, he did not 
intervene. Instead he chose to let the amendment carry as an 
indication to the British government of the kinds of problems 
it could expect if calls for a fresh move on Northern Ireland 
continued to be met with derision and ignored. 
The State Department had supported the sale of guns to 
the R.U.C. and traditionally maintained a pro-British policy. 
Because the Carter administration was facing internal 
criticism at home and from Congress, Tip O'Neill's power was 
elevated. Carter relied on the Speaker's support to get 
legislation through Congress and he could not afford to 
criticize such a powerful and essential ally. Considering 
these factors, the administration felt the need to maintain 
good relations with O'Neill was more important than the risk 
of offending the British. Therefore, the R.U.C. arms sales 
were suspended. 73 
In America, Irish-American weekly newspapers from 
New York to San Francisco all hailed the arms suspension as a 
great victory and editorial comments in the metropolitan and 
national newspapers was generally favorable. The New York 
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'.times criticized the suspension while The Washington Post 
gave .it tacit support. The Chicago Tribune issued strong 
praise for the decision: 
When Tip O'Neill criticized the State 
Department for licensing sales of weapons to 
the police in Northern Ireland he was exactly 
right. The sales should be stopped immediately 
If the R. u. c. really needs the weapons 
[and we question the wisdom of introducing 
3,000 handguns and 500 automatic rifles to an 
already over-armed environment] there ar~ 
plenty of other countries that can provide 
them [other than America]. 74 
In Northern Ireland, the reaction from Unionists was 
swift and hostile. On August 2, Ian Paisley delivered a strong 
protest to the American Ambassador in London, while Alan 
wright, Chairman of the Northern Ireland Police Federation, 
accused the Carter administration of "tacitly supporting 
terrorism in Northern Ireland. 11711 The Belfast NewsLetter ran 
an editorial which attacked the conduct of United States 
police forces and described the R. U. c. as one of the most 
professional in the world. It claimed the state Department not 
only "denied arms to the force that keeps this country in some 
semblance of order, but also gave an almighty boost to the 
killers. A powerful propaganda weapon has been placed in their 
hands. 1176 
In Britain, these attacks were echoed by an assortment of 
Conservative M.P.s, including Mrs. Jill Knight and Mr. John 
Stokes. Among government ministers and those directly involved 
With Northern Ireland, however, reaction was 





profound shock and brought home the power of the Irish-
American lobby. Humphrey Atkins refrained from the customary 
attacks on the Four Horsemen and down played the arms ban. He 
said that the R.U.C. had no pressing need for new weapons and 
in the future they could be obtained from other countries. 
British Defense Minister Francis Pym, a former Northern 
Ireland Secretary, supported Atkins' restrained reaction. He 
said that the efforts of Irish-American politicians had been 
misinterpreted in Britain and their concern for Ireland was 
positive and genuine. Merlyn Rees, another former Ulster 
Secretary, supported Pym and praised the Four Horsemen for 
their work against the I .R.A. network in America. Almost 
immediately, the British press interpreted this changed 
attitude as indicative that the government had yielded to 
Irish-American intimidation and was about to make new 
political moves in Ulster. The Daily Telegraph warned: 
The government should realize, before it is 
too late, that any proposal for Ulster bearing 
the marks of American sponsorship, would be 
foredoomed to failure, the price of which 
might well be counted in the lives of U. K. 
soldiers and civilians." 
A further indication of the shift in British policy came 
just five days after the R.U.C. arms ban. Hugh Carey, on his 
way back from vacation in Europe, met with Humphrey Atkins in 
London. There were reports that Carey was accompanied by a 
State Department official at this meeting and they discussed 
the possibility of holding a peace conference in New York. 
Atkins said he would consider the proposal but maintained that 
315 
Ulster's political future could not be negotiated. When Carey 
returned to New York, he announced he would host talks between 
Atkins and Irish Foreign Minister O'Kennedy in September and 
said he had received strong indications that the Thatcher 
government would make significant policy changes in Ulster. 7 • 
In Britain, while some newspapers and political 
commentators dismissed the "Carey initiative", others reacted 
quite positively. The Guardian, for example, ran an editorial 
which concluded: 
Humphrey Atkins should follow his first 
thought and accept Hugh Carey's invitation to 
take part in informal talks, in New York, on 
the future of Northern Ireland. He should not 
be deterred by the mist of diplomatic protocol 
and Anglo-Irish suspicion which have swiftly 
enveloped the Governor's suggestion. 79 
Throughout August, press speculation about the proposed 
"Carey initiative" increased as Edward Kennedy, Tip O'Neill 
and the Irish government gave their support. On August 21, A. 
Mcilroy, New York correspondent for The Daily Telegraph, 
reported that "an authoritive American diplomatic source" told 
him that there were extensive unofficial consultations between 
Whitehall and Dublin over the agenda of the New York talks. 
Mcilroy claimed the main elements of the discussions would be 
the prospect for political progress in Ulster; an exchange of 
views on cross-border economic cooperation; and joint measures 
to combat the I.R.A. 80 
It appears, however, that these discussions between 
British and Irish officials collapsed because of the 
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opposition of Margaret Thatcher. She discussed the feasibility 
of the Carey initiative with Humphrey Atkins, but remained 
unconvinced the exercise could produce significant benefits. 
consequently, Atkins wrote to Carey on August 23, and said he 
would not be attending the proposed discussions. He was 
careful , however, to praise the Governor for his actions 
against I .R.A. fund-raising and wrote that he found their 
meeting in London, "invaluable and enjoyable and looked 
forward to seeing him again. 11111 
The fact that the British government was even prepared to 
contemplate talks in New York is indicative of the changed 
perception of Irish-American involvement in the Ulster 
question. Many political analysts agree that the R.U.C. arms 
ban brought home to the Thatcher administration the power of 
the Four Horsemen and indicated the potential trouble they 
could cause in Washington. British officials also feared that 
if they did not respond to the Irish-American lobby, they 
would exploit the Ulster issue in the upcoming presidential 
race. 82 
Constitutional nationalists did not attack Atkins' 
refusal to go to New York because they felt the British were 
on the verge of making a major political initiative in Ulster. 
Their expectations were realized on October 25, 1979, when 
Atkins announced he would convene discussions aimed at finding 
consent among Ulster's political parties. Most significantly, 
the Northern Ireland secretary chose to disclose details of 
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the new initiative before the Association of American 
correspondents in London. 
At this press conference, Atkins lavished high praise on 
President Carter and the Four Horsemen for steering the flow 
of Irish-American money away from the I .R.A.. He appealed 
directly to the Irish-American leaders for more understanding 
of the British position and asked for their assistance in 
encouraging political dialogue in Ulster: 
I hope that as a result of speaking to this 
audience today more awareness will be 
forthcoming in the United States and that will 
in turn temper the attitudes and utterances of 
some people and groups there who in their 
profound ignorance of the situation only play 
into the hands of an outcast terrorist 
organization whose aim is to destroy the 
democratic structure of government in Ireland 
and replace it with a distinctively Marxist 
oriented regime. 83 
In New York, the British Information Service quickly 
issued copies of the Atkins address to the media. On November 
12, Margaret Thatcher gave an extensive interview to The New 
York Times in which she further elaborated on the new 
political initiative. Sean Cronin reported that the U.S. State 
Department was very enthusiastic about the change in British 
policy and said it would be most pleased if the discussions 
produced an agreement. 84 
In late October, the British issued a White Paper on the 
new initiative. It excluded from consideration either the 
Stormont system or the sunningdale formula. Discussion of the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland was also ruled out. 
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Within these parameters, the main political parties were free 
to consider any arrangements for the devolution of power from 
Westminster. The White Paper described the task of the 
conference as being "to establish the highest level of 
agreement." 
Ironically, in view of the role played by John Hume in 
working for the initiative, there was initial confusion about 
whether the S.D.L.P. would participate in it. Internal party 
divisions led to the resignation-of Gerry_Fitt as leader. He 
was succeeded by John Hume and in December the party 
eventually agreed to take part in the conference. Atkins also 
persuaded the D. U. P. and Alliance parties to attend, but 
failed to secure the cooperation of the Official Unionists. 
The first session of the Atkins conference took place on 
January 7, 1980, and the ·last on April 18. By the end of 
January, it was clear that very little basis for agreement 
existed among the parties. The Four Horsemen were somewhat 
disappointed that the British did not force the Unionists into 
some form of cooperation. This disappointment, however, did 
not quench their conviction that they had succeeded in forcing 
the British to do something in Ulster. 85 
Analysts of the Atkins initiative almost universally 
agree that American pressure was the key element finally 
pushing the British into action. One of the strongest 
proponents of this view is Adrian Guelke who concluded: 
While the evidence of the role of the American 
connection is largely circumstantial, no other 
factor loomed as large in analysis of the 
initiative and it seems reasonable to conclude 
that American pressure was the main reason for 
the initiative. 86 
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Despite the eventual failure of the Atkins conference, 
the Four Horsemen saw their campaign as a major success. They 
fully believed that for the first time in the present 
"troubles," Irish-American political pressure had actually 
been instrumental in changing British policy. The Big Four 
could now give a concrete example of the influence of 
constitutional agi ta ti on and persuade Irish-Americans that 
theirs was the only way to achieve real political change in 
Ireland. 
In the summer of 1980, the leaders of constitutional 
nationalism in America were again able to demonstrate their 
power and ability to influence Irish politics. On July 8, an 
article in The Washington Star reported that the new Irish 
government of Charles Haughey was planning to remove Sean 
Donlon as the Ambassador in America. Political analysts in 
Ireland suggested the move was part of a change in policy by 
the Taoiseach designed to win support among the militant 
nationalist elements in Fianna Fail. 
Haughey especially wanted to cement an alliance with Neil 
Blaney T. D. . In 19 7 9, Blaney had toured the United States 
Under the sponsorship of the Irish National Caucus. During the 
trip, he launched a series of attacks on Sean Donlon because 
of his constant attempts to undermine the Ad Hoc committee. 
Donlon, since his appointment as Ambassador in 1978, had 
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continued to lead a sustained campaign against republican 
groups in America. When Blaney returned to Ireland he began 
pushing Haughey for Donlon's removal. 87 
Reports of this deal between Haughey and Blaney initiated 
a series of criticisms from Irish politicians. John Hume and 
Garret Fi tzGerald both called the move a classic piece of 
political opportunism which would weaken constitutional 
nationalism in America. When the Four Horsemen heard of 
Haughey's proposed action, they each issued statements 
praising Donlon for his invaluable work in promoting 
constitutional nationalism in America. 
Tip O'Neill and Edward Kennedy contacted John Hume and 
William Shannon, the American Ambassador to Ireland. They 
instructed both men to convey their extreme displeasure to 
Haughey. 811 Later, O'Neill and Kennedy telephoned the 
Taoiseach and said they would not cooperate with his 
administration if Donlon was removed from Washington.•9 
Haughey, faced with this intense pressure from America, backed 
down. On July 9, he met with his cabinet and announced Donlon 
would remain as the Irish Ambassador. Brian Lenihan, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, further stated that there would 
be no major changes in the government's policy towards 
Northern Ireland. 90 
Reports immediately circulated that the Four Horsemen had 
reversed Haughey's decision to remove Donlon, and their 
intervention received praise in the American press. O'Neill 
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and Kennedy, however, wanted Haughey to make a public 
condemnation of Irish-American republican groups. John Hume 
conveyed their feelings in an appeal which stated: 
In order that all shreds of suspicion be 
removed and this unfortunate affair closed, it 
is necessary that it be made clear that the 
activities of congressman Mario Biaggi and the 
organizations with which he is associated 
enjoy no support whatsoever among any section 
of Irish opinion.n 
Haughey again acquiesced to this pressure and on July 27, 
made a major policy speech at a Fianna Fail conference in 
Cork. He strongly attacked Irish-American republicanism and 
told his audience there was "clear and conclusive evidence 
available to the government that Noraid has provided support 
for the campaign of violence and direct assistance for its 
pursuit." The Taoiseach also attacked the Irish National 
Caucus and accused it of prolonging the violence in Ulster.•2 
The Donlon affair was yet another example of the 
influence of the Four Horsemen. Their obvious ability to 
affect political developments in Ireland increased the 
prestige of constitutional nationalism in America. The 
increasing political successes of Kennedy, Moynihan, O'Neill, 
Carey and their supporters stood in sharp contrast to the 
failures of the Ad Hoc committee. While Noraid and the Irish 
National Caucus were engaged in mutual antagonisms and Mario 
Biaggi was still suffering from the failure of his peace 
initiative, constitutional nationalism was going from strength 
to strength. As both nationalist factions entered the 
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eighties, it seemed certain that consti tutionalism would 
consolidate its ascendancy and republicanism would remain 
marginal with little influence in America. 
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Chapter 7 
From the Blanket Protest to the Hunger Strikes. 1979-1981 
Support for the I .R.A. among Irish-American activists 
decreased in the mid-seventies because of the continued 
success of constitutional nationalists. Political actions 
taken the Four Horsemen weakened the effectiveness of 
republican publicity campaigns and undermined their fund-
raising. Noraid tried to counteract this pressure by 
highlighting British human rights violations and exploiting 
the draconian legal system in Ulster. They concentrated on 
publicizing a series of prison protests undertaken by 
republicans against the British penal system. Mos.t Irish-
Americans remained apathetic and showed little interest in 
these republican maneuvers. 
The lack of Irish-American activist concern for I.R.A. 
prisoners changed dramatically, however, when the inmates 
launched a hunger strike campaign in 1980-81. It provided 
American republican groups with a series of publicity 
victories which enabled them to regain much of the ground lost 
to constitutional nationalists. The deaths of ten prisoners 
rejuvenated the republican network and won levels of Irish-
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American support far in excess of that induced by Bloody 
Sunday. 
The key issue in the republican prison protests concerned 
the inmate's classification within the penal system. Convicted 
Irish republicans have traditionally fought to be acknowledged 
as prisoners of war instead of common criminals. Recognition 
of I.R.A. prisoners as "political" gave them the same standing 
as captured soldiers in a legitimate war of national 
liberation. It was only natural when republicans were 
convicted or interned in the early seventies that they would 
fight within the jail for "prisoner of war" status. 
The first protests began in Belfast's Crumlin Road Jail. 
On May 8, 1972, republican prisoners refused penal labor and 
eventually rioted to demand treatment as political prisoners. 
William Whitelaw, the Secretary of State, denied the 
legitimacy of the prisoner's demand and announced there would 
be no change in prison conditions. Provisional I.R.A. leaders 
in Crumlin Road then issued a statement which declared they 
would go on hunger strike if Whitelaw did not reverse his 
position. On May 15, after having received no concessions 
from the British, the Provisional prisoners carried out their 
threat and began refusing food. 1 
Five republicans, led by Billy McKee, initiated the fast 
and warned authorities that "We will hunger strike until our 
demands to be recognized as political prisoners are met and 
our protest will last until death if necessary. 112 Each 
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consecutive week, five more republicans joined the hunger 
strike. Eventually the protest spread to Armagh Women's Prison 
and to the internees in Long Kesh. At the peak of the strike, 
over sixty prisoners were refusing food. 
William Whitelaw ignored the hunger strike and seemed 
unconcerned about growing public demonstrations supporting the 
prisoners. Even after May 20, when Billy McKee's physical 
condition rapidly deteriorated, the government remained 
unresponsive. In June, however, British officials began 
contacts with Provo leaders outside the jails. These 
discussions eventually led to the short-lived truce between 
June and July of 1972. 
As part of the pre-conditions to talks, the Provisionals 
asked Whitelaw to accept the demands of the hunger strikers. 
The Secretary of State· was so anxious to commence dialogue 
that he immediately announced a change in the prison regime 
and introduced a "Special Category status." Republican and 
loyalist prisoners were granted the right to wear their own 
clothes; to abstain from penal labor; to associate freely; to 
participate in recreational and educational activities; and to 
have full remission of sentence restored. 
These concessions, al though denied initially by the 
government, amounted to de-facto recognition of republicans as 
prisoners of war. The hunger strike, therefore, ended. On July 
7, the delegation of top Provo leaders met Whitelaw in London 
and agreed upon a truce. 
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Although the British achieved nothing from the truce, 
they had acknowledged republicans were political prisoners. 
Worse than this for Westminster, the new prisbn regime became 
a "training ground" for the I .R.A. and was christened "The 
Republican University." Inside Long Kesh, the prisoners ran 
their own affairs and organized themselves along military 
lines. Provo leaders conducted weapons training using wooden 
rifles, gave lectures on the use of explosives, and 
continually planned schemes for escape. Living conditions 
were among the most favorable in the entire European penal 
system. It was not long before the prisoners constructed a 
poteen still, had free access to educational and recreational 
facilities, and received frequent parcels from relatives. For 
many, the experience in prison encouraged their commitment to 
republicanism and increased their military prowess. 3 
This situation grew increasingly repugnant to the British 
government and made it determined to reform the prison regime 
in Northern Ireland. In 197 4, Merlyn Rees commissioned an 
independent inquiry into anti-terrorist legislation in Ulster. 
Headed by Lord Gardiner, the inquiry commission published its 
report in January 1975. It concluded that granting of special 
category status was a mistake and recommended all prisoners be 
treated equally. Rees hesitated to implement these 
recommendations because of ceasefire with the Provisionals in 
1975. When he realized that continued contact with the I.R.A. 
was fruitless, he closed the "incident centers" in October 
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1975 and announced that after March 1, 1976, special category 
status would no longer apply to new prisoners. 
Republicans immediately grasped the significance of this 
change. Not only would it eliminate their comfortable life-
style within the prisons, but it denied their claim to be 
captured soldiers and different from common criminals. I.R.A. 
inmates naturally prepared to resist the new prison reform. 
One of the first measures announced by the British was 
that prisoners would no longer be allowed to wear their own 
clothes and would have to wear regulation uniforms. The first 
republican to be subjected to this new regime was Ciaran 
Neugent, a long time I .R.A. activist from Belfast. When 
warders brought prison clothes to his cell in the newly 
constructed H-Block compounds at the Maze Prison, Neugent 
refused to wear them. He remained naked in his cell for one 
day until the authorities brought him a blanket. He told 
warders that the only way they could get him to wear prison 
ciothes was to nail them to his back. He remained in his cell 
wrapped only in the blanket. This "blanket protest," as it 
became known, grew as each new republican came under the 
reformed prison regime. 
In April 1976, supporters of the prisoners formed a 
Relatives Action Committee. It publicized the prisoners' 
condition and organized demonstrations. The I.R.A. also began 
a campaign of attacks against prison officers. By the end of 
1976, they had assassinated seven warders and that figure 
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eventually rose to eighteen by the time the protest ended. 
This I .R.A. campaign led to an intense hatred between the 
prison officers and the protesting prisoners and made the 
British government even more determined to resist the "blanket 
protest." 
In 1977, while the I.R.A. attacked prison officers, the 
Relatives Action Committee organized a series of 
demonstrations. But they were not well attended and the prison 
protest failed to raise universal anger within the nationalist 
community. Republicans trying to publicize the protest in 
America faced similar problems. Despite sustained efforts to 
get media attention, the "blanket protest" received little 
coverage in the u. s. press and television. Nora id 
demonstrations attracted only handfuls of supporters. The 
situation was so bad that The Irish People launched a series 
of attacks on the apathy of Irish-Americans. One such 
editorial commented: 
As we go to press, Irishmen -- naked but for a 
blanket -- have been beaten, humiliated and 
tortured for twelve months in H-Block. I give 
you these details because it seems to me that so 
many Irish people don't want to know about it --
they're too busy having a good old time for 
themselves .•• and that is why there is a Long 
Kesh and torture chambers called H-Blocks. The 
Irish don't care! The Irish don't want to know! 
The Irish are selfish! And, the selfishness of 
the Irish has left them divided, because, the 
wily enemy caters to our selfishness and keeps 
us in bondage. 4 
The prisoners in H-Block escalated their protest in 
response to the apathetic public response. In April 1978, they 
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refused to empty their chamber pots and neither shaved or 
bathed. Warders would not clean the prisoners' cells and soon 
some 300 republicans began smearing the walls with excrement. 
Initially, this new "dirty protest" was slow to win 
support and publicity. Public demonstrations continued to be 
poorly attended and media coverage was limited. Many Irish-
Americans were revolted by the unorthodox prison protest. 
Public demonstrations consisted of small groups chanting 
outside British consulates. The Irish People continued to 
attack Irish-Americans for their lack of concern while the 
limited number of reports in the American media tended to 
support the British position. Tim Pat Coogan commented on the 
"dirty protest:" 
Its bizarre and repellant nature, the fact that 
the marches almost inevitably ended in stone 
throwing and violence, and the public view that 
the whole thing was only a Provisional 
propaganda stunt, all militated against 
widespread public support. 5 
In the summer of 1978, however, republicans finally 
succeeded in making some headway in their campaign. 
Republicans exploited a series of investigations into British 
torture, culminating in the Bennett Report, to justify the 
political status claim. The prisoners had always maintained 
they were convicted under "special" legislation in "special" 
non-jury Diplock Courts. Under this system, the emphasis was 
on confessions, which prisoners claimed were routinely 
obtained through torture. The Bennett Report confirmed ill 
treatment of republican prisoners while academic works such as 
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peter Taylor's Beating the Terrorists? provided further 
evidence of physical abuse during interrogation. 
Supporters of the prisoners claimed that the justice 
system created a "conveyor belt" in which republicans were 
charged under "special" emergency legislation, in "special" 
non-jury courts, and convicted on the basis of evidence 
obtained by "special" procedure. They argued that this unique 
treatment proved the prisoners were not ordinary but were 
political, and deserved a "special" status. 
The Relatives Action Committee employed this logic in 
their publicity efforts and, in August 1978, achieved an 
important success. The catholic Archbishop of Armagh, Tomas 
O'Fiaich, visited the H-Blocks and issued a strong 
condemnation of the prison authorities. After seeing the 
appalling conditions in which the prisoners were living he 
lamented: 
One would hardly allow an animal to remain in 
such conditions, let alone a human being ••• The 
nearest approach to it that I have seen was the 
spectacle of hundreds of homeless people living 
in sewer-pipes in the slums of Calcutta. The 
stench and filth in some of the cells, with the 
remains of rotten food and human excrement 
scattered around all walls, was almost 
unbearable. In two of them I was unable to speak 
for fear of vomiting. 
O'Fiaich then went on to give support to the prisoners 
demand for political status: 
The authorities refuse to admit that these 
prisoners are in a different category from the 
ordinary, yet everything about their trials and 
family background indicates that they are 
different. They were sentenced by special courts 
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without juries. The vast majority were convicted 
on allegedly voluntary confessions obtained in 
circumstances which are now placed under grave 
suspicion. Many are very youthful and came from 
families which had never been in trouble with 
the law, though they lived in areas which 
suffered discrimination in housing and jobs. 
How can one explain the jump in the prison 
population of Northern Ireland from 500 to 3,000 
unless a new type of prisoner has emerged?6 
O'Fiaich's statement generated extensive publicity in the 
media and was quoted in the American press. Major U.S. 
newspapers began to run the first major articles on the prison 
protest, encouraging supporters of the prisoners to increase 
their appeals to Irish-Americans. 
In October 1978, Fr. Raymond Murray, a longtime activist 
for the prisoner's cause, went on a publicity tour of the 
United States. The tour was financed by the Irish National 
caucus. Murray met with top American politicians and media 
executives to explain the protest. He distributed copies of a 
pamphlet entitled The Castlereagh File, outlining extensive 
cases of alleged police brutality at the R.u.c. interrogation 
center. 
Murray was so enthusiastic about his reception in America 
that he and Fr. Dennis Faul produced a new booklet entitled 
The Sleeping Giant. It called upon H-Block activists to 
concentrate their efforts on a trans-Atlantic publicity 
campaign. The clergymen claimed that this was the best way to 
force the British into concessions in the prisons. 7 
In the autumn of 1978, republican supporters organized 
American tours for family and friends of the prisoners. The 
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inmate's wives spoke at Irish-American gatherings and held 
press conferences to outline the extent of British brutality 
in the H-Blocks. They gave first-hand accounts of the horror 
both they and their husbands were experiencing. The American 
media covered these visits and occasionally the relatives 
succeeded in winning newspaper columnists over to the 
prisoner's cause. After meeting with four of the women, Chuck 
stone, a reporter for The Philadelphia Daily News, wrote an 
article supporting the H-Block protest. After what stone 
described as "the stomach-wrenching rottenest of British 
atrocities which would make Idi Amin proud" he concluded that, 
"the real heroes in this dirty and endless war are the 
prisoners in the H-Blocks. 111 
The prisoners' relatives also won support from 
journalists Pete Hamill and Jimmy Breslin in The New York 
Daily News but received the greatest publicity from Jack 
Anderson, a leading columnist with The Washington Post. In 
1978, the Irish National Caucus persuaded Anderson to write 
about Northern Ireland. He met with prisoner's relatives in 
October and afterwards wrote a scathing attack on the British 
policy. In an article which was syndicated to over nine-
hundred newspapers, he compared the H-Blocks to the tiger 
cages in Vietnam and concluded: 
It is estimated that perhaps 70% of the 
political prisoners in Long Kesh have been 
convicted by uncorroborated statements or forced 
confessions made in Stalin-like kangaroo court 
procedures. Human rights violations have put 
Northern Ireland on an unenviable par with some 
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of the most barbarious regimes of communist 
commissars or tinhorn Latin American dictators. 
The British are trampling on the rights of Irish 
citizens in a manner reminiscent of Oliver 
Cromwell's iron fisted rule more than three 
centuries ago. 9 
This article created substantial publicity in America. It 
was strongly condemned, however, by the British government. 
Tim Pat Coogan in On the Blanket, humorously reported that 
Anderson's views, "went down in the British Embassy in 
Washington like a Long Kesh turd in the salad bowl. 1110 
Ambassador Peter Jay attacked the article and described H-
Block prisoners as "bloody murders." He further argued their 
conditions were self-inflicted. 11 
Peter Jay's reply was given prominence in a number of 
American newspapers, but British officials in Belfast felt 
that a more determined campaign would have to be conducted 
against H-Block publicity. In February 1979, "two of the best-
informed and most persuasive of the government's team of 
policy advisors in Belfast" traveled to the United States. 
These two top ranking civil servants met with British 
diplomats in New York and Washington and advised them on ways 
to present their case more persuasively. They told B. I. S. 
officials to conduct a more sustained media campaign to 
counteract the effects of the H-Block relatives' tours. 12 
Determined to achieve this result, British authorities 
allowed American reporters, photographers, and television 
cameramen to tour the H-Blocks on March 15, 1979. They hoped 
this concession would help to bring the "reality" of the 
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conditions in the Maze to Irish-Americans and stifle 
republican propaganda. The correspondents were not allowed to 
interview the protesting prisoners. Despite this restriction, 
however, reports of the tour in the American press tended to 
sympathize with the men. Some British officials consequently 
believed their exercise had backfired. 13 
In October 1979, encouraged by the increasing media 
reports, various prisoner support groups in Ireland merged 
into the National ff-Block/Armagh Committee. This new group 
revitalized the publicity battle and increased support within 
the nationalist community by stressing that endorsement of the 
H-Block protest did not necessarily mean acceptance of the 
armed struggle. The committee established an information 
bureau which kept Irish-Americans up-to-date with every new 
development in the prisons and shipped large amounts of 
literature across the Atlantic. 
American republican groups quickly became more successful 
at increasing awareness of the H-Block issue. Noraid 
supporters drew widespread attention when they symbolically 
wore blankets during the 1979 st. Patrick's Day parade in New 
York. They also organized demonstrations against Royal Navy 
ships docking in U.S. ports. Actress Jane Fonda attended one 
such protest in San Francisco as a show of solidarity with the 
prison protest . 14 
Republicans also began to exploit Roman Catholic 
symbolism in order to win the support of devout Irish-
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Americans. Noraid handouts carried drawings of bearded, long 
haired, prisoners clad in blankets and clasping rosary beads. 
The comparison with Christ suffering was obvious and 
intentional. Editorials in The Irish People constantly 
employed this imagery and told readers how the prisoners were 
suffering religious persecution. One of these editorials 
presented the allegation in the following manner: 
In the H-Block concentration camp, a young Irish 
republican -- naked but for a blanket -- faces a 
trio of British soldiers. One hand holds his 
blanket around his shoulders and the other 
grasps the crucifix of his rosary. His rosary 
beads have been a great source of comfort to him 
all these long, cold, and dreary nights as he 
recited decade after decade for his parents, 
family, friends, and especially for his fallen 
comrades. 
Now these foreign mercenaries make fun 
of his religion and his dedication to the 
Mother of God. They use four letter words 
as they grasp at his neck. The rosary 
beads snap in broken pieces. A part falls 
to the floor and one of the soldiers 
laughs raucously as he stamps his boot 
on it. 15 
Irish-American republicans continued to use this kind of 
emotive imagery throughout the prison campaign. They also 
sponsored U.S. tours by ex-blanketmen designed to give Irish-
Americans a personal account of the "horrors" in H-Block. In 
August 1980, Ciaran Neugent illegally entered America and 
conducted a hectic information tour in which he addressed 
crowds of Irish-American activists. He met with newspaper 
columnists, conducted radio talk shows, and appeared on the 
McNeil-Lehner Newshour. 16 
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The publicity generated by Neugent's tour prompted the 
British to send Cyril Grey, a key official in the Northern 
Ireland Office, to the embassy in Washington. Although the 
Thatcher administration described the move as a "routine 
deployment," it was specifically designed to strengthen anti-
republican activities in America. British diplomats took 
seriously 
widespread 
issue . 17 
Neugent's 
moral and 
claims that his tour 





On August 28, Neugent led a demonstration outside the 
British Consulate in New York. Wearing only a blanket, he read 
a statement to reporters attacking British barbarity against 
republican prisoners. When Neugent finished, eight immigration 
officials seized him and he was later deported. 
Despite Neugent's arrest, publicity for the H-Block 
campaign in America continued due to a visit of U.S. churchmen 
to Northern Ireland on August 24, 1980. The delegation was 
sponsored by the H-Block committee. Relatives of the prisoners 
hoped the clerics would be allowed to visit the Maze prison 
and report on conditions themselves. 
The leader of the group was Fr. Daniel Berrigan S.J., a 
committed civil right activist. When he asked for permission 
to visit the H-Blocks, British officials refused fearing a 
republican propaganda exercise. Berrigan reacted furiously and 
condemned the Maze compounds as comparable to Nazi 
concentration camps. 
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Berrigan further elaborated on these criticisms in an 
extensive article printed in The New York Times. He blamed the 
British government for the "disgraceful" conditions in H-Block 
and supported republican claims to be political prisoners. 1 • 
The article initiated a prolonged propaganda battle. Michael 
Allison, the British Minister of State in Northern Ireland, 
and Patrick Nixon of the B.I.S. both wrote scathing letters to 
the editor specifically attacking each issue Berrigan had 
raised. The priest was in turn defended in letters from Paul 
O'Dwyer and Fr. Sean McManus. 
The publicity surrounding Berrigan' s tour encouraged 
Noraid to continued financing trips by former blanket 
protesters to the United States. In September 1980, Liam 
Carlin and Fra Mccann entered the country illegally and gave 
lectures on their experiences in prison. They conducted a 
nationwide publicity campaign while evading immigration 
officers from New York to Los Angeles. 
British officials condemned the apparent ease with which 
the two men were able to escape arrest and the political 
support they attracted. 19 In Boston, Fra Mccann was awarded 
a citation from the Massachusetts State legislature which 
commended "his heroic stand in suffering over three years of 
torture and degradation." After a private meeting with Edward 
King, the then-Governor of Massachusetts, the Boston City 
Council extended its best wishes to Mccann and wished him 
success in "educating the American people in the struggle to 
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achieve justice." Liam Carlin received similar citations from 
State legislatures in California and Michigan. He also 
succeeded in persuading a number of City councils throughout 
the U.S. to support political status for republican 
prisoners. 20 
Despite the increasing publicity for, and support of, the 
prisoners' cause in Ireland and America, by September 1980 
they felt that they would have to intensify their campaign to 
extract concessions from the British. Rumors of a hunger 
strike circulated, and British officials began looking for 
ways to compromise on the politi'Cal status issue. 
The Thatcher government was conscious that news of a 
hunger strike would be exploited in the United States and add 
to the adverse publicity which had been generated by the tours 
of former blanketmen. On October 23, 1980, Humphrey Atkins 
announced that protesting prisoners would not be required to 
wear prison clothing. To avoid giving the appearance of a 
special status, he said the new clothing rules would apply to 
all male prisoners common criminals as well as 
"terrorists. 1121 Leaders of the H-Block prisoners discussed 
this new proposal but rejected it as a failure to recognize 
their claim to political status. On the morning of October 27, 
seven prisoners, led by Brendan Hughes, began refusing food. 
In Ireland, the H-Block Committee organized the 
inevitable demonstrations in support of the prisoners. It 
again was careful to emphasize that participation in protests 
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was not a show of support for the I .R.A. 's campaign of 
violence. This had some effect. Following a demonstration in 
west Belfast on October 26, 1980, protest marches throughout 
the province attracted substantial support. 
In America, all the major newspapers reported on the 
outbreak of the hunger strike and the television networks ran 
footage of large protest demonstrations. The Irish-American 
press was saturated in coverage of the latest developments and 
American republicans organized weekly protest marches 
nationwide. 
On October 29, Brendan Hughes called for an escalation of 
protests outside the prisons. He particularly asked for 
greater efforts from the Irish-American groups and emphasized 
that demonstrations in New York, Boston, and Chicago would 
bring most pressure on the British government. After Hughes' 
statement, The Irish People issued the following editorial 
linking the hunger strikes directly to the heroes of the War 
of Independence and encouraging Irish-Americans to become 
active: 
Irish lives and Irish public opinion do not 
greatly trouble the British. Public opinion in 
America does. sixty years ago Terence Macswiney 
died on a hunger strike. His death, however, 
helped force the British to the treaty table. 
Irish-American interest made his suffering front 
page news. Longshoremen refused to unload 
British ships. The mood throughout the u.s. was 
one of indignation. His death cost the British 
more than the concessions necessary to save his 
life ... Let the present hunger strike be wielded 
mightily by Irish republican supporters in the 
U.S. Let the hunger strike become known to every 
American and through it reveal the brutality of 
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British colonial rule in Ireland. The publicity 
tour by Neugent, Mccann, and Carlin has laid the 
groundwork but an intelligent campaign is an 
absolute necessity. Only then will the Brits 
concede. Only then can Irish lives be saved. 22 
The hunger strike widened after December 1, when three 
female prisoners in Armagh Jail announced they would join the 
protest. The participation of women added a new dimension to 
the campaign. Sympathy for the protest increased. 
Demonstrations attracted significantly larger numbers and 
media coverage expanded. In analyzing this development, Kevin 
Kelley concluded: 
It seems that the starvation of three young 
girls in a British jail was more objectionable 
and horrifying a protest to some on-lookers than 
was the specter of seven-hundred grown men in 
the Maze. In a society in which women are 
assigned a protected and condescendingly 
reversed position, a hunger strike by three 
lasses was considered an unspeakable tragedy. 23 
In this increasingly urgent situation, Irish-American 
republicans tried to increase political pressure on Britain. 
The Irish National Caucus lobbied members of the Ad Hoc 
Committee and encouraged them to support the prisoners. Mario 
Biaggi tried unsuccessfully to get Donald McHenry, Chief U.S. 
delegate at the United Nations, to mediate with the British. 
Caucus activities achieved greater success when Fr. Sean 
McManus convinced Senator Alfonse D 'Amato ( R. , N. Y. ) to conduct 
a fact-finding tour of Ulster beginning December 8, 1980. 
D'Amato was accompanied by Dennis Dillon, a Nassau County 
District Attorney, and Long Island councilmen Peter King. The 
Senator attended an ff-Block rally in Belfast. When a reporter 
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suggested there were two sides to the prison dispute, D'Amato 
replied, "yes, there are two sides, a right one and a wrong 
one." Dennis Dillon was asked about the purpose of their visit 
and replied it was because, "American news organizations are 
distorting the problem by presenting it in a balanced way as 
if the English had some right to be here. 1124 
These statements were criticized by the Northern Ireland 
Office in Belfast. In America, John Oakes, a former senior 
editor of The New York Times, attacked D'Amato's association 
with the Irish National Caucus and commented: 
In his haste to ingratiate himself with one 
segment of his local constituency, D'Amato took 
a reckless step into the dangerous minefield of 
foreign affairs. • • His visit to Northern 
Ireland, at the moment of explosive sectarian 
tension, demonstrated a kind of careless 
irresponsibility to which obscure politicians 
suddenly elevated to seats of unaccustomed power 
occasionally succumb. 25 
Such publicity kept the hunger strike a major news item 
in the U.S. media. The vast majority of American newspapers 
however, did not support the I.R.A. prisoners and denied the 
legitimacy of political status. The Washington Post captured 
the general opinion in an editorial which stated: 
The strike is bound to start looming large in 
the American consciousness as Christmas nears. 
Calls will come from troubled Irish-Americans, 
I.R.A. sympathizers, and humanitarians to have 
the British do something. Americans as a whole 
need to understand, however, as a good number of 
Irish-Americans already do, that what is 
involved is an assault on the very tissue of 
authority by which any government is 
sustained. 26 
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While accepting that the British were right to hold out 
against granting political status, other papers suggested that 
Margaret Thatcher employ some flexibility in the dispute. ~ 
New York Times, for example, suggested there was room for 
compromise over the issue of prison clothing: 
Right though they are on principle, the British 
have otherwise played into the hands the H-Block 
prisoners. They seemed recently to have granted 
a lesser demand that the prisoners be allowed to 
wear civilian clothes. But they had to be 
prison-issue civilian clothes, which the 
prisoners deemed just as offensive as uniforms. 
The inflexibility of the British on such 
bureaucratic fine print has only gained sympathy 
for the hunger-strikers among moderates. By 
contrast, jailed terrorists in the Irish 
Republic are free to wear what they wish, which 
is surely a better policy than letting clothes 
make the martyr. 27 
In response to the largely pro-British editorials, 
American republican groups began bombarding the major U.S. 
newspapers with protest letters. While this campaign failed to 
produce major editorial reversals, some syndicated columnists 
did support the hunger strike demands. In The Chicago Tribune, 
Coleman Mccarthy wrote two articles calling for political 
status and the complete withdrawal of British forces from 
Ulster. 28 
The British government, hoping to prevent the American 
media from adopting a more favorable view of the hunger 
strikes, began its own series of publicity initiatives. 
Michael Allison held a number of formal lunches with American 
correspondents in London to ensure adequate coverage was given 
of the British viewpoint. On November 24, Conservative M.P.s 
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John Biggs-Davison and Brian Mawhinney were sent to Washington 
to coordinate B.I.s. publicity against the prisoner's demands. 
They distributed a new glossy brochure entitled H-Block : The 
Facts, which described conditions in the Maze prison as "on 
par with the best in Western Europe" and reemphasized that the 
prisoners suffering was self-imposed. 29 
Ironically, Republicans claimed that the publicity 
efforts of Mawhinney and Biggs-Davison actually helped their 
cause by increasing exposure to the issues involved. Some 
British newspapers also reported the two M.P.s made little 
impact. Demand for their appearance on television and press 
conferences was "embarrassingly small. 1130 
The event which did help the British position was the 
meeting between Margaret Thatcher and Charles Haughey on 
December 8, in Dublin. It was part of a series of Anglo-Irish 
Summits which had begun in May 1979. When the talks concluded, 
Charles Haughey claimed an "historic breakthrough" in Anglo-
Irish affairs and that a new formalized relationship between 
Britain and Ireland would emerge. As a result of the 
discussions, there was also speculation that a solution to the 
hunger strike was near. Margaret Thatcher did not repudiate 
any of Haughey's claims or the press speculation. 31 
Haughey's claims of a breakthrough in the crisis were 
greatly exaggerated. Political analysts claim the Taoiseach's 
statements were designed to deflect attention away from the 
country's disastrous economic position. They also believe 
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Haughey was trying to maintain support from the republican 
wing of Fianna Fail. Margaret Thatcher did not immediately 
dismiss his statements because of their political usefulness. 
in The Uncivil Wars, Padraig O'Malley alleged she used 
Haughey's exaggerated claims to blunt Irish-American criticism 
of her handling of the hunger strike. Suggestions of a 
positive change in Anglo-Irish relations would dilute the 
expected outcry if any of the prisoners should die: 
Thatcher allowed Haughey a certain leeway to 
exaggerate the outcome because it tied him all 
the more firmly to her in the event that the 
hunger strikers died and she faced an 
international political backlash. 32 
The American press interpreted the Haughey statement as 
an indication that the British were working hard to find a 
solution, not only to the hunger strike, but to the whole 
Northern Ireland problem. Articles contained suggestions that 
Thatcher would be giving Dublin a direct political role to 
play in the future of the province. A flurry of editorials 
praised the progress in Anglo-Irish affairs and attention was 
deflected from Thatcher's handling of the hunger strike. ~ 
Washington Post commented: 
It is encouraging to find these two strong-
willed leaders accepting a common commitment to 
explore a new arrangement. The terror in 
Northern Ireland will go on, at some level, a 
hunger strike is but a form of it. But terror 
cannot be allowed to dominate Irish-British 
dialogue. The politicians must show they believe 
in a political alternative. From the sidelines, 
Americans can quietly cheer Mrs.Thatcher and Mr. 
Haughey on. 33 
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The meeting between Thatcher and Haughey also helped the 
position of constitutional nationalists in the United States. 
The Four Horsemen had been noticeably subdued in their 
reaction during the hunger strike. They were alarmed at the 
publicity American republicans were generating and they were 
subjected to a series of critic isms for doing nothing to 
resolve the dispute. Haughey's exaggerated claims after the 
meeting with Thatcher allowed them to show how political 
dialogue was making progress. They all praised the results of 
the Anglo-Irish summit and resisted calls to support the 
hunger strikers demands. 
The hunger strike reached its crisis point on December 
16, 1980, while these political developments occurred. Sean 
McKenna, one of the original protestors, was nearly blind and 
had received the last rites. Within the prison, frantic 
negotiations were conducted between Brendan Hughes and British 
officials. Eventually the prison authorities presented the 
hunger strikers with a thirty-four page document which hinted 
that concessions could be given if the fast was ended. After 
an extensive debate among the prisoners and their 
representatives, it was decided the document opened the way 
for significant changes in the prison regim.e. On December 18 
1980, the prisoners ended their fast in anticipation of 
negotiations with British officials. 
Republicans claimed the prisoners had won a major victory 
while the British maintained that no concessions had been 
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granted. In America the media presented the end of the hunger 
strike as "an important victory for Thatcher and an indication 
of the unyielding stand that she took throughout. 1134 When 
leaders of the prisoners tried to negotiate concessions, the 
British were much more inflexible. Kevin Kelly concluded it 
was the general impression that; 
It seemed to most observers that the Provos had 
surrendered in the face of Thatcher's unbending 
policy and out of fear that they would actually 
have to make good on their threat to fast until 
death. . • The Provos had been badly out 
maneuvered by the British in the propaganda war. 
Many people in Ireland and around the world were 
left, rightly or wrongly, with the impression 
that Britain had won and the I.R.A. had lost on 
this key battleground. 35 
The British failure to make substantial concessions after 
the ending of the hunger strike caused extreme bitterness 
among the prisoners. While some leaders wanted to continue 
negotiations in the hope of making a breakthrough agreement, 
the vast majority of republicans in the H-Blocks braced for 
another hunger strike. 
There was considerable resistance when support groups on 
the outside heard of the prisoners attitude. Sections within 
the H-Block Committee believed the prisoners' cause had been 
dealt a serious blow by the ending of the first hunger strike. 
They believed it would be impossible to build up national and 
international support for another fast. Leaders of Sinn Fein 
urged Bobby Sands, the commander of republican prisoners in 
the Maze, to negotiate. Irish-American republicans, ·believing 
they could not afford to tie up resources in another protest 
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which might end in failure, were likewise exhausted after the 
first hunger strike campaign and expressed similar 
reservations about another protest. 
The H-Block prisoners responded to the hesitancy of 
republican groups on the outside by testing the government's 
flexibility. On January 20, 1981, some went off the dirty 
protest and washed for the first time in three years. They 
asked for clothes to be brought from their families. When 
these arrived, the prison authorities refused to pass them on 
to the prisoners. This led to a riot in the prison. 
Republicans concluded the only course of action was another 
hunger strike. 
Despite their initial apprehension, H-Block activists 
gave their full support when the second fast began. The hunger 
strike started on March 1, 1981, when Bobby Sands refused 
food. Other ·strikers joined him at fortnightly intervals. The 
strategy was to allow these prisoners a reasonable time period 
for negotiations if Sands died. Kevin Kelly pointed out that 
this staggered system: 
meant that there would be a time-lag of about a 
week or two between the death of one prisoner 
and the imminent demise of whoever was next in 
line. In this way, the pressure on the 
authorities would be relentless. 36 
In the first weeks of the hunger strikes the initial 
fears of the H-Block Committee seemed confirmed. Public 
demonstrations in Ireland were poorly attended and publicity 
was minimal. The perceived failure of the first hunger strike 
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had also weakened Irish-American republicanism. In February, 
Margaret Thatcher traveled to Washington to receive an 
honorary law degree from Georgetown University. Despite 
strenuous attempts to organiz'e a protest, only a handful of 
demonstrators appeared at the ceremony. 37 
To add to the problem of poor attendance at 
demonstrations, American republican groups also suffered from 
the continued activities of constitutional nationalists. 
During the first hunger strike, the Four Horsemen- were 
criticized for not using their political influence to resolve 
the dispute. Republicans attacked Tip O'Neill, in particular, 
claiming he was callous and uncaring. They tried to convince 
Irish-Americans that; 
A few words uttered by any of the four might 
have had great effect upon the British and 
prevented much of the suffering endured by the 
hunger strikes. Yet, the four were silent and 
did nothing... They are shallow, self-serving 
politicians unworthy of our support. 38 
In response to this attack, the Four Horsemen began 
considering ways to re-establish their image and leadership 
among Irish-Americans. In February 1981, Senator Chris Dodd, 
Congressman Tom Foley, and Carey Parker, chief aide to Edward 
Kennedy, held a meeting with John Hume. They agreed that 
efforts to counteract republican groups in America would be 
greatly enhanced by the formation of · a formal group in 
Congress. Consequently, twenty-four of the most influential 
Senators, Congressmen and Governors formed "The Friends of 
Ireland" on St. Patrick's Day 1981. They announced the group 
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would champion the goals of constitutional nationalism and 
attack Irish-American support for violence. 39 
constitutional nationalists achieved a further success 
when they persuaded President Ronald Reagan to endorse the new 
group. Sean Donlon had successfully established good relations 
with the new President since his inauguration. He convinced 
Reagan to take the unprecedented step of visiting the Irish 
Embassy for lunch on st. Patrick's Day. The President welcomed 
the formation of the Friends of Ireland and issued a statement 
obviously aimed at Noraid: 
We will continue to condemn all acts of 
terrorism and violence, for these cannot solve 
Ireland's problems. I call on all Americans to 
question closely any appeal for financial or 
other aid from groups involved in this conflict 
to ensure that contributions do not end up in 
the hands of those who perpetuate violence. 40 
Formation of the · Friends of Ireland and the Reagan 
statement compounded the problems faced by American 
republicans in winning support for the H-Block prisoners. The 
hunger strike campaign in Ireland also seemed to suffer when 
Frank Maguire, M.P. for Fermanagh/South Tyrone, died suddenly 
in early March 1981. Maguire had been an outspoken supporter 
of the hunger strike and had created substantial publicity by 
his militant speeches. 
Although Maguire's death was a setback, the situation it 
ultimately created produced an unparalleled publicity coup for 
the prisoners. Sinn Fein, despite the fear of rejection at the 
polls, eventually nominated Bobby Sands as a candidate for 
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Maguire's vacant seat. After a series of political 
maneuverings, Sands was left as the sole nationalist candidate 
running against Harry West of the Unionist Party. 41 
During the election campaign, the H-Block Committee 
successfully presented their case to the nationalist 
electorate. They convinced many that a vote for Sands was not 
necessarily an endorsement of the I.R.A., but a means to save 
a prisoner's life. As the election day neared, media coverage 
in Britain reached unprecedented levels. When Sands was 
elected on April 9, journalists and newsmen flocked to Belfast 
in the greatest build up of the international press that 
Northern Ireland had ever witnessed. The battle of wills 
between a starving M.P. and the "Iron Lady," Margaret 
Thatcher, presented an irresistible media event. Journalist 
Gerry Foley caught the essence of the situation when he 
observed: 
The election victory brought an altogether new 
dimension to the hunger strike. Now, overnight, 
the British were dealing with not just a 
"convicted terrorist," but an elected M.P. The 
issue was now front page news throughout the 
world. 42 
Media coverage of the hunger strike reached saturation 
levels as Sands' condition deteriorated in late April. Twenty-
three nations sent television crews to Belfast while over 
four-hundred international journalists reported on the event. 
When Sands died on May s, 1981, there were over three-hundred 
photographers at his funeral to provide the world's press with 
front page pictures. 
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Perhaps most significantly for groups like Noraid, 
American journalists composed the largest segment of the 
international newsmen. The three major U.S. television 
networks sent sixteen camera crews to the province and 
provided the American public with daily news footage of the 
deepening crisis.u 
Republicans and some media analysts claim that this build 
up of journalists had a profound effect on the nature of news 
coverage from Ulster. Noraid had continually attacked the 
mainstream U.S. media coverage of the conflict as pro-British. 
They alleged that most American reporters never went to 
Belfast and wrote all their reports from the comfort of 
London. They further claimed these journalists took their 
information from British sources and therefore produced 
reports which were highly critical of Irish republicanism. 
American republicans were particularly critical of The New 
York Times, transforming the popular catch phrase and accusing 
it of containing, "All the News That's Brit to Print."'' 
These republican criticisms of the U.S. media have been 
supported by journalists who worked in Ulster. Jo Thomas, who 
covered the province for two years with The New York Times, 
recalls how easy it was to remain in London -- with its fine 
restaurants and excellent entertainment -- and compose reports 
from the weekly press briefing issued by the British Foreign 
Office. She maintains that; 
Because of the way assignments in London are 
generally structured, with large territories to 
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cover -- sometimes all of Europe and the Middle 
East American journalists cover Northern 
Ireland infrequently, in short trips sandwiched 
between other assignments, if they go there at 
all. Many stories are simply written from 
London, with no on the ground reporting. If they 
go to Northern Ireland, they seldom leave 
Belfast. Sometimes the press officers at the 
Northern Ireland Office will do something as 
blatant as arranging the visiting 
correspondents' entire itinerary. 45 
Republicans claim that it was the large build-up of 
journalists in Belfast between April and May of 1981 that 
marked a change in the nature o~ American media coverage of 
Ulster. Reporters scoured the province to report on the daily 
violence and talked directly to the groups involved. Liz 
Curtis and Roger Faligot contended that for the first time in 
years, U.S. journalists provided information stemming from 
other than British sources. 46 Consequently, there was much 
greater criticism of the British position on the hunger 
strike. Lamenting this change, The London Sunday Times 
concluded: 
The hunger strikers have rekindled a flagging 
interest in Ulster and its problems; as a 
result, world opinion has begun to shift away 
from the British government and in favor of the 
I. R. A. The image of the gunman has actually 
improved. And the general opinion is emerging 
that the time has come for Mrs. Thatcher to 
begin negotiations with Dublin leading to 
eventual union with the south. 47 
In America, no other event in the Ulster conflict had 
received as much media coverage as the hunger strikes. It 
became the lead item of network television news, and the 
column inches previously devoted to Northern Ireland in the 
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press ran into miles. With Sands' impending death, editorial 
comment generally attacked the hunger strike and the I.R.A •• 
Some encouraged the British to take a tougher stand against 
the prisoners. The Chicago Tribune, for example, asked, "If 
forced feeding could deny Irish nationalists the incendiary 
martyrdom they seek, why has the British government not used 
it?" .. 
Almost all the major American newspapers denied the 
legitimacy of political statusfor I.R.A. and I.N.L.A. 
prisoners. They backed the British government's claim that 
concession to this principle would only encourage terrorism. 
The Detr9it News typified editorial opinion on the issue when 
it commented: 
Margaret Thatcher was right to refuse political 
status to Bobby sands, the I.R.A. man who died 
on a hunger strike at Maze Prison. Mr. sands 
belonged to a terrorists organization, and no 
government can afford to concede that repugnant 
acts of violence are somehow sanctified by 
political aspirations.~ 
The American press maintained its lack of support for 
political status throughout the hunger strike but, as more 
prisoners died, they launched equally strong attacks against 
the British government. Many newspapers attacked the legal 
system and the process whereby most of the prisoners ended up 
in the H-Blocks. The Boston Globe commented, "The British 
prison system in Northern Ireland is defective because the 
system of justice is a sham." 50 The New York Times supported 
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this contention and renewed its earlier calls for Britain to 
allow the prisoners to wear their own clothes. 51 
In July 1981, after a series of independent negotiating 
teams failed to secure a compromise between prison authorities 
and the hunger strikers, the American press issued strong 
attacks against Margaret Thatcher. They attacked her 
"haughtiness, " "starchy tone," and "monumental inflexibility. " 
The Baltimore Sun condemned Thatcher's "misplaced resolve" and 
urged President Reagan to "convince her that stubbornness, not 
flexibility, is the great evil to be avoided. "52 The Chicago 
Tribune, in assessing the violence after Bobby Sands' death, 
concluded: 
Much of the blame for this can be laid on Mrs. 
Thatcher and her obstinate refusal to work for 
reform ... It must be abundantly clear to her now 
that her policy of complacency and inactivity 
has failed miserably. Now that she has won her 
point, she should qi ve some consideration to 
relaxing prison rules to accommodate some of the 
inmates demands. 1153 
Newspaper columnists also produced innumerable articles 
on the hunger strike. Many extended the editorial attacks on 
Margaret Thatcher's uncompromising stand and urged her to talk 
directly with the prisoners. In The Wall Street Journal, 
Alexander Cockburn castigated "The Bankrupt British Policy in 
Northern Ireland," while Dennis Shanahan, in The Chicago Sun-
Times, described Bobby sands as an "extraordinary individual" 
in dying for a principle which "subsumes life and sets fire to 
the soul. 115' Coleman McCarthy in The Washington Post· ,again 
gave strong support to the prisoners and told his readers: 
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The prisoners' demands -- involving changes in 
political status, work rules, and privileges 
are modest. The men are not seeking to be 
released from prison for reduced terms, even 
though their arrests and convictions were 
suspect and their sentences -- such as fourteen 
years merely for being found in a car that had 
an unloaded gun in i t--were extreme. "55 
American television stations broadcast a series of 
background reports on the hunger strike which tended to 
romanticize Irish republicanism. On April 27, 1981, "C.B.S. 
Morning News" presented a very complimentary biography of 
Bobby Sands and his republican ideals. It told viewers of 
Sands' poetry and political writings and how "he memorized the 
entire contents of Trinity by Leon Uris, translated them into 
Irish, and then tapped them out in code to his co-prisoners in 
other cells."56 on May 3, C.B.s. ran an extensive report 
describing the New York Irish-American reaction to the hunger 
strike in New York. With republican songs playing as a 
background, those interviewed cursed Margaret Thatcher, 
praised Bobby Sands, and expressed their own willingness to 
die for Ireland." 
Many local television and radio stations broadcast 
similar reports and interviewed prominent Irish-American 
republicans. Michael Flannery and Martin Galvin, Noraid 
Publicity Director, appeared frequently as commentators on New 
York's W.N.B.c. television station. They typically accused the 
British of being "murderers" who only responded to "violent 
resistance. " 58 
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The British government was extremely concerned about the 
American media presentation of the hunger strike. Officials at 
the B.I.S. feared that unfavorable reactions to British policy 
could lead to overflowing Noraid collection boxes. The 
Thatcher administration also dreaded the prospect of increased 
militancy from Tip O'Neill and Edward Kennedy and the 
possibility they would ~ry to get the u.s. government 
involved. 
These fears increased as American media reports of the 
hunger strike grew more critical of Britain. The English press 
carried reports of how Britain was losing the propaganda war 
and occasionally condemned specific views in the United 
States. For example, The London Times attacked The New York 
Times' suggestion that the hunger strikers be allowed their 
own clothing. It called American media reports "prejudiced and 
inaccurate" and concluded: 
Advice such as that in The New York Tj,mes is 
well meaning no doubt, as well as apparently 
being a salve to the liberal conscience and 
popular in certain Irish constituencies in the 
u. s. . But is very dangerous none the less! 59 
Britain's Daily Mail focused on a report by Michael 
Daley, a correspondent with The New York Daily News, and 
accused it of being "a malevolent piece of lying propaganda" 
which was designed "to persuade American politicians to take 
an increasingly anti-British line. 1160 Daley's article 
recounted the story of a British army patrol firing on a 
teenage boy. He told the story through the eyes of "gunner 
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Christopher Spell," one of the British soldiers. After the 
allegations from The Daily Mail, Daley admitted that 
Christopher Spell was a pseudonym. He said the rest of his 
story was true but, in order to spare his newspaper any 
further "embarrassment," he resigned on May a, 1981. 111 
British government officials also criticized American 
network news reports on the hunger strike. They generally 
adhered to a view expressed later by R.J. Raymond, "Covering 
the Ulster conflict is a task far which American television 
reporters are unprepared. They have neither the sources in 
Northern Ireland nor the necessary knowledge of Irish 
history. 11 • 2 
Officials at the British Information Service were 
particularly incensed at some of the reports on American local 
television and radio. They attacked specific programs which 
they considered pro-republican. The British press joined these 
condemnations and one weekly journal concluded: 
In cities with big Irish-American populations, 
local newscasts have been appalling. Highly 
popular, they are not so much journalism as 
news-as-show business. Presenters picked for 
their pretty faces and ethnic mix, have been let 
loose on the complexities of Ulster. 63 
The Thatcher administration began sending delegations to 
America to counteract republican publicity in the media. 
Senior officials from the Northern Ireland Office and 
prominent M.P.s assisted the B.I.S. in trying to influence 
editorial boards and television executives. These efforts 
produced few noticeable results. One official lamented: 
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I'm very much aware that opinion in the U.S. is 
severely against us. We haven't enough resources 
to counter this very skillful campaign. And, 
American opinion is very important to us. If the 
U.S. government was persuaded that our actions 
in Northern Ireland are wrong, or that human 
rights are being violated, it would effect 
overall policy toward Britain. But, there is no 
real interest in our side of the story in the 
U.S.!64 
The failure of British officials to adequately counteract 
Irish republicanism in America produced continual cri~icism 
from unionist politicians. They accused the Thatcher 
administration of incompetence and lack of commitment to the 
publicity battle. These criticisms were endorsed by a number 
of British newspapers, which in turn, called on the government 
to employ private publicists and lobbyists in its campaign. 
There was also a demand for the appointment of a top official 
from the N. I. o to head .the British Information Service. ~ 
Economist characterized the government's efforts as follows: 
The intermittent salesmanship by such Northern 
Ireland ministers· as Humphrey Atkins and Adam 
Butler has been embarrassingly patrician and 
inept. It is an axiom of public relations that 
the best publicity cannot sell a bad product. 
But in America no publicity is conspicuously not 
selling a good one--especially when a worse 
product is being sold by one of the world's most 
effective techniques; ethnic loyalty backed by 
terrorists ready to die for the cause. 65 
The unprecedented media coverage of the hunger strike in 
the U.S. greatly increased Irish-American concern for events 
in Ulster. News reports in Tbe Irish Echo, Irish Voice and 
Irish Advocate were almost completely devoted to the latest 
developments in the H-Blocks. They unanimously supported the 
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prisoners' "five just demands," printed information about 
protest demonstrations, pleaded with Irish-Americans to get 
involved in the publicity campaign, and published severe 
condemnations of the Thatcher government. The Irish People 
surpassed all of these newspapers in its violent attacks and 
threats against the British. It also tried to humanize the 
hunger strike by printing extensive weekly biographies of the 
prisoners, describing their typical Irish Catholic background, 
their endearing personal characteristics, and emphasizing 
their idealistic devotion to the centuries old cause of Irish 
freedom. 11615 
Noraid and other groups capitalized on the increased 
Irish-American concern for the hunger strikes. They built 
support by publicizing the intense suffering endured by the 
prisoners as their bodies grew weaker from lack of food. They 
emphasized the prisoners' extreme courage and nobility in 
being willing to die for the eternal cause of Irish unity. The 
Irish National Caucus, in particular, re-emphasized Catholic 
symbolism in their publicity materials and continually drew an 
analogy between the prisoners and Christ's suffering on the 
cross. 
Through these appeals, republicans succeeded in 
attracting previously uninterested Irish-Americans. As the 
hunger strike continued, they organized the largest and most 
prolonged public demonstrations in the current troubles. The 
biggest of these took place in New York City outside the 
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British Consulate on Fifth Avenue. Republicans held daily 
protests throughout May 1981. They peaked in the week after 
Sands' death, when an average of several thousand people 
protested daily.~ 
Initially these demonstrations were orderly, typically 
consisting of protesters marching up and down Fifth Avenue, 
led by pipers playing Irish laments, chanting pro-republican 
slogans. As the hunger strike reached a climax the protests 
became more militant. Irish-American republicans burned 
effigies of Margaret Thatcher and there were a series of 
attacks on the British consulate. Demonstrators forced British 
officials to remove the Union Jack from outside their 
consulate and the flag had to be removed from businesses 
throughout the city. 68 
on July 6, 1981, seven protesters, including Fr. Daniel 
Berrigan, broke into the British Consulate and held a three 
hour sit-in. Consular staff claimed they broke furniture and 
destroyed documents in the library. 69 On August 4, an I.R.A. 
sympathizer entered the British mission at the United Nations. 
He said he had a bomb strapped to his body and demanded to 
talk to Margaret Thatcher about the hunger strike. 70 
Demonstrators dressed in I.R.A. uniforms maintained all 
night vigils outside the British Consulate throughout the 
hunger strike. They cursed and jeered at consular staff 
entering or leaving the building. The British Emb~ssy was 
forced to ask for greater police protection for its staff in 
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New York and had to increase security at its consulates 
throughout the United States. One British diplomat told ~ 
London Times, "When I go to work I am called a bastard, a 
murderer, a butcher, and a liar--and I suffer the same all 
over again when I leave. 1171 
Irish-American republicans demonstrators were given an 
added bonus when Prince Charles visited the United States in 
mid-June 1981. Noraid ran a spontaneous campaign to disrupt 
his public engagements. As the Prince toured New York harbor 
in the yacht Highlander, a small flotilla of protesters, 
waving anti-British placards, followed and chanted republican 
slogans. 
Later, when the Prince attended a ballet performance at 
the Lincoln center, he was greeted by thousands of jeering 
demonstrators. Inside, at regular intervals, protestors arose 
from their seats and ran down the aisle shouting "obscenities" 
at the Royal box. The Chicago Tribune reported: 
A middle aged man with a thick Irish accent, 
rose from a $200 seat at the back of the 
auditorium and ran down the aisle screaming 
insults at a "royal whose country is 
committing human rights violations. 72 
Following these protests, The New York Daily Post 
published an article which criticized the timing of the royal 
visit and complained at the cost to the city of providing 
security to Prince Charles. Mayor Ed Koch and Mario Cuomo, 
Lieutenant-Governor of New York, joined the co~troversy, 
issuing statements which attacked "the centuries-old British 
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policy of denying basic civil rights in Ireland" and 
supporting the withdrawal of British troops from Ulster. 73 
As a result of the demonstrations against Prince Charles, 
British officials advised Princess Margaret to cancel a 
proposed trip to Washington in July 1981. The Princess had 
raised the fury of Irish-Americans in 1979. During a dinner 
party in Chicago, she reportedly ref erred to the Irish as 
"pigs." British Information Office agents convinced the 
Princess that her presence in the U.S. would only act as a 
"royal rag to the Irish-American bull. 1174 
In light of this information, Princess Margaret canceled 
the trip. Princess Anne and Captain Mark Phillips followed her 
lead and declined an invitation to visit Pennsylvania in 
August for a horse show. Irish republicans gloated at these 
successes and determined to escalate the H-Block publicity 
campaign. 75 
Noraid continued to enhance its publicity efforts with 
tours of former "blanket men" Noel Cassidy, Charles Crumley, 
and Seamus Delaney, all ex-Maze inmates, conducted illegal 
lectures and press conferences in the U.S. during late spring 
1981. These former prisoners were later joined by a group of 
relatives of the hunger strikers, including Sean Sands, the 
brother of Bobby, and Oliver Hughes, brother of Francis who 
died on 11 May. They visited twenty-six cities on a three week 
tour and conducted innumerable press interviews, television 
appearances and public lectures. 
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The relatives enraged Irish-American audiences with 
personal accounts of British brutality. Elizabeth O'Hara, 
sister of I.N.L.A. hunger striker Patsy O'Hara, told how 
prison officers had tortured her brother before he died by 
leaving hot meals beside his bed. On July 8, Oliver Hughes 
told a crowd in New York that during his brother's funeral, 
"British thugs stopped the hearse and bashed the funeral 
director senseless. I heard one of them say "'get the casket, 
we' 11 burn the body. 11176 
These personal accounts greatly assisted Noraid's 
publicity and further infuriated British officials. 
Republicans allege that the Thatcher government eventually 
persuaded u.s. officials to curtail the relatives' tours. The 
Irish National Caucus, for example, claimed that American 
immigration officers harassed Alice Mcilwee, mother of hunger 
striker Tom Mcilwee. Despite the fact she had American 
citizenship, the u.s. consulate in Belfast questioned Mcilwee 
about her intended public appearances and never issued her a 
visa. She only managed to get to the U.S. by obtaining an 
Irish passport and visa at the American Embassy in Dublin. 77 
Despite these allegations of harassment, Jack Holland 
contends that the relatives' tours greatly increased 
republican fund-raising and publicity in America. He says they 
were, "one of the most successful tours ever on the Irish-
American circuit" and claims they raised over a quarter of a 
million dollars. This was achieved despite strained relations 
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between Noraid and Elizabeth O'Hara, who insisted on 
emphasizing that her brother Patsy was a member of the 
"Marxist" Irish National Liberation Army. 78 
One of the most significant aspects of the hunger strike 
was the amount of political support the prisoners received. 
After Bobby Sands died, his campaign agent, owen Carron, was 
elected to the vacant seat in Fermanagh/South Tyrone. During 
the June 1981 elections in the Irish republic, hunger striker 
Kieran Doherty was elected to the Dail. Because of these 
electoral victories, the British could no longer claim that 
the prisoners were a small group of fanatics without public 
support. Republicans in America continually emphasized the 
victories at the polls and tried to win support from 
politicians, labor leaders, and the Catholic church. They 
achieved some notable and widely publicized successes. 
Two days after Bobby Sands died, the 135, 000 member 
International Longshoremen's Association (I.L.A.) imposed a 
twenty-four hour boycott of British ships. The action affected 
vessels from Maine to Texas and was masterminded by Teddy 
Gleason, President of the I. L.A. Later, an Irish-American 
Labor Coalition was formed to coordinate trade union 
activities in support of the hunger strike. The new 
organization ran boycotts against British goods and organized 
a mass demonstration to qreet the Queen Elizabeth II when it 
sailed into New York on May 9, 1981. 79 
375 
On April 27, 1981, Cardinal Terence Cooke of New York 
sent a message to Mrs. Thatcher which urged her to change 
prison regulations in the H-Blocks. A number of other bishops 
and high ranking clerics supported Cooke. Although the church 
did not officially support political status for H-Block 
prisoners, it continued to press the British for concessions. 
As each successive prisoner died, there were large 
commemoration services at St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York 
and in churches all over America;'0 
The Irish National caucus played a leading role in the 
American campaign to publicize the prison conflict. Father 
Sean McManus had shown solidarity with Bobby Sands by 
undertaking a twelve day hunger strike outside the British 
Embassy in Washington. 11 After this, McManus tried to get 
members of the Ad Hoc Committee to support the prisoners. He 
contacted Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R.,N.Y.) in the hope that the 
Congressman's close friendship with Vice-President Bush would 
have some influence. Fish tried to get the Reagan 
administration to mediate in the hunger strike but he was 
later contacted by the state Department and told there would 
be no such action. 
Undeterred by this State Department response, McManus 
then encouraged Mario Biaggi to lead a hectic drive within 
Congress to rally support for the hunger strikers. Biaggi 
succeeded in getting members of the Ad Hoc Committee to 
endorse a series of statements which sharply criticized the 
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Thatcher administration.· In April 1981, the Caucus also 
organized a trip by former u. s. Attorney General, Ramsay 
Clarke, and Fr. Daniel Berrigan to the H-Blocks. British 
authorities refused to let the two men meet with Bobby Sands 
and they reacted with bitter condemnations of Margaret 
Thatcher. During a news conference in Belfast, Clarke 
commented: 
The fact is that Margaret Thatcher -- who had 
the power to keep Sands alive, to wear his own 
clothes, and to receive a letter a day in prison 
-- permitted him to die ••• She has destroyed any 
claim she may have had of moral leadership by 
this outrageous act ••• People around the world 
will wonder what· failure of character in the 
government there is that permits young men to 
die because it will not do a small thing that is 
right. 82 
Ramsay Clarke's statement infuriated British politicians 
and prompted The London Daily Mail to issue a bitter attack on 
the former Attorney General. The newspaper accused Clarke of 
hypocrisy for failing to acknowledge the murder of R. U .c. 
Constable Gary Martin, killed in riots after Sands' death, and 
concluded; 
Former U.S. Attorney Generals and foreign 
prelates do not concern themselves with the 
death of a policeman doing his duty. Too 
commonplace! Too predictable! ••• When pity apes 
the political fashion, truly it can be grotesque 
in its selectivity. 83 
The hunger strikers received strong support from State 
Assemblies and city governments, particularly on the East 
Coast. Many issued resolutions calling for political status, 
while some city politicians tried to get British diplomats 
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evicted from their consulates. The Boston City Council changed 
the name of Chestnut Street to "Francis Hughes Avenue," in 
honor of the dead hunger striker. Maire Howe, assistant 
majority leader of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 
led a group of republican demonstrators who dumped British tea 
into Boston Harbor in a symbolic protest inspired by the 
American colonists in 1773. *" In response to Bobby Sands' 
death, the Massachusetts State legislature passed a 
resolution; 
condemning the government of Prime Minister 
Thatcher for its insensitivity to the value of 
human life and the real issues of Ireland's 
divisive struggle, and wholeheartedly supports 
the ultimate objectives of the I.R.A •• •5 
While this local political pressure had no impact on 
government policy in Washington, it did increase the strains 
on constitutional nationalist leaders. The Friends of Ireland 
recognized the growing sympathy for the hunger strikers among 
Irish-Americans who were concerned with Ulster but they did 
not want to be associated with republican groups. In April 
1981, they tried to maintain the position adopted during the 
first hunger strike -- urging the British government to 
compromise on some of the prisoners' demands while refusinq to 
support the prison protest. 
As the hunqer strike progressed and the crisis deepened, 
constitutional nationalists were pushed into a more militant 
position and their criticisms of Britain intensified. 
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Following Sands' death, Senator Edward Kennedy made the 
following statement: 
I urge the British government, which has clear 
responsibility for prison administration in 
Ulster, to act on an urgent basis to end its 
position of inflexibility, and to implement 
reasonable reforms capable of achieving a 
humanitarian settlement of the hunger strike.•• 
on May 6, 1981, the Four Horsemen sent a telegram to 
Margaret Thatcher which was made public in the American and 
British press. It strongly condemned Thatcher's 
"intransigence" and urged her to end the "posture of 
inflexibility that must lead inevitably to more senseless 
violence and more needless deaths. 11 • 7 
In her public response to this telegram, Thatcher was 
careful to acknowledge the contribution the four politicians 
had made to cutting Noraid fund-raising. Yet, she refused to 
offer concessions, claiming that Britain had tried all 
possible ways to end the hunger strike, and bluntly stated: 
The responsibility for additional deaths rests 
firmly on the shoulders of those who are 
ordering these young men to commit suicide in 
the cause of subverting democratic 
institutions.•• 
Thatcher's cool response led constitutional nationalists 
to concentrate on securing the involvement of the American 
government. Edward Kennedy made initial contacts with the 
State Department and encouraged the Irish government to launch 
a direct appeal to the President. On July 15, 1981,· Sean 
Donlon met with Reagan in the Irish Embassy. He conveyed a 
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which described Moynihan, Carey, Kennedy, O'Neill, and Ed Koch 
as, "Five Guilty Men." The newspaper claimed that because of 
their statements on the hunger strike, all five were "equally 
responsible morally" for the bomb attack. 91 
The positive effects of the prison protests on American 
republicanism can be gauged in the F.A.R.A. statements of 
Noraid. For the six month period up to July 1980, Noraid 
received $90,056. In January 1981, its collections rose to 
$105,124. Due to hunger strike pttblicity the group collected 
$15,424 in November, $33,395 in December, and $21,695 in 
January. This marked a steady increase from the $9, 139 
collected in October 1981." 
In the six month period from January to July 1981, 
Nora id's fund-raising leapt to a total of $250, 511. The 
monthly figures rose from · $5, 088 raised in February, to 
$42,848 in May, and $84,894 in June--the period of maximum 
publicity for the second hunger strike. Martin Galvin further 
stated that in the week after Sands' death, Noraid received 
$20,000 directly to its Bronx office alone, compared to a 
previous weekly rate of $3, 500 in donations nationwide. 93 
Noraid chapters from Los Angeles to Baltimore all reported 
similar increases in weekly funding and in October 1981, the 
group claimed it had established twelve new chapters due to 
increased membership during the hunger strikes. 9 ' 
Noraid refused to file a financial statement after July 
29, 1981, so no official documents exist on the amount of 
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money raised during the final three months of the hunger 
strike. Political analysts allege, however, that the group 
continued to receive unprecedented levels of financial 
support. 
The hunger strike, therefore, rejuvenated Irish-American 
republicanism and reversed a downward trend· in support and 
effectiveness which had been growing from the mid 1970s. Not 
only did Noraid increase its fund-raising, but it used the 
prison protest to achieve a significant publicity victory. 
This success substantially damaged the work of the British 
Information service. Republican activities also eclipsed the 
efforts of constitutional nationalists and the Friends of 
Ireland. 
It was Ulster unionists who were most alarmed by the 
American reaction to the hunger strike. They were infuriated 
by reports of the large republican demonstrations in New York 
and believed increased Noraid fund-raising would directly 
enhance the military capacity of the I.R.A •• Leaders of the 
Democratic Unionist Party (D.U.P.) and the Official Unionist 
Party ( o. u. P. ) , therefore, determined to launch their own 
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Chapter 8 
Ulster Unionists arui Tbe Hunger Strikes. 1980-1985 
From the beginning of the "troubles," Ulster unionists 
constantly condemned the Irish-American dimension to the 
Senator Edward Kennedy's attacks on Stormont and his support 
for the N.I.C.R.A •• When Kennedy later issued his 
Congressional Resolution calling for British withdrawal, 
unionists reacted furiously. Prime Minister Brian Faulkner 
described the Senator as an "ignoramus" and accused him of 
"playing· American politics with Ulster peoples lives." The 
pro-unionist Belfast NewsLetter ran a front page editorial 
describing how the Scotch-Irish had provided fourteen U.S. 
Presidents and, "carved out a nation years before the 
departure of the Kennedys and the Famine Irish from the shores 
of Wexford". The editorial then advised Kennedy to straighten 
out his own personal affairs, after Chapaquidick, rather than 
interfere in Ulster, and concluded: 
Of all Senator Kennedy's indescressions -- and they 
are too well remembered to recall here -- his dabbling 
in the affairs of Ulster is most mischievous and 
reprehensible. His lack of knowledge on the situation 
might be excused but to presume to advise, indeed to 
direct, from that position is to display again the 




There was little noticeable change in this unionist 
attitude, even after Kennedy moderated his views in the mid-
seventies. Despite the fact that the Four Horsemen condemned 
Irish-American support for the I.R.A., unionists continued to 
regard these politicians with extreme suspicion. Perceiving no 
difference between constitutional nationalists and republican 
groups in the U.S., they judged every political statement by 
Kennedy and his supporters as giving encouragement to the 
Provos. 2 
Unionists generally viewed the Four Horsemen as deviously 
working to win the American government's support for a united 
Ireland. They felt these leading Irish-American politicians 
would do anything within their power to harm Ulster Unionism. 
This attitude intensified after Tip O'Neill played a vital 
role in the R.U.C. "arms ban" of 1979. Unionists viewed 
O'Neill 's action as a clear indication of the treacherous 
intentions of the Four Horsemen. 
Despite this loathing for Irish-American political 
leaders, unionists directed their most bitter condemnations 
against Noraid. The Democratic Unionist Party (D.U.P.) and 
Official Unionist Party (O.U.P.) continually described Noraid 
members as "callous cowards," funding the murder of innocent 
Protestants from the safety of America. As mentioned earlier, 
some loyalist paramilitaries were so enraged by Irish-American 
republicanism that they threatened a trans-Atlantic 
assassination campaign against Noraid. 3 
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In the 1970's, unionist politicians generally tried to 
counteract Irish-American nationalists by issuing 
condemnations of their "unwanted interference" in the internal 
affairs of Ulster. Some more ambitious politicians actually 
traveled to the United States and tried to publicize the 
unionist political position. These politicians also worked to 
establish a support network in America, to counteract the 
publicity of the Four Horsemen and Noraid. 
Al though a number of unionist groups did emerge, they 
remained extremely small. This was principally because, unlike 
Irish-Americans, there was no Ulster Protestant ethnic network 
which they could draw upon. The major waves of Ulster 
Protestant emigration had occurred in the eighteenth century. 
Most had completely assimilated into the mainstream of 
American society and retained no attachment for their 
ancestral homeland. There were only a few notable exceptions 
to this general trend.' 
one of the oldest Ulster Protestant organizations in 
America is the Loyal Orange Institution of the United States. 
The first Orange Lodge was established in 1820 in New York. By 
the 1870s an extensive orange network had grown throughout the 
East Coast, supporting Anglo-American nativism and organizing 
annual parades on the Twelfth of July. These parades naturally 
raised the antagonism of Irish catholic immigrants. A number 
of people were killed in sectarian clashes during Twelfth 
celebrations in New York in 1871. 5 
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The Loyal Orange Institution steadily declined from its 
peak in the 1870s. Today there are only twenty-nine lodges 
with a few hundred members. 6 Most of these Orangemen are 
immigrants from Northern Ireland. Some have tried to promote 
Ulster unionism in America. They hold an annual Twelfth of 
July parade in Philadelphia at which participants eat orange 
ice cream and drink orange dyed beer. Guest speakers try to 
outmatch their brethren in Belfast in the ferocity of their 
condemnations of the I.R.A •• 7 
The Loyal Orange Institution in the United states promotes 
Ulster unionism in its quarterly newspaper The Sash. It also 
regularly supports publicity tours of America by Official 
Unionist M.P. Rev. Martin Smyth, Imperial Grand Master of the 
Loyal Orange Lodge. Recently, American Orangemen began making 
direct financial contributions to Unionist political 
campaigns. 8 
Ulster unionism has also received support in America from 
Scotch-Irish societies. These groups are almost exclusively 
centered in Pennsylvania, a region which had been extensively 
settled by Ulster immigrants. 9 One of the largest of these 
organizations was the Scotch-Irish Foundation of Philadelphia, 
founded in 1949 by descendants of Ulster immigrants. The 
Foundation encouraged a greater appreciation of the Scotch-
Irish contribution to the United States by funding historical 
research. 
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When the present troubles broke out in Northern Ireland, 
the Scotch-Irish Foundation strongly supported Ulster 
unionism. President John McPherson and General Secretary John 
Tuten appeared on local television and radio in Philadelphia 
to challenge Irish-American nationalists. They conducted 
letter writing campaigns claiming there was no discrimination 
against Catholics under the Stormont government. McPherson and 
Tuten also tried to counteract what they perceived as a "anti-
unionist bias" in the American media's presentation of the 
Ulster conflict.w 
While the scotch-Irish societies and the Orange network 
had been in existence before 1968, some groups formed in 
direct response to the current troubles. In 1971, the Ulster 
American Loyalists (U.A.L.) began in Los Angeles. It was 
mainly composed of Ulster exiles who had been recruited to 
work for West Coast aerospace industries in the 1960s. The 
U.A.L. encouraged unionist politicians to travel to California 
and present their views at public meetings. They also 
conducted information campaigns to warn Congress of the 
"devious" activities of Irish-American politicians in working 
for a united Ireland." 
To finance its publicity efforts, the U.A.L. organized a 
variety of fund-raising schemes and social functions. The 
largest of these was a yearly Twelfth of July dinner dance in 
Los Angeles. Members of the group decorated a function room 
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with Ulster flags, wore Orange Sashes, and danced the night 
away to recordings of loyalist flute bands. 12 
These groups, however, were atypical of the unionist 
support network in America. Individuals working on their own 
initiative promoted the Ulster Protestant cause. Harold 
Alexander, for example, maintained a single-handed publicity 
drive in support of the New Ulster Political Research Group. 
He also worked for at least ten other organizations ranging 
from the Ulster Unionist Council to the Progressive Unionist 
Party. 13 
Ulster clergyman Rev. Charles Reynolds organized a 
unionist publicity group in New York called the Northern 
Ireland Service Council. He hosted visiting unionist 
politicians and tried to offer an opposing opinion to Irish-
American nationalist groups in the New York media •14 In 
Chicago, Rev. Virgil Knight, a fundamentalist Protestant 
preacher, collected money among his congregation and delivered 
it to "families of soldiers, Ulster policemen and others 
killed by the I .R.A .• 1115 
Throughout the 1970s, this small Unionist support network 
tried unsuccessfully to influence the American media and 
counteract the campaigns of Irish-American nationalists. 
Al though the main unionist political parties in Northern 
Ireland tried to encourage and support the network, their 
efforts were not given strong priority. Both the O.U.P. and 
D.U.P. had limited financial resources and used their money 
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for political campaigns in Ulster. Unionists tended to leave 
the anti-I.R.A. propaganda war to the British Information 
service, which possessed much greater financial resources and 
contacts with the media. 16 
unionist concern with the Irish-American dimension was 
greatly heightened by the R. U .c. "arms ban" in 1979. There was 
also increased alarm over media reports on the importance of 
u.s. weapons and Noraid fund-raising to the I.R.A •• It was the 
1981 hunger strike, however, which caused the most unionist 
anxiety. D.U.P. and O.U.P. leaders reacted bitterly to reports 
of how American cities were naming streets after dead hunger 
strikers; how republicans had forced the removal of Union 
Jacks from all public and commercial buildings in New York; 
and how the American media was pushing the Thatcher 
administration to make concessions to the hunger strikers. 
Unionist outrage at the levels of support for the hunger 
strikers in America was compounded by their contempt for the 
British Information Service. Many O.U.P. and D. U.P. 
politicians felt that British efforts to challenge republican 
publicity were totally incompetent and inadequate. Unionists 
strongly criticized the Thatcher government for doing nothing 
to show their political position. 17 The commander of the 
Ulster Defence Association, Andy Tyrie, expressed the attitude 
of many Ulster Protestants when he commented: 
You must talk to the people in their own language •. 
The I.R.A. does that and the Brits don't know how. 
It's our own fault the United States is badly 
informed. The I.R.A. puts its case in colorful and 
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romantic terms. The British are so earnest and so 
humorless they can't combat it •18 
Unionists naturally believed that republican publicity 
victories in America would increase Noraid fund-raising_and 
this money in turn would be used to finance the I. R. A. 's 
campaign of violence. In light of this conclusion, and the 
perceived ineptness of the B. I. s., unionists began to organize 
a comprehensive publicity campaign of their own. They 
determined to present Americans with the unionist perspective 
and counteract Irish-American nationalism. 
The Belfast NewsLetter and The Belfast Telegra,ph both 
called for a major publicity drive aimed at presenting the 
Ulster unionist viewpoint to the American public. This call 
was further supported in publications ranging from the 
U. V. F. 's Combat to the Free Presbyterian Protestant Telegraph. 
One of the strongest endorsements of an American initiative 
came from the Orange Order. An editorial in its journal, The 
Orange Standard, supported a campaign to strengthen the 
unionist network in America and stated: 
In the past decade the whole running has been made 
by the "shanty Irish" in information and propaganda 
about Ulster. The Scotch-Irish, an older and more 
honorable influence on the U.S., have been 
particularly muted ••• We have not seriously sought 
to inform or influence them. The case for Ulster has 
not been pleaded in America with any enthusiasm. 
Something more permanent must be added to the verbal 
and literary pleas for American understanding. There 
has to be a bringing together of people, whose 
support is for the suffering people of Ulster, in 
such a way that they can effectively help our 
cause. 19 
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The leaders of Ulster's Protestant churches were the first 
to challenge the growing support for Irish-American 
republicanism. In the first weeks of April 1981, Bishop Robin 
Eames led a Church of Ireland delegation to the United states. 
The group had a series of discussions with religious and 
political leaders in Washington and New York. They held press 
conferences at which they condemned I.R.A. violence and tried 
to show "that Ulster Protestants were not all red-necked 
backwoodsmen and bigots. 1120 Eames asked his colleagues in the 
American Episcopal Church for support and was rewarded when 
Bishop John Allin classified the I .R.A. as terrorists and 
called the hunger strike "mass suicide."8 
Like the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland had been alarmed by Irish-American support for the 
I.R.A. since the late 1970s. In its annual report in 1979, the 
church synod expressed "deep unease" over Noraid' s 
activities. It also "deplored" the allegations of sectarian 
bias made against the R.U.C. by Tip O'Neill and his 
. supporters • 22 
On May 15, 1981, following the example of the Church of 
Ireland, a ten man Presbyterian delegation visited America. 
Their objective was to present an alternative view to the 
rising republican publicity after the death of Bobby Sands. 
The group said it wanted to counteract the American media 
presentation of the hunger strike which they claimed was 
"clearly inclined towards the nationalist perspective. 1123 
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The Presbyterian group, led by Rev. J.A. Weir, were much 
more forceful in pushing the unionist perspective than the 
Church of Ireland delegation. They not only launched severe 
attacks against the hunger strikers, but also tried to defend 
the civil rights record of the Stormont government. Spokesmen 
for the group emphasized that the N.I.C.R.A. was principally 
a nationalist movement and claimed there was extensive anti-
Protestant discrimination carried on by nationalist dominated 
local councils in the 1960s. 24 
The efforts taken by the two church groups inspired 
unionist politicians. John Dunlop, O.U.P. Member of Parliament 
for Mid-Ulster, began supporting publicity trips to the U.S. 
by victims of I.R.A. attacks. Many unionists felt that if 
Americans could hear about the horrors of I.R.A. attacks from 
the victims, it would greatly discourage financial support for 
Noraid. Partly from this premise, a group called the Loyalist 
League of Ulsterwomen (L.L.U.) formed in August of 1981. 
In October 1981, two members of the L.L.U. undertook a 
tour of the United States to tell Irish-Americans about the 
"reality of the armed struggle." Ruby Speer and Kathleen 
McCurrie both lost their husbands to I.R.A. assassins. They 
traveled extensively throughout the East Coast, describing 
their personal tragedy to public meetings and media 
executives. The women also lobbied State Department officials 
to plead for .the lifting of the R.u.c. "arms ban" and the 
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removal of the tax exempt status of the Irish National Caucus 
and Ancient Order of Hibernians. 25 
Following this trip, another group of victims called 
"Widows Mite" conducted a similar publicity drive in America. 
It consisted of Protestant churchmen and individuals such as 
Georgina Gordon, whose husband and young daughter were killed 
in an I.R.A. booby trap. They distributed 10,000 copies of a 
Widow's Mite Brochure, which listed innumerable examples of 
I.R.A. atrocities.u 
These tours by Protestant church delegations and widows 
groups did not achieve much publicity in America and their 
efforts went largely unnoticed. Their limited achievements 
only served to increase unionist concern over the success of 
republican propaganda. The church leaders and widows contacted 
Unionist politicians upon their return and told them of the 
difficulty they encountered in trying to make a significant 
impact in America. 27 
The difficulty of getting the unionist viewpoint across 
was further confirmed by individual politicians who travelled 
to the United states at the time. When Harold Mccusker of the 
O.U.P. toured the East Coast in October 1981, he reported the 
total lack of appreciation for the unionist cause to his 
colleagues. He was particularly incensed by the weakness of 
B.I.S. efforts to counter the I.R.A. and made a series of 
bitter complaints to the Thatcher government. 28 
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Unionists became increasingly convinced that the only way 
to get their views heard in America was to organize a well-
f inanced and sophisticated tour by top politicians. They felt 
that if a delegation of Unionist leaders crossed the Atlantic 
they could attract attention in the u. s. , publicize their 
position, and thus destroy the influence of Irish-American 
nationalism. 
Plans for what would become the most ambitious unionist 
initiative in America began in the autumn of 1981. One of the 
driving forces behind the scheme was Official Unionist M.P. 
Rev. Robert Bradford. He realized that a show of unionist 
solidarity would bring the greatest success. Bradford 
therefore brought together a tour party composed of the most 
prominent politicians from the D.U.P. and o.u.P .• It included 
John Taylor, Official Unionist Member of the European 
Parliament, and Peter Robinson, Deputy Leader of the 
Democratic Unionists. The key figure in this task force, 
however, was Rev. Ian Paisley. 
Paisley, the most recognized Ulster unionist politician in 
America, was the natural leader of the publicity tour. From 
the early 1960s he had made numerous visits to the United 
States and established a small network of loyal supporters. 
These were mainly Protestant fundamentalists attracted by 
Paisely's fierce condemnation of the ecumenical movement, and 
staunch conservatives impressed by his fierce anti-qommunist 
rhetoric. 
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In the 1960s, one of Paisley's principal associates was 
Rev. Carl Mcintire, head of the International Council of 
Christian Churches (I.C.C.C.) based in Collingswood, New 
Jersey. The I . c. C. c. was composed of over one-hundred and 
forty Protestant fundamentalist groups, of which Paisley's 
Free Presbyterians were prominent members. It vehemently 
attacked the ecumenical movement and condemned all aspects of 
"papist influence." Paisley and Mcintire developed a close 
friendship and conducted joint protests against the World 
Council of Churches and its movement towards closer relations 
with Roman Catholicism.~ 
Soon Mcintire became a regular speaker at Paisley's 
political demonstrations in Northern Ireland. At rallies in 
Belfast he typically alleged that the N.I.C.R.A. was part of 
a "godless communist plot to overthrow western civilization." 
Mcintire stressed that Irish civil rights activists were 
motivated by the same "evil principles" as Black campaigners 
in America. 30 
Mcintire also tried to aid the unionist cause in America. 
In August 1969, he organized counter demonstrations against 
Bernadette Devlin while she was in New York. The protests 
received little publicity and so Mcintire contacted Paisley. 
He convinced the Ulster leader to come to America and 
challenge Devlin. 31 
Despite the fact that Devlin left America before Paisley 
arrived, his tour caused controversy from the outset and won 
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significant publicity. When he flew into Philadelphia a group 
of unionist supporters engaged in a brawl with republicans 
waiving an Irish tricolor. In New York, Mayor John Lindsay 
refused Paisley's request for a meeting. The Ulster firebrand 
responded by accusing the Mayor of "barefaced discrimination" 
and telling reports outside City Hall that, "the Roman 
Catholic Church is getting closer to communism every day. 1132 
The second leading figure in Paisley's American support 
network was Bob Jones, another anti-communist and anti-papist. 
He was President of Bob Jones University in Greenville, South 
Carolina. The University's founder, Bob Jones Sr., had 
believed the Bible ordained separation of the races. 
Consequently, the university had refused to admit African-
American students from its founding in 1927. In 1971, B.J.U. 
was forced to relax its policies and admit married African-
Americans. By 1975 it began admitting single African-Americans 
but declared that interracial dating would be punished by 
expulsion. These racial policies complemented the strictly 
conservative administration of B. J. u. which prohibited all its 
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Bob Jones first met Ian Paisley in 1962 at an anti-World 
Council of Churches conference in Amsterdam. The two 
established a strong friendship and Jones invited his new 
associate to preach at the annual B.J.U. Bible Conference in 
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1964. Paisley so impressed the student and faculty body that 
he subsequently ~ade innumerable gospel tours to Greenville, 
and today is a prominent trustee of the University. 3 ' 
Jones, like Carl Mcintire, began supporting the Ulster 
unionist cause. He made frequent trips to Northern Ireland in 
the late sixties and seventies to attack republicanism and the 
"demonic" influence of catholicism in Ireland. In 1966, Jones 
awarded Paisley with an honorary Doctorate of Divinity. The 
American preacher was also the key speaker at the opening of 
Martyrs Memorial Free Presbyterian Church in 1967. 35 
To mark the Bicentennial celebrations of the U.S. in 1976, 
Jones and Paisley produced a pro-unionist booklet entitled, 
America's Debt to Ulster. In the introduction, Jones 
denigrated Catholic Irish-Americans and asserted that the 
Ulster Protestant influence was Ireland's key contribution to 
America's greatness. He concluded that if "Ulster's enormous 
and vital role in the founding of the great American Republic 
is re-told," then Americans would no longer be "blinded" by 
the lies of Irish nationalists.~ 
In Paisley, Ed Maloney and Andy Pollack show that Jones' 
extreme conservatism made him a friend of some of America's 
most noted racists and right-wing politicians. He was closely 
associated with George Wallace, Governor of Alabama, Lester 
Maddox, Governor of Georgia, and Senator storm Thurmond of 
South Carolina. Jones awarded honorary degrees to all three 
men and introduced them to Paisley's political ideals. Jones 
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also had contacts with Jerry Falwell's "Moral Majority" and 
used this connection to get Paisley an invitation to the 
Reagan inauguration in January, 1981. 37 
Paisley used these American contacts to establish a 
significant network of supporters in the U.S. and eventually 
began founding branches of his Free Presbyterian Church. 
Maloney and Pollack claim that the first of these churches was 
established with Bob Jones' assistance in Greenville. In 1977, 
a congregation of Protestant fundamentalists in South Carolina 
cont?cted Paisley and asked if he could provide them with a 
Free Presbyterian minister. Paisely agreed and sent over Rev. 
Alan Cairns, one of his strongest allies. 
Rev. Cairns soon established an extension of the Free 
Presbyterian Church's Theological Hall and began training 
American ministers. He helped found new churches in 
Philadelphia and Londonderry, New Hampshire. By the mid-1980s, 
graduates of the Theological Hall were building up 
congregations in Florida, Georgia, Arizona and California. 31 
With this chain of American supporters and his long 
experience in traveling to the U.S., Paisley was the central 
figure in the proposed unionist publicity tour. He began 
contacting his associates across the Atlantic to organize 
speaking venues and build up media attention. 
As plans were being finalized for the American venture, 
the I.R.A. assassinated Rev. Robert Bradford on November 14, 
1981. There is no indication this action was taken to destroy 
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the unionist publicity tour, but Irish-American republican 
groups strongly supported the killing. An editorial in ~ 
Irish People said Bradford deserved to die because of his 
associations with loyalist paramilitaries and because he had 
"prayed for typhoid in the H-Blocks so the prisoners would 
suffer more. " 39 Unionists received information on this 
editorial and were immediately enraged. The remaining members 
of the touring party became even more determined to make their 
efforts succeed.~ 
Much of the publicity and logistical organization of the 
unionist tour was conducted by David Burnside of the o.U.P. 
and Jim Allister of the D.U.P. They christened the tour 
"Operation U.S.A." and built it into the largest unionist 
publicity drive ever devoted to America. Allister and Burnside 
printed announcements of Operation U.S.A. in the unionist 
press and appealed for donations. They also organized a number 
of fund-raising socials throughout Northern Ireland to support 
what they described as "one of the most important unionist 
missions in history. 11 ' 1 
Al though unionists viewed the assassination of Robert 
Bradford as a serious setback to their American venture, 
Burnside and Allister used it to benefit the cause. They 
persuaded Bradford's widow, Nora, to take her husband's place 
on the tour. Both felt that she could convey the suffering 
caused by her husband's death and therefore show the American 
public the horror of I.R.A. murders. 
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To complement the testimony of Nora Bradford and the 
politicians, organizers of the tour produced 10,000 copies of 
a glossy brochure entitled Ulster : The Facts. The book was an 
elaborate defense of the unionist position, aimed at the 
American audience. It stressed Ulster's contribution to the 
founding of the United States and emphasized the province's 
"vital" role in World War II. The authors claimed that while 
Ulster fought alongside America and provided an essential 
staging ground for D-Day, the Republic of Ireland "helped the 
Nazis by remaining neutral." To emphasize this point, the book 
contained a photograph of Eamonn de Valera next to one of 
Adolf Hitler, obviously offering readers a direct comparison 
between the two men. 
Ulster : The Facts also outlined the leftist connections 
of the I.R.A. and emphasized that its objective was to create 
Marxist revolution. There were photographs of secret weapons 
allegedly confiscated from the Provisionals with captions 
stating: 
Money has come from the u. s. to provide arms and 
support for the killing of British citizens in 
Northern Ireland. Those who contribute such money 
are either people of feeble intelligence who have 
fallen naively for the lies of Irish republican 
propaganda or else - and this is a grave possibility 
- they are enemies of the American people, of the 
American way of life and of the Western alliance, 
who are working as the agents of these alien forces 
which want to destroy the standards of civilization 
we in the West have created and are prepared to 
uphold. 42 
The book was intended to capitalize on American anti-
communism and aversion to international terrorism. In order to 
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grip the reader, it also contained a number of horrific color 
photographs of dismembered limbs and charred corpses. These 
were alleged to be victims of I.R.A. attacks. The photographs 
were so gruesome that they generated publicity in their own 
right. At a press conference to launch the book in Belfast, 
some journalists were so sickened they had to leave the 
room. 43 
David Burnside and Jim Allister arranged for 8,000 copies 
of Ulster The Facts to be transported to America for 
distribution by members of the Operation U.S.A. team. They 
also tried to prepare for the expected pro-I .R.A. 
demonstrations. Members of the tour were booked into hotels 
under assumed names. Unionist organizers also contacted the 
American Consul in Belfast to express their concern that 
Irish-American republicans might use violence against them. 
The Consul General assured the group that they would get full 
police protection in every city they visited.'' 
In order to maximize publicity in America, the unionist 
organizing committee also employed the services of Jack 
Buttram, owner of a public relations firm working in 
Washington o.c. The Buttram Agency specialized in publicizing 
political causes to Congressmen and Senators on Capitol Hill. 
Buttram began organizing television and radio appearances for 
the Operation U.S.A. team, printed publicity materials, and 
arranged public lectures and press conferences. Because of 
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these activities, the Agency was forced to register under the 
F.A.R.A., as agent of both the D.U.P. and o.U.P •• 45 
The organization of Operation U.S.A. was thus highly 
professional and unionist leaders believed it would make a 
considerable impact on American opinion. The Buttram Agency 
arranged a schedule which would take tour members all over the 
United States and give them as much media exposure as 
possible. Throughout late November 1981, David Burnside also 
tried to contact Ronald Reagan and Alexander Haig to arrange 
discussions with the Operation U.S.A. team. 
The optimism of unionist organizers, however, was severely 
shaken by a series of adverse developments which seriously 
damaged their initiative. When Ulster-The Facts was released, 
it was immediately attacked by nationalists in Ireland. They 
took exception to its historical analysis which claimed the 
Easter Rising was "essentially a pro-German rebellion" and its 
association of Hitler with de Valera. Though unionists had 
expected these criticisms, they were not prepared for the 
' equally strong attacks in the British press. A number of 
leading newspapers ridiculed the unionist booklet as 
"simplistic" and "historically inaccurate." The Guardian, in 
particular, condemned the book's allegation that the Irish 
government was assisting the I .R.A •• The newspaper pointed out 
the long series of Garda raids on arms dumps and the 
continuous prosecutions under the Special Criminal Court in 
Dublin. 46 
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More damaging than these attacks, however, was the 
s.o.L.P.'s discovery that one of the book's gruesome 
photographs was not what it was claimed to be. The photograph 
showed a mangled victim and was entitled, "The Decomposed Body 
of an I.R.A. Victim Found by an R.U.C. Search Party." Michael 
Canavan, S.D.L.P. spokesman for Law and Order, disputed this 
claim and pointed out that the photograph was of Sam Miller, 
a victim of loyalist assassins. 47 
Unionists originally disputed Canavan's allegation, but 
after conducting research, David Burnside admitted that the 
booklet was in error. This acknowledgement caused considerable 
embarrassment to the Operation U.S.A. team. Irish-American 
republicans later used the mistake to denigrate the unionists 
during press conferences in the United States. 48 
The damage done to Operation U.S.A. by this adverse 
publicity was slight compared to the action taken by both 
republican and constitutional nationalists in America. The 
Irish National caucus had closely monitored the development of 
the unionist initiative and received information on the tour 
schedule organized by the Jack Buttram Agency. Fr. Sean 
McManus fully realized that Ian Paisley was the key figure in 
the publicity initiative and so he began investigating ways to 
wreck the initiative. On December 2, 1981, he began a lobbying 
campaign in Washington aimed at removing Paisley's American 
visa. He wrote to Secretary of State Alexander Haig alleging 
that Paisley would be a disruptive influence in the United 
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states. Later, on December 14, McManus encouraged one hundred 
members of the Ad Hoc Committee to send a telegram to Haig 
endorsing this claim and requesting the State Department to 
deny a visa to Paisley. 49 
Members of the Friends of Ireland were also alarmed at the 
prospect of Paisley leading a major unionist publicity tour. 
They were particularly incensed by his strong opposition to 
the Anglo-Irish Summits and by his formation of the Third 
Force a new loyalist parliamentary organization whose 
purpose was to defend Protestants from I.R.A. attacks. 50 
On December 8, 1981, Daniel Moynihan, Tip O'Neill and Ted 
Kennedy wrote to Alexander Haig and requested the removal of 
Paisely's visa "in light of his appeals to bigotry and 
religious hatred in Northern Ireland, his long standing 
tactics of intimidation and oppression, and his thinly-veiled 
exhortations to sectarian violence." on December 11, a group 
of nineteen Senators, including Robert Dole, Joseph Biden and 
even Jesse Helms, backed this request and informed Alexander 
Haig that "Paisley has consistently expressed the gospel of 
bloodshed in leading mob demonstrations through Roman Catholic 
areas of Belfast."M 
When Paisley heard of this campaign in Washington, he held 
a press conference in which he casually dismissed the 
possibility his critics might succeed. He told reporters that 
he had traveled to the United States over fifty times in the 
1970s without any trouble. Paisley further stated that there 
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was no way the government could exclude both a Member of 
parliament and a·Member of the European Parliament. He claimed 
The Friends of Ireland were; 
dead scared at the success of my campaign against 
the Anglo-Irish Summit and the harm I'm doing their 
united Ireland cause. Evidently, the united Ireland 
men in the U.S. are afraid. They don't want the 
Unionist case to be made. The truth is going to hurt 
them too much ! 52 
Paisley failed to appreciate the influence of The Friends 
of Ireland and was shocked to learn that on December 13, the 
state Department announced it was reviewing his visa. 
Government officials issued a rather unconvincing statement 
which claimed their review had started before the pressure 
from Congress. Following this re-assessment, the State 
Department announced on December 21 that it would revoke 
Paisley's visa because his presence "would be prejudicial to 
the American public interest. 1153 
The visa denial caused immediate controversy on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Paisley violently denounced the decision and 
claimed it was taken because of the "anti-Ulster bigotry" of 
the Reagan administr~tion. He pointed out that Deputy 
Secretary of State William Clark was a member of the Ancient 
Order of Hibernians, and that Alexander Haig was a Roman 
Catholic. Paisley claimed that these facts naturally inclined 
the two officials towards Irish nationalism. 54 
Paisley also organized protest demonstrations outside the 
U.S. Consulate in Belfast and its staff reported receiving a 
series of threatening phone calls . 55 He also contacted his 
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supporters in America and urged them to protest the visa 
denial. Bob Jones began orchestrating a letter-writing 
campaign to Senators and Congressmen appealing for help. 
Typical of these was a telegram from Rod Bell, President of 
the Fundamentalist Baptist Fellowship of America, to 
Congressman William Whitehurst. It stated: 
His character is impeccable, the salt of the earth 
in his country. Americans will not stand for people 
like O'Neill and Kennedy to spread slanderous 
attacks against a man like Dr. Paisley. It will 
cause every Protestant and Baptist in the U.S. who 
loves freedom to rise up in vigorous protest. Dr. 
Paisley has hundreds of thousands of friends in the 
U.S. who will not stand for such Roman catholic 
bigotry. 56 
In Britain, the press reaction was generally critical of 
the State Department's action. A number of newspapers 
suggested the visa denial would make Paisley a martyr and 
increase his support among militant unionists. 57 In America, 
the press reaction against the state Department was much 
stronger. Many newspapers viewed the denial of Paisley's visa 
as an attack on the principle of free speech and freedom of 
information. The Washington pgst described the government's 
action as "shameful" while The Christian Science Monitor 
demanded that, "Ulster's voice should be heard! 1151 An 
editorial in The r.os Angeles Times commented: 
The American people would have been able to make up 
their own minds about Paisley's extremism. Revoking 
his visa is a form of extremism itself and not 
worthy of our country •.. such actions by the State 
Department tend to harm American traditions more 
than they hurt objectionable characters ·like 
Paisley. 59 
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While the American press supported Ian Paisley's right to 
visit the U. s. , almost every editorial also condemned his 
political views. Any benefit Paisley received from the 
publicity surrounding the visa denial was far outweighed by 
the attacks which were launched against him. He was described 
as an "arch bigot" and one of the primary causes of sectarian 
strife in Ulster. Political commentaries generally reflected 
the opinion offered later by Mike Barnacle of The Boston 
Globe: 
Paisley is a howling bigot who gets his kicks out.of 
hating Roman Catholics ••• He has done everything a man 
could do to keep the fires of hate bright and burning 
in Ulster. He is a cynical, ignorant, manipulative, 
publicity seeking rabble rouser. 60 
These severe denunciations had an adverse effect on Ulster 
unionism. They failed to distinguish between Paisley's 
extremist views and those of moderate unionists. Consequently, 
Americans were given the impression that all Ulster 
Protestants were intransigent and narrow minded in their 
refusal to contemplate a political agreement with 
nationalists. 
Among Irish-American activists there was considerable 
divergence of opinion over the visa issue. Noraid adopted the 
unlikely position of supporting Paisley. This was primarily 
because the group wanted all restrictions lifted so that 
prominent Irish republicans could come to America. Leading 
Irish-American republicans, such as Frank Durkan, wrote to 
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Alexander Haig appealing for a reinstatement of Paisley's visa 
because; 
Stifling discussion on such a topical matter as 
Northern Ireland can only lead to frustration and 
encourage violence. In a situation where dialogue 
and expression of opinion are vital in order to 
clear the air, the suppression of any viewpoint, 
whether nationalist or Unionist, serves only to 
exacerbate the situation." 
In Ireland, John Hume opposed the State Department's 
decision but this did not change the strong opposition to 
Paisley from The Friends of Ireland. The Irish National Caucus 
and Ad Hoc Committee, while supporting visas for republicans, 
were not prepared to acknowledge a similar right to Paisley. 
The Irish Echo summarized the feelings of both groups in an 
editorial which stated: 
Paisley insults every American Roman Catholic 
virtually every time he opens his mouth. . . Like 
Kohmeini, Paisley uses religion as an object of hate 
not love. The Irish-American community simply can 
not tolerate this fascist bigot's easy access to our 
beloved nation. 62 
The organizers of Operation U.S.A. realized Paisley's 
absence from the tour would greatly diminish its impact. They 
devised a plan to get permission for Paisley to at least visit 
New York. On January 6, 1982, Paisley re-applied for an 
American visa and stated that he wanted to address the United 
Nations. He hoped that if he promised to stay within a four 
mile radius of the U.N. building, the U.S. government would be 
forced to grant him admittance. This is how "unwelcome" 
political figures, such as Fidel Castro, are able to visit the 
United States without a visa. 
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The Reagan administration, however, refused to alter its 
position. Staff members at the U.S. Consulate in Belfast 
considered Paisley's renewed visa application but turned it 
down. They pointed out that the D.U.P. leader was unable to 
show that he had been invited to address the United Nations. 
To enforce this decision, the U.S. Embassy in London sent a 
telegram to all trans-Atlantic airlines informing them that 
Paisely's visa was void. It warned the airlines that if they 
carried him to America they would be subject to a hefty 
fine. 63 
When unionists realized that Paisley would not be 
permitted to enter the United States, they re-assessed their 
planned itinerary and tried to make the best of the situation. 
They contacted supporters in Toronto and arranged for Paisley 
to visit Canada instead. Eileen Paisley took the vacant 
position on the American tour and brought tape recordings of 
speeches her husband had intended to deliver. 
On January 16, 1982, the Operation U.S.A. team flew out of 
Belfast for their various destinations. Despite the group's 
optimism, the tour was a publicity disaster from the 
beginning. Nora Bradford, Eileen Paisley, John Taylor, and 
Peter Robinson intended to begin their campaign with rousing 
speeches at the National Press Club in Washington. Without the 
presence of Ian Paisley, however, the media showed little 
interest. Not one American television network appeare~ at the 
Press Club to record Eileen Paisley reading out her husband's 
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speech. The few journalists who did attend condemned the 
unionist delegation for spreading Paisley's "bigotry" and 
"deep derangement. 1164 
Following the press conference in Washington, the group 
split up. Nora Bradford and Eileen Paisley went south to make 
appearances in Birmingham and Atlanta. The climax of their 
trip came at a rally in Greenville where the women played a 
recorded message from Paisley to a group in Bob Jones 
University. Peter Robinson made a number of public appearances 
in California while John Taylor toured the Mid-West and 
Boston. 
The scant publicity the four managed to attract was mostly 
negative. While Peter Robinson was speaking in San Francisco, 
someone telephoned a bomb threat and the hall had to be 
evacuated. 65 When the four met up again in New York, they 
signed into the Empire Hotel under assumed names. Noraid 
discovered their whereabouts, however, and groups of 
republicans picketed the hotel chanting pro-I .R.A. slogans and 
derogatory remarks about Rev. Robert Bradford. After these 
demonstrations, the F.B.I. arrested a man in Brooklyn who had 
a sub-machine gun and was alleged to be a contract killer 
hired to assassinate Peter Robinson. 66 
The Operation U.S.A. tour also suffered negative publicity 
because of its close association with Bob Jones. On January 9, 
1982, the Reagan administration announced that it would 
reinstate the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University. Its 
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tax-exempt status had been removed in 1976 because the 
government declared the admission policy towards African-
Americans was discriminatory. Reagan's decision to lift the 
ban received widespread condemnation in America and newspapers 
carried articles attacking the "racism" practiced at B.J.U •• 
As the unionists tour group had strong contacts with Bob 
Jones, their image was also depreciated in this wave of 
negative publicity. 67 
Jones created more bad publicity for Ulster Unionism with 
his attacks on the State Department's refusal to grant Paisley 
a visa. In March 1982, Paisley re-applied for permission to 
attend the annual Bible conference at Bob Jones University. 
The State Department again denied a visa. This prompted Jones 
to launch a severe personal attack on Alexander Haig. Before 
7,000 students at the Bible conference, Jones described the 
Secretary of state as a "Roman Catholic bigot" and "a monster 
in human flesh and a demon possessed instrument to destroy 
America." He asked his students to pray that "the Lord will 
smite him, hip and thigh, bone and marrow, heart and lungs, 
and all there is to him, and he shall destroy him quickly and 
utterly. 1168 
Jones' attack caused a wave of publicity in the United 
States and initiated a series of criticisms in the media. A 
number of editorials described his views as "despicable" and 
"ignorant." Commentators writing on the statement also 
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attacked Ian Paisley and criticized similar unionist 
"intolerance" towards Catholics in Northern Ireland. 69 
Perhaps the worst consequence to unionists of the 
operation U.S.A. tour was that it actually enabled republicans 
to stage their own publicity drive. When the D.U.P. and O.U.P. 
first announced their American initiative, Sinn Fein said it 
would send Danny Morrison and Owen Carron M.P. across the 
Atlantic to disrupt the group. Carron and Morrison applied for 
visas but, like Paisley, they were refused. Undeterred by 
this, both men promised they would ignore the visa denial and 
enter the United States illegally. 
On January 17, 1982 , Carron and Morrison flew to Canada 
to challenge Ian Paisley's activities in Toronto. They 
obtained copies of his schedule and organized protests. The 
two Sinn Fein leaders worked alongside members of Toronto's 
Irish Prisoners of War Committee and effectively demonstrated 
against every public appearance of the D.U.P. leader. 
Danny Morrison addressed a crowd of republicans outside a 
Free Presbyterian Church in which Paisley was preaching. They 
chanted pro-I .R.A. slogans in an attempt to drown out the 
sermon. Morrison and Carron also disrupted the official 
launching of Ulster : The Facts at a press conference in the 
Royal York Hotel, Toronto. Through such activities, the two 
Sinn Fein leaders deflected attention away from Paisley, 
challenged his political statements, and attracted media 
exposure for the republican perspective. Partly due to their 
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efforts, The Toronto Star, Canada's largest daily newspaper, 
refused to report on Paisley's tour. 70 
After the campaign against Paisley, Carron and Morrison 
decided to enter the United States to challenge the other four 
Unionists and attend the annual Noraid dinner in New York. The 
U. s. Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, had been 
monitoring illegal crossings by republican from Canada for 
months. They were alerted about Carron and Morrison and 
arrested the two men when they presented false passports to 
authorities in Buffalo. 
The two Sinn Fein leaders were held in Erie State 
penitentiary. They immediately used the opportunity to exploit 
the propaganda potential. Both went on a blanket protest, 
refusing to wear prison clothes, and threatened a hunger 
strike if they were not allowed to contact republican 
supporters in New York. Morrison and Carron also refused legal 
assistance so they could deliver fiery republican speeches at 
their arraignment. These efforts produced the intended 
results, as the incident was reported on C.B.S. Evening News 
and in the major American newspapers. One observer reported 
that in Buffalo the affair "was played as the biggest 
international story since acid rain." 71 
Initially, U.S. officials filed felony charges and 
threatened to hold Carron and Morrison without bail. This 
infuriated Irish-American republicans who immediately 
encouraged Mario Biaggi to pressure the I.N.S •• Eventually, 
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federal prosecutors decided to indict the two men on criminal 
charges. Noraid posted bail and the Sinn Fein leaders returned 
to Ireland in late January, pending trial. 
Their trial was initially set for March of 1982, but 
because of a series of delays, was not held until October of 
1983. Carron and Morrison again milked maximum publicity from 
their situation. They claimed they did not have the finances 
to attend the trial and so the U.S. government was obliged to 
pay for their first class tickets to America. This was an 
intense embarrassment for a government which had maintained a 
strict ban on republicans entering the country from the early 
1970s. 
When Carron and Morrison arrived in New York they were 
released pending jury selection. Both men immediately began a 
circuit of public lectures and news conferences at which they 
defended the I.R.A.'s campaign and attacked the state 
Department's visa policy. They were .handed yet another great 
publicity opportunity when James Prior, Northern Ireland 
Secretary of state, arrived in America to conduct a British 
information campaign in Washington and other major cities. 
Carron and Morrison followed Prior around the country, 
appearing unexpectedly at his press conferences to directly 
attack British policy. Their confrontations were widely 
reported in Ireland. Prior later admitted the two Sinn Fein 
leaders caused him extreme annoyance and embarrassment in 
America. 72 
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When Carron and Morrison were eventually brought to trial, 
they used the event to issue an extensive defense of Irish 
republicanism from the dock. They were ultimately convicted of 
attempting to enter the United States illegally, though were 
sentenced to a mere one year period of unsupervised probation. 
The case concluded in controversy when Judge John Curtin 
congratulated the two defendants for their dignified conduct 
throughout the trial, praised their moving testimony about 
events in Ireland, and implied that the American government's 
visa policy was in error. Republicans in America rejoiced at 
the court decision and sarcastically thanked the Reagan 
administration for allowing Carron and Morrison to win this 
important publicity victory at U.S. government expense. 73 
The failure of Operation U.S.A. and the subsequent 
publicity victory of Carron and Morrison enraged unionist 
leaders. When the tour members returned to Northern Ireland, 
they told reporters their trip was a great success. Privately, 
however, they admitted the failure of their mission. John 
Taylor, in particular, was extremely discouraged over the 
inability to get the unionist view across to the American 
media. He complained about the "all pervasive influence" of 
Irish nationalists and the inherent bias against unionists 
among U.S. politicians and government officials. 7 ' 
Unionists were deeply frustrated, having devoted so much 
effort to the Operation U.S.A. initiative yet achieving 
nothing except providing republicans with a propaganda 
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victory. Perhaps out of this frustration, unionists began 
issuing unusually severe condemnations of the American 
dimension to the Ulster conflict. James Molyneaux, leader of 
the O.U.P., presented the strongest of these in March of 1982. 
He held a news conference at which he suggested the C.I.A. 
were operating in Ulster, trying to achieve a united Ireland. 
Molyneaux also implied that the C.I.A. might have been 
involved in the assassinations of Airey Neave, Robert 
Bradford, and Lord Louis Mountbatten. 75 
It seems Molyneaux was motivated more by disappointment 
after the Operation U.S.A. tour than by conviction. He never 
produced evidence to support his allegations and was 
criticized by the American Embassy in London, which described 
his statement as "unworthy of comment." Even some members of 
the O.U.P. criticized Molyneaux and The Belfast Telegraph told 
him to stop "talking in riddles," to "produce hard evidence," 
or "withdraw the allegations! 1176 
The final aspect of Operation U.S.A. which frustrated the 
participants was their inability to strengthen the unionist 
support network in America. One of the main objectives had 
been to encourage greater effort from the various groups and 
individuals promoting the unionist cause. While in California, 
Peter · Robinson claimed that his public appearances were 
extremely successful and that he was "deluged with calls and 
messages of support from Ulster exiles telling me to keep up 
the good work. " Robinson said that because of this 
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enthusiastic response he was forming new unionist support 
organizations called "The Friends of Ulster."~ 
Despite Robinson's lofty claims, only a handful of people 
followed up on their promise and formed the "Friends of 
Northern Ireland" in San Francisco. The group consisted of 
only ten to fifteen Ulster exiles. Its initial publicity 
materials focused on attacking the I.R.A. by exploiting the 
American fascination with the English Royal Family. One 
publicity brochure stated: 
There is no honest man in the English speaking world 
who would speak ill of the Queen's integrity or her 
conscientious attempts to maintain peace ••• It is 
natural that the I.R.A. should oppose her because, 
just as the Royal Family signifies the best in an 
orderly and civilized society, the Provisionals 
represent the ultimate in Marxist revolutionary 
disorder. 78 
The Friends of Northern Ireland tried to monitor the 
activities of Noraid in the Bay Area and sent information back 
to Peter Robinson. They also worked unsuccessfully to present 
the unionist case to local Congressmen. Their enthusiasm soon 
waned, however, and by mid-1983 the group disintegrated and 
ceased to function. 
There were also some unionist groups that formed in the 
early 1980s by their own initiative and not out of inspiration 
from Operation U.S.A •• Again, however, they remained generally 
ineffective and collapsed from lack of interest. David 
McCalden formed one such organization, the Ulster American 
Heritage Foundation (U.A.H.F.) in 1981. McCalden was born in 
Belfast in 1951 but moved to California in 1978. He was 
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indignant at the publicity success republicans had achieved in 
America because of the hunger strikes and decided to establish 
the U.A.H.F. to counteract I.R.A. propaganda. He began 
producing a quarterly newspaper called the Ulster American 
Newsletter, which described the group's activities and 
defended unionism. The group was very small consisting of only 
about ten activists. All the organizational work was conducted 
by McCalden and Peter Peel, a history teacher at Santa Monica 
College. Peel had the distinction of being the great-great 
grandson of the founder of the British police force, Sir 
Robert Peel • 79 
McCalden tried to encourage interest in Scotch-Irish 
history by organizing exhibits at his local library in 
Manhattan Beach. These displays featured biographies of the 
American Presidents of Ulster dissent, music by Van Morrison 
and James Galway, and free samples of Bushmills whiskey. 80 He 
also conducted a campaign against the flying of the Irish 
tricolor outside the Alamo in San Antonio, Texas. He 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Daughters of the Republic 
of Texas, who were in charge of raising national emblems 
outside the mission, that because Davy Crockett and Jim Bowie 
were Scotch-Irish, an Ulster flag should be raised in their 
honor. 81 
The U.A.H.F. tried to counteract Irish-American 
republicans at every feasible opportunity. McCalden 
participated in television and radio debates with Noraid' s 
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Martin Galvin and wrote pro-unionist articles to the press. He 
attended public debates on Northern Ireland organized by San 
Francisco's Irish Forum, and later lambasted republican 
"yahoos" for getting drunk and pelting his table with dinner 
rolls. 82 When hundreds of Noraid supporters in Los Angeles 
demonstrated against a visit by Queen Elizabeth in 1983, 
McCalden and Peel organized their own two man counter protest. 
They braved republican obscenities and hails of saliva to 
parade outside the British Consulate carrying the Union Jack 
and Ulster Flag. 83 
McCalden valiantly continued his activities until 1987, 
when he stopped publishing the Ulster-American Newsletter 
because the organization could not afford the quarterly 
production costs of fifty dollars. The U.A.H.F. never built 
formal links with any of the unionist parties in Northern 
Ireland, but did assist in organizing the itinerary of 
politicians visiting the West Coast. Some unionists suspected 
McCalden of having contacts with white supremacist groups. 
They therefore tried to avoid him, heeding the warning of 
Harold Mccusker that "our image in the United States is bad 
enough without having to contend with charges of supporting 
anti-Black and anti-Semitic racism."" 
The only other unionist group which formed in this period 
was the American Aid to Ulster (A.A.U.) in Philadelphia. The 
A.A.U. was led by Annette Ravinsky, an Italian-American Jew. 
She claimed she was motivated by the I.R.A. 's support o·f the 
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P.L.O. and the similarities between Ulster Loyalists and Jews 
in Israel. She regularly contributed articles to the U.D.A. 
newspaper, Ulster, in which she warned Protestants to take up 
arms against the I.R.A. or else they would be "butchered like 
they were in 1641" and become "the Vietnamese boat people of 
Western Europe. nss 
In 1982 Ravinsky and some of her companions visited 
Northern Ireland for the Twelfth of July parades. She met with 
u.o.A. leaders and promised to help raise money for loyalist 
prisoners and challenge republican supporters in Pennsylvania. 
During the Philadelphia st. Patrick's Day Parade in 1983 I 
which honored Bobby Sands, she plastered the route with anti-
I.R.A. stickers. When the Noraid delegation passed her group, 
they booed and hissed and chanted, "Bloody Communist 
Murders! 1186 Ravinsky maintained her activities until 1985 but 
again, like David McCalden, lost enthusiasm for her gargantuan 
task and quit. 
The ineffectiveness and quixotic nature of these groups 
served only to increase unionist frustration and paranoia over 
the failure of Operation U.S.A •• They faced a situation in 
which the I.R.A. was getting important support in America. 
Unionists could do nothing about this and were again. forced to 
rely on the "incompetent" British Information Service to 
counteract Irish-American republicanism. Consequently, the 
American dimension to the Ulster conflict contributed to the 
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unionist sense of being an embattled community and accentuated 
their tendency towards political intransigence. 
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Chapter 9 
The Rejuvenation of Irish-American Republicanism Atter 
the Hunger Strike. 1981-1985. 
The failure of Operation U.S.A. greatly encouraged Irish-
American republicans. Noraid lampooned the "incompetent" 
attempts of the unionist tour group to attract positive media 
coverage. It claimed that republican demonstrations in New 
York "hounded the Orangemen back to the North with their tails 
between their legs." 1 Noraid also successfully exploited the 
publicity generated by Danny Morrison and Owen Carron. The 
group used the trial of the two Sinn Fein leaders to embarrass 
the State Department over its visa denial policy. 
The Carron/Morrison case and the collapse of Operation 
U.S.A. were just some of the positive developments for Irish-
American republicanism in the post-hunger strike period. 
Noraid and a variety of similar republican groups maintained 
the high level of activism they achieved during the prison 
protest. The sacrifice of ten hunger strikers in the H-Blocks 
inspired these groups and contributed to a rejuvenation in 
Irish-American republicanism. 
The hunger strike produced a similar renaissance in the 
republican movement in Ireland. When the fast was called off 
on October 3, 1981, the British government responded with some 
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conciliatory provisions allowing the prisoners to wear their 
own clothes and restoring half of their lost remission. These 
concessions fell well short of the hunger strikers' original 
demands and seemed a meager reward for the lives of ten men. 
Yet, the prison protests brought a dramatic improvement in the 
fortunes of Sinn Fein and re-established the I.R.A.'s heroic 
standing among segments of the nationalist community. As 
Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie point out; 
It was an irony of the episode that it began with 
the government attempting to impose on the 
prisoners the status of criminals and ended with 
the I.R.A. restoring their credentials among 
sections of the catholic community as freedom 
fighters. 2 
The most visible sign of the renewed support for 
republicanism came with the election victories of Bobby Sands 
and Owen Carron in Fermanagh/South Tyrone. These successes 
encouraged a movement within Sinn Fein to end the traditional 
policy of political abstention. The shift culminated at the 
1981 Ard Fheis when delegates overwhelmingly endorsed the 
contesting of elections and embarked on the policy of uniting 
Ireland "with a ballot paper in one hand and an armalite in 
the other. tt3 
The first opportunity to discover whether Sinn Fein's 
support would decline without the sustaining emotional charge 
provided by the hunger strikes occurred in October 1982 with 
the elections to a new regional Assembly. British Secretary of 
State, James Prior, launched this new political initiative, 
designed to secure a measure of self government in Ulster. 
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Sinn Fein contested the election but said its candidates would 
refuse to take their seats if elected. The party orchestrated 
a campaign based on traditional republicanism and on the 
party's increased community work in the nationalist ghettos. 
The results were a triumph for Gerry Adams and all those 
who supported the new republican strategy. Sinn Fein won five 
of the seventy-eight seats and took 10.1% (64,191) of the 
first preference votes. This was an advance of 2.5% on the 
anti-H-Block vote in the 1981 local elections. Even more 
satisfying, in view of Adam's ultimate desire to present Sinn 
Fein as the voice of northern nationalists, their success was 
achieved at the expense of the s.o.L.P •• 
Sinn Fein' s success was further consolidated in the 
general elections for Westminster in 1983. The party's share 
of the vote increased from 3.3% to 13.4% (102,601) while the 
S.D.L.P. total dropped by one percent to 17 .9% (137 ,012). 
Gerry Adams was elected M.P. for west Belfast, defeating a 
S.D.L.P. candidate and Gerry Fitt, who ran as an independent. 
Between 1983-85, a number of political analysts felt that Sinn 
Fein was destined to displace the S.D.L.P. as the main 
nationalist political party in Ulster.' 
The electoral success of Sinn Fein complemented the 
rejuvenation of Irish-American republicanism. Noraid used the 
republican vote to support its contention that the I.R.A. was 
not an isolated band of terrorists. It continually publicized 
and exploited Sinn Fein victories to claim that the Provo 
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campaign was a legitimate war of national liberation which had 
the support of _ a substantial section of the nationalist 
community. 
Noraid reacted to the rise of Sinn Fein by redoubling its 
own publicity and fund-raising activities. The group continued 
the high level of activism it achieved during the hunger 
strikes and consolidated its increased levels of support. 
Michael Flannery and Martin Galvin both claimed that the 
prison protest touched a nerve of ethnic identity among 
previously uncommitted Irish-Americans. They alleged that many 
young Irish-Americans were inspired by the prisoners' 
sacrifice. Consequently, Galvin claimed that by the end of 
1981 the number of American born members of Noraid exceeded 
those of Irish origin. 5 
Noraid further benefitted from the increase in Irish 
immigration to the United States in the early 1980s. The 
weakness of the Irish economy forced larger numbers of young 
people to enter America illegally in search of employment. 
While most of these new immigrants were solely concerned with 
surviving financially and did not get involved with Irish-
American political groups, some were immediately attracted by 
Noraid. 6 Their involvement arose from a variety of factors. 
Some were bitter at the Irish government's inability to 
provide them with employment. They could readily identify with 
Noraid's bitter attacks against the political leaders in the 
twenty-six counties. Others got involved with Irish-American 
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republicanism simply because the social events were "lively, 
entertaining, and offered the opportunity of meeting fellow 
Irish people. •17 
A significant number of new Irish immigrants worked in 
England before they came to America. Some claimed that this 
experience led to their involvement with Noraid. They felt 
that some English people regarded the Irish as "ignorant 
navies." This attitude contrasted sharply to their experience 
in America where being Irish was an asset. One immigrant from 
Cork, now living in the Bronx, recalls; 
I was in London for three years. After my first 
month an I.R.A. bomb went off. I knew nothing about 
it, I'd never been interested in politics, but at 
my local newsagent, where I bought a paper every 
morning, the owner asked me not to come into his 
shop again. After that I felt everyone suspected me 
just because I was Irish. 8 
An important element in the post-hunger strike 
rejuvenation of Irish-American republicanism was the 
radicalization of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. With around 
80,000 members, the A.O.H. was the largest Irish organization 
in the United States. In the 1970s, it had adopted a strong 
nationalist political perspective but its leadership generally 
withheld full endorsement of the republican position and 
condemned I. R. A. actions on several occasions. During the 
hunger strikes, however, the A.O.H. issued fierce 
condemnations of the British government and gave strong 
support to the prisoners. This growing militancy was 
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consolidated in 1982 with the election of Joseph Roche as 
President of the organization. 
Roche believed in the ideals of Irish republicanism and 
used his Presidency to endorse Sinn Fein's political program. 
He continually condemned the "brutality" of the British Army 
in Ulster and supported the I.R.A's right of armed resistance. 
Roche also encouraged a stronger republican editorial line in 
the A.O.H. newspaper, National Hibernian Digest, and forged 
closer ties between his organization and Noraid. 9 
In January 1983, Roche attended as guest of honor at the 
annual Noraid dinner aqainst the appeal of the Irish 
government not to go. He warmly applauded speeches by Seamus 
Gibney and Martha McClelland of Sinn Fein praising the I.R.A •• 
When Roche spoke he congratulated Noraid for "all the works of 
mercy that you perform for the prisoners and their families" 
and told Michael Flannery he had attended the dinner because 
"I believe that forty percent of A.O.H. members are members of 
Irish Northern Aid and I am here to represent their views. 1110 
Roche also made frequent trips to Ireland to hold 
consultations with Sinn Fein leaders. In February, 1984, he 
led an A.O.H. delegation to meet with and honor the families 
of the dead hunger strikers. While in Belfast, he invited 
Gerry Adams to speak at the A.O.H. national convention in 
Albany, New York. Adams accepted but was refused a visa to 
enter the United States. Roche was furious at this denial and 
became determined to out-maneuver the government. He organized 
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an amplified telephone link-up between Belfast and Albany 
through which Adams was able to address the A.O.H. delegates. 
The Sinn Fein President gave convention delegates the 
following compliment: 
We in Ireland are familiar with the great work of 
the Ancient Order of Hibernians in support of Irish 
national freedom. We are grateful for your 
financial contributions to An Cumman Carbrach and 
Green Cross; for your close cooperation with Irish 
Northern Aid; and for the invaluable efforts of 
President Joseph Roche. 11 
The efforts of Roche and the A.O.H. were complemented by 
various other republican groups which had greatly expanded 
their activities during the hunger strikes. These groups had 
previously been overshadowed by Noraid, but raised their level 
of activity to unprecedented heights during and after the H-
Block campaign. The American Irish Congress, for example, had 
worked for the republican cause in Long Island and New Jersey 
from the beginning of the troubles. Its activities greatly 
increased in the early eighties as it established new 
chapters, paid for anti-British advertisements on local 
television and radio, and published a monthly newsletter which 
it distributed to all politicians in the New York area. 12 
Previously dormant chapters of Clan na Gael reemerged and 
conducted enthusiastic publicity campaigns. In Toledo, Ohio, 
Dr. Seamus Mettress revitalized the Clan and organized 
demonstrations against British officials throughout the mid-
west. He also ran Irish cultural awareness forums, collected 
funds for An Cumman Carbrach, and pressured the Toledo media 
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to include the republican perspective in its reports on events 
in Ireland. 13 
One of the most colorful organizations to achieve 
prominence in this period was the American Irish Republican 
Army (A.I.R.A.). The group was formed in 1946, and since then 
had worked continuously for the republican cause. Its 
President, Colonel P. G. Duffy, claimed he participated in 
r.R.A. raids during the Border Campaign between 1956-62. He 
also took great pride in his inclusion in Ripley's Believe it 
or Not because of the great number of occupations he had 
pursued. These ranged from a shark fisherman to body guard for 
Bing Crosby. Duffy was also noted for his extreme 
conservatism, a point reflected by A.I.R.A. membership 
applications which emphasized ·"All are welcome regardless of 
race, sex or creed. No Communists!"14 
After the hunger strikes, the A.I.R.A. began a sustained 
campaign to distribute its newspaper, The Shillelagh, to 
Irish-Americans throughout the United States. The newspaper 
ran militant editorials which warmly welcomed Provisional 
I.R.A. bombing attacks on the English mainland and called for 
a final violent uprising to drive the British out of Ireland. 
The group raised funds for An cumman Carbrach by selling green 
bomber jackets with the A.I.R.A. logo printed on the back and 
auctioned oil paintings of Bobby Sands. 15 
There were also a number of new republican groups which 
formed specifically in response to the hunger strike. One of 
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these was the Irish-American Fenian Society (I.A.F.S.), 
founded in New Jersey in 1982. The I.A.F.S. soon established 
chapters in New York, California, Connecticut and 
Massachusetts. It hosted public lectures by members of Sinn 
Fein who were able to bypass the State Department's visa 
policy. The group also produced a weekly cable television news 
program which gave the republican perspective on events in 
Northern Ireland. 16 
The "Fenian Society" introduced novel ways to raise cash 
for Ireland. It began promoting an Irish-American Book of 
Freedom. For a donation of $300, patrons could have their 
photographs mounted in the book accompanied by a nationalist 
poem of their choice. The I.A.F.S. also auctioned Irish 
Prisoner of War bracelets with the name of a republican 
engraved on it. The bracelets were accompanied with a 
certificate which stated: 
By promising to wear this bracelet until the 
prisoner is released, you are pledging your support 
not only to the prisoner, but to their family and 
all those who are fighting for the freedom of 
Ireland. 17 
The rejuvenation of the republican support network in 
America alarmed both the British and Irish governments. 
Diplomats based in Washington encouraged the Reagan 
administration to intensify its actions against republican 
activities. From the beginning of the hunger strikes and into 
the mid-eighties, U. s. law enforcement agencies tightened 
their pressure on Noraid and launched a renewed campaign 
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against I.R.A. gunrunning. The increased efforts of the U.S. 
government did achieve a number of successes which hurt Irish-
American republicanism. There were, however, some noted 
failures which had the unintended effect of inspiring 
republicans and producing major publicity victories. 
The most noted republican victory over the U.S. 
government came in November, 1982, after the trial of five men 
who were caught red handed sending weapons to the I.R.A •• The 
five men included Noraid leader Michael Flannery and top 
I.R.A. gunrunner, George Harrison. The Justice Department felt 
that their inevitable conviction would be a great blow to 
Irish-American republicanism. Instead, Noraid and the other 
support groups received a tremendous publicity victory when 
the men were acquitted by a federal court in Brooklyn. 
The case originated in April 1976 when a British Army 
patrol discovered a Finnish made Valmet rifle in the Ardoyne 
area of Belfast. Chris Ryder claims that the weapon was 
analyzed by R.U.C. forensic experts who determined it had been 
shipped from America. They gave its serial number to agents of 
the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms who then 
traced the weapon to George De Meo -- the key arms supplier in 
George Harrison's network. 18 
In June 1980, De Meo was tried in North Carolina and 
convicted of illegal arms trafficking to Ireland. He received 
ten years imprisonment and a fine of $9,000. De Meo, ~reading 
such a jail term, began negotiating with the F.B.I •• He told 
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agents he would help them smash the Harrison network in 
exchange for a reduced sentence. Bureau officials promised De 
Meo that if he participated in their undercover operation his 
sentence would be reduced to two years. They also promised 
that his jail term would be served in Allenwood minimum 
security prison . 19 
With De Meo' s co-operation, Justice Department agents 
began taping the telephones of George Harrison and Tom Falvey, 
another key member of the gunrunning network. In early 1981, 
De Meo, while free on bail, visited Harrison's apartment with 
a F.B.I. wire taped to his body. He told Harrison he would 
introduce him to a trusted arms dealer. De Meo promised that 
this man would maintain the flow of arms during his stint in 
prison. 
On May 17, 1981, De Meo introduced John White to Harrison 
and Falvey. White, in reality F.B.I. agent John Winslow, posed 
as the arms dealer and began negotiating with the two I.R.A. 
supporters. Winslow told the men he could supply a whole range 
of weapons. He promised to deliver Uzi sub-machine guns, a 
flamethrower, and a 20mm cannon to shoot down British Army 
helicopters. 
The F.B.I. trap, code named "Operation Bushmills," 
reached its climax on June 17, 1981. Agent Winslow originally 
told Harrison and Falvey the cost of his first arms shipment 
was $15,000. Later he telephoned Harrison and said the price 
had to be raised to $16,000. F.B.I. agents listening to the 
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wire tap then heard Harrison call Michael Flannery and ask for 
more cash. The Noraid leader replied that the money would be 
supplied immediately. 
on June 18, Harrison called at Flannery' s house in 
Jackson Heights, New York. Federal agents observed him leaving 
with a white envelope, which was later found to contain 
$17,000. Harrison then went to Tom Falvey's house and waited 
for Winslow to arrive with the weapons. The phoney arms dealer 
soon drove up to the house in a van loaded with sub-machine 
guns and AK-47 assault rifles. The men loaded these weapons 
into Falvey's garage. Harrison then paid Winslow with the cash 
he received from Flannery. 
F. B. I. agents observed and recorded the whole 
transaction. After Winslow left they saw Harrison and Falvey 
leave the house with a bag containing a heavy object. The 
agents feared it was one of the machine guns and decided to 
spring their trap prematurely. Those in charge of the 
operation did not want to let one weapon escape their grasp 
with the possibility it might be used in Northern Ireland. 
Harrison and Falvey were therefore stopped by agents wielding 
hand guns and taken into custody. Their plastic bag contained 
two cans of beer. 
Federal agents then raided Harrison's house and 
confiscated records detailing his years of gunrunning to the 
I.R.A •• Shortly after this, they arrested Patrick Mull~n who 
had stored thirteen of the weapons in his basement. It was not 
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until October 1981 that Bureau officials apprehended Michael 
Flannery and charged him with being the paymaster in the arms 
conspiracy. Daniel Gormley, the final member of the group, was 
arrested in April 1982 after investigations discovered he had 
also supplied cash for the operation. 
The five men were brought to trial in the autumn of 1982, 
charged with conspiracy to ship weapons to the I.R.A •• Paul 
O'Dwyer and a group of associates conducted the defense but 
soon realized the amount of evidence against the men was 
overwhelming. The lawyers devised a strategy which claimed 
their clients believed that George De Meo was a C.I.A. agent. 
The C.I.A. has a license to export weapons, therefore the men 
claimed they were not only acting within the law but also had 
the endorsement of the u. S. government. George Harrison 
testified that he suspected.the C.I.A. were involved in his 
operations as a means of monitoring the flow of weapons to 
Ireland and to remove the necessity of the I.R.A. turning to 
communist countries for arms. 20 
Throughout George De Meo's long career in arms sales, he 
continually boasted to George Harrison that he was an 
operative for the c. I .A •• The defense emphasized this boasting 
to build credibility for their case. De Meo was subpoenaed 
from prison and subjected to intense questioning about his 
C.I.A. involvement. These questions seemed to unnerve De Meo 
and he continually pleaded the Fifth Amendment. He did, 
however, categorically deny any association with the c.I.A •• 
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Defense lawyers skillfully manipulated De Meo's denial to 
raise the jury's suspicions of his credibility. They employed 
former Attorney General Ramsay Clark as a key witness. He told 
the jury how the F.B.I. always had a deep distrust of the 
C.I.A. and never believed their denials of membership. Clark 
gave the impression that the C.I.A. consistently lied to 
protect its operatives and were continually involved in covert 
operations similar to Harrison's. These statements were 
supported by Ralph McGehee, a retired c.I.A. official, who 
further testified that it was perfectly logical for the 
defendants to believe the agency was involved in their 
gunrunning scheme. 21 Attorneys for the five men therefore 
succeeded in undermining De Meo's vehement denials of C.I.A. 
connections. 
The accused men also impressed the jury with their 
testimonies. They pointed out that none had criminal records 
and had collectively served their country in World War II, 
Korea, and Vietnam. As character witnesses, the men used 
people like Sam O'Reilly, an 86 year old I.R.A. veteran of the 
Easter Rising, who told the jury of the men's great patriotism 
for both America and Ireland. Bernadette Devlin described the 
defendants as "the finest human beings I have ever known" and 
there were reports that her emotional statement brought two 
jurors to tears ! 22 
The courthouse was packed daily with Irish-American 
republicans giving encouragement to the defendants. George 
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Harrison delighted them when his lawyer issued a statement 
expressing insult that he was only charged with supplying 
weapons for a six month period in 1980. Harrison proudly told 
the judge he had been exporting guns to the I.R.A. for over 
twenty five-years. 23 Michael Flannery, with equal audacity, 
stated that the money he gave Harrison for the weapons was not 
from Noraid. He claimed it was from a secret I.R.A. fund which 
donors had specifically asked to be used for guns. 2 ' 
The trial ended on November 2, 1982, with a not guilty 
verdict. Several jurors said they could not believe that 
Harrison's arms supply network could have operated for over 
twenty-five years without the knowledge of the C.I.A •• The 
courtroom fell into pandemonium when the decision was 
announced. Groups of Irish-American republicans cheered and 
waived tricolors as Harrison and Flannery shouted "Up the 
I.R.A .• " The defendants were carried shoulder high from the 
courtroom. 25 
The verdict was a major set-back to the American 
government's efforts against I.R.A. supporters in America. The 
Justice Department had hoped the involvement of Michael 
Flannery would provide undisputed evidence Noraid was involved 
in purchasing weapons. British government officials tried to 
respond to the defeat positively by emphasizing that the 
operation did smash Harrison's network. They could not, 
however, disguise their intense disappointment at the verdict. 
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The British press reacted with horror at the court 
decision. The. Sunday Express described the verdict as an 
"obscene charade" and alleged British intelligence officers 
had absolutely no confidence in the ability of American law 
enforcement agencies to "plug the arms loophole. 1126 mg 
London Times reported that Federal Judge Joseph McLoughlin had 
saluted the not guilty verdict as a great victory for'justice 
and further alleged some of the jurors took part in a victory 
celebration after the trial. 27 The Daily Mirror told how one 
rich Irish-American businessmen was so impressed by the court 
victory that he gave Noraid a blank cheque to use as they 
thought fit . 28 
In Northern Ireland, the reaction from unionists was 
predictably even stronger. The Belfast NewsLetter and ~ 
Belfast Telegraph both· described the trial as a farce and 
demanded a greater commitment from U.S. authorities to smash 
I.R.A. gunrunning. Some extremists telephoned death threats to 
the American Consul in Belfast. Unionist M.P. Harold Mccusker 
typified the anger when he stated: 
I am appalled. I can't help but believe the jury 
were totally prejudiced or intimidated, or feared 
the consequences of making any other decision. rt 
is a disgusting verdict when one thinks that seven 
people have been murdered here in the past four 
weeks -- and some were almost certainly killed by 
guns smuggled from the United states. 29 
The controversy created by the arms trial verdict caused 
Secretary of State James Prior to fly to the U. s. in an 
attempt to counter the positive publicity Noraid was 
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receiving. As the U.S. government was equally alarmed at the 
acquittal, it made every attempt to support Prior. Internal 
memoranda within the state Department showed its embarrassment 
with the verdict and its commitment to maintain good relations 
with the British. On November 16, 1982, Prior met with Kenneth 
Dam, Deputy Secretary of state. Policy coordinators instructed 
Dam to assure the British Secretary that the U.S. was 
committed to prosecuting I.R.A. gunrunners. They advised Dam 
that; 
In view of public controversy over alleged C.I.A. 
involvement with the I.R.A. following the acquittal 
of five suspected I.R.A. gunrunners in New York and 
the consequent death threat against our Consul 
General in Belfast, public acknowledgement of our 
continued assurances to the British would be 
helpful in dispelling any doubts about our 
policy. 30 
Despite this assurance of continued U.S. government 
support, Prier's visit failed to undermine the positive 
publicity engendered for republicans by the Flannery trial. 
His media appearances were canceled because of the prominence 
given to the death of Leonoid Brezhnev and his public 
appearances were disrupted by Owen Carron and Danny Harrison. 
Noraid actually contended that Prier's visit helped their 
publicity efforts and encouraged republicans. The Irish People 
commented: 
For centuries the British have reserved their 
loudest condemnations for those groups that are 
most effective in opposing their rule. Attacks by 
British officials thus become accolades signalling 
Irish nationalists that their efforts are having an 
impact. In coming to American to attack I .N .A., 
453 
Prior has paid the highest tribute to which 
republicans might aspire." 
Republican groups in America rejoiced at the controversy 
surrounding the arms trial and used their victory to attack 
the British and American governments. They concentrated on 
publicizing the information disclosed during the trial which 
showed the continuous flow of information on Irish-American 
republicans between the F.B.I. and R.U.C .• Noraid used these 
revelations to allege there was a network of British agents 
operating in America who were working against republican 
sympathizers. The Irish Echo called for massive demonstrations 
from all Irish-Americans "to make it known that they are 
against the illegal activities of British intelligence 
operatives as regarding American citizens and the cynical 
activities of our own intelligence agents in this whole grey 
area of dirty tricks."" 
New York's Irish community received George Harrison and 
his compatriots as great heroes and christened them the 
"Freedom Five." The five made guest appearances at a 
continuous round of banquets, socials and fund-raisers in 
their honor. Michael Flannery received particular praise for 
his conduct during the trial. Despite being in his eighties 
and relying on a walking stick, Flannery delivered impassioned 
republican statements and won considerable admiration outside 
republican circles. He even became the subject of a 
documentary produced by public television entitled, ·"The Old 
Man and the Gun." 
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Republican groups looked for ways to exploit Flannery's 
new found celebrity status to win even more publicity. A 
movement began within New York's Irish Societies to forward 
him as the Grand Marshal of the St. Patrick's Day parade. 
Irish-American republicans emphasized that it would be a 
fitting tribute to a man who had devoted so much of his 
energies in charitable work within the Irish-American 
community. 
Irish-American republicans were optimistic that their 
campaign for Flannery could succeed. They had considerable 
influence within the st. Patrick Day organizing committee. In 
1982, they succeeded in naming Bobby Sands as Honorary Grand 
Marshall despite strong opposition from constitutional 
nationalists. The most powerful group within the committee was 
the Ancient Order of Hibernians. With Joseph Roche at its 
head, they naturally supported Michael Flannery. At a vote 
held in February 1983, the Noraid leader was overwhelmingly 
endorsed as Grand Marshall. 33 
The election of Flannery caused an immediate political 
controversy as constitutional nationalists vented their 
outrage. Taoiseach Garret Fi tzGerald and Ambassador Tadhg 
O'Sullivan described the republican exploitation of Ireland's 
patron saint as, "bitterly di verse and deplorable." Aer 
Lingus, the Irish national airline, withdrew its financial 
sponsorship of the parade and the U.S. Defense Department 
prohibited the participation of military bands. 34 
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As the controversy mounted, the Friends of Ireland joined 
in the attacks on Flannery. senator Daniel Moynihan and former 
Governor Hugh Carey, who had always been prominent guests at 
the parade, announced they would not participate. Flannery 
responded in his typically uncompromising manner and told 
reporters, "everyone who comes to New York on March 17 is in 
favor of Irish unity. Most are I.R.A. supporters in one way or 
another. Its definitely going to be a pro-I.R.A. parade. 1135 
The conflict over the St. Patrick's Day parade received 
wide coverage in the American media. countless articles 
appeared describing the various aspects of the controversy, 
while Flannery made frequent appearances on television 
explaining his republican views. Editorial comment in the 
mainstream American press tended to be critical of Flannery 
and condemn the New York Irish as "gullible" and 
"shameless. 11315 The Irish-American press held the opposite 
opinion and fully endorsed Flannery for the years of work he 
had devoted to working for Irish-American charities in New 
York. John Thornton, editor of Tbe Irish Echo, reported his 
newspaper was inundated with letters of support for 
Flannery. 37 
Irish-American republicans claimed the parade itself was 
a great propaganda coup. Mayor Edward Koch, Governor Mario 
Cuomo, Senator Alphonse D'Amato and Representative Geraldine 
Ferraro, all marched despite pressure from the Irish 
government and Friends of Ireland to boycott the parade. 3 • 
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The parade attracted a record crowd. Flannery stole the center 
of attention. He was cheered all along Fifth Avenue by groups 
waiving pro-I.R.A. placards and flags. When the Noraid leader 
approached St. Patrick's Cathedral, cardinal Terence Cooke 
refused to give his traditional blessing. The Cardinal 
appeared twenty minutes after Flannery passed and was greeted 
by a hostile crowd chanting "Up the Provos. " 39 
The British media reaction to the parade controversy was 
all Noraid and the other republican groups could have hoped 
for. The general impression conveyed was that the whole 
incident showed substantial support for the I .R.A. from Irish-
Americans. The Daily Express, for example, described the 
parade as "the biggest anti-British demonstration ever held in 
America. ""0 Television news reports by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation relayed pictures of Flannery being 
cheered by the crowd and scenes of republican celebrations in 
Irish pubs in the Bronx • 
The publicity generated in 1983 encouraged Irish-American 
republicans to exploit the New York City st. Patrick's Day 
parade in subsequent years. In 1984, Teddy Gleason, President 
of the Longshoremen's Union and noted for his strong attacks 
on British policy in Ulster, was elected as Grand Marshall. 
The 1985 Grand Marshal was Nassau county comptroller Peter 
King, a strong supporter of Noraid who had recently met with 
Sinn Fein officials in Belfast. Al though both these Grand 
Marshals did not attract as much media attention as Flannery, 
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their election continued the controversy and was exploited for 
maximum publicity by republicans.•1 
The rejuvenation of republican groups in America and the 
success in achieving publicity coups, led to calls for greater 
cooperation and coordination of their activities. The leaders 
of Noraid and other Irish-American organizations began 
suggesting ways to maximize their efforts through joint 
political and publicity ventures. In 1982, a movement grew in 
support of the formation of a central coordinating group to 
synchronize the diverse activities of republican supporters. 
This eventually calumniated in the creation of the Irish 
American Unity Conference (I.A.U.C.) in 1983. 
One of the principal figures in the formation of the 
I.A.U.C. was James Delaney, a millionaire real estate 
developer based in San Antonio, Texas. He was deeply 
interested in his Irish roots and rose to become a National 
Director in the Ancient Order of Hibernians. Delaney's concern 
over the Ulster conflict intensified during and after the 
hunger strikes when the deaths of Bobby Sands and his comrades 
led him to adopt a more militant republican perspective. 
Delaney was also infuriated by the use of plastic bullets in 
Ulster by the security forces. After the death of Carol Anne 
Kelly from injuries received by one of these projectiles, he 
told Tbe San Antonio EXJ>ress: 
I don't support the I.R.A., but I have a twelve 
year old daughter. If we lived in Ireland and they 
carried my daughter home with a British plastic 
bullet in her head and her only crime had been 
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going to the store to get a carton of milk, I'd 
sure join the I.R.A •. And if there wasn't one, I'd 
start fine! 42 
Delaney wanted to bring Irish-America influence to bear 
in achieving an end to the conflict in Ulster. He was 
frustrated, however, by the factionalism and infighting and 
began to plead for greater co-ordination and unity of purpose. 
At a series of A.O.H. conventions and Irish-American 
conferences in 1982, Delaney built support for the formation 
of a new organization. Eventually, the heads of the main 
groups decided to discuss the details of Delaney's suggestion 
at a conference in Chicago. 
From July 15th-17th, 1983, over two-hundred delegates 
representing 617 Irish-American groups convened at Chicago's 
Hyatt Regency Hotel. They began discussing ways to increase 
the impact of their activities · and achieved a remarkable 
degree of consensus. They agreed to the creation of a new 
coordinating group called the Irish American Unity .conference 
which would work for an agreed list of political objectives. 
The delegates divided into seven sub-committees which 
produced a thirty-five point manifesto. Noraid leaders Martin 
Galvin and Michael Flannery played an important role in these 
proceedings and, consequently, the document was strongly 
republican. It called on the British to leave Ulster within 
three years and demanded that the American government 
"withhold all military and economic assistance from the U.K. 
until all repressive measures that deny human rights and 
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political rights to Irish people are eliminated. 1143 The 
manifesto also demanded an end to the use of plastic bullets, 
visas for all members of Sinn Fein to visit America, and an 
end to U.S. governmental "harassment and entrapment of Irish-
American nationalists."" 
The conference voted that the I.A.U.C. should produce a 
monthly magazine, The Irish Newsline, to publicize its 
activities and provide a republican perspective on Ulster. In 
keeping with the theme of uniting all Irish-Americans, the 
delegates agreed that the I.A.U.C. should work in Congress 
with both the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee and also the 
Friends of Ireland. Many still hoped that Tip O'Neill and his 
supporters would yet be persuaded to return to the traditional 
republican fold. one of the manifesto's final provisions was 
to organize a senior citizens· branch of the I.A.U.C. under the 
unlikely title of "The Green Panthers". Surveys constantly 
showed high levels of political participation among the older 
sections of American society. The aim of The Green Panthers 
was to tap this activism for the benefit of the new 
organization. 
After the Chicago conference, the delegates began forming 
I.A.U.C. chapters throughout America. They held regional 
recruitment gatherings and the group soon claimed it had a 
combined membership of 1 to 5 million individuals by 1984. 45 
It established an off ice in Washington and began assisting the 
lobbying efforts of the Irish National Caucus. 46 James 
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Delaney also led a much publicized visit to Belfast of 
I.A.U.C. officials in the autumn of 1983. They met with Sinn 
Fein leaders and issued a subsequent report severely 
criticizing every aspect of British rule in Northern 
Ireland. 47 
The formation of the I. A. U. C. raised great enthusiasm and 
expectations among the Irish-American republican groups. They 
hoped the organization would encourage a new unity among 
Irish-Americans which would wield great influence in the U.S. 
and in Ireland. In its first years of existence, the group 
helped to coordinate activities and sustain the high level of 
activism which had been maintained since the hunger strike. 
The emergence of the I.A.U.C. was also a considerable 
publicity victory for republicans and they presented it as a 
sign of the determination of Irish-Americans to end British 
rule in Ireland once and for all. 
Despite the formation of the I.A.U.C. and the publicity 
successes in the years following the hunger strike, it was the 
Noraid tours of Northern Ireland, beginning in August 1983, 
which engendered the greatest controversy and propaganda 
victories. Noraid organized the tours as a means of 
counteracting the U.S. government policy of denying visas to 
top republicans. The group concluded that if Sinn Fein 
officials were denied the opportunity to present their views 
in the United States, then Irish-Americans could hear them 
first hand by traveling to Ulster. Noraid also believed that 
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such tours would inspire participants and motivate them to 
increased support for the republican movement in America. 
The first tour group arrived in Dublin on August 2, 1983, 
consisting of eighty members from Noraid, the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians, Clan na Gael, and the I.A.U.c. They were welcomed 
by Joe Cahill and Fra Mccann of Sinn Fein and then taken on a 
tour of republican areas in the North. The group visited 
Crossmaglen, Carickmore, West Belfast and Derry. For the tour 
fee of $200, they stayed each night at the houses of 
republican families and were conducted on a hectic schedule of 
political meetings, film shows, and successive rounds of 
drinking and Irish dancing. 
One of the highlights of the trip occurred in Cullyhanna, 
South Armagh, when a group of I .R.A. volunteers in full combat 
gear stopped the Noraid bus at a staged road block. One of the 
men, carrying a M-60 machine gun, read a statement from the 
Army Council praising the delegation and thanking them for 
their tireless fund-rasing efforts. When he finished, the bus 
erupted into cheers of support. 48 
Some members of the Noraid delegation got directly 
involved in the conflict and joined riots against the security 
forces. On August 9, Stephen Lich from Indianapolis was 
arrested for riotous behavior in Belfast. An R.U.C. man 
observed him lobbying rocks at a British Army land rover. On 
August 11, he appeared at Belfast Magistrates Court, was fined 
$100 and told to leave Northern Ireland imniediately.'9 
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Another American, James Hennesey from Pittsburgh, received a 
similar sentence after his conviction for stoning a British 
Army patrol in Derry. 50 
Noraid Publicity Director Martin Galvin was the chief 
spokesmen for the tour and from this time became the most 
recognized figure in the republican movement in America. 51 He 
exploited the media attention given to the Noraid delegation 
and gave a continual round of press and television interviews 
in which he strongly supported the I.R.A .. Galvin created a 
hail of criticism from unionist leaders after an interview in 
which he was asked how Noraid justified financing murder and 
terrorism. He snapped back at the reporter, "We don't give any 
of our money to the British Army. 1152 
Other members of the tour party praised the I.R.A. during 
the internment anniversary rally in west Belfast. British 
officials were particularly angered at a statement issued by 
State Representative Charles Doyle of Massachusetts who 
commented: 
Every country that England has ever been in they 
have exploited and persecuted the people. They 
persecuted the brown race in India and, for 800 
years, exploited and persecuted the Irish. On the 
streets of Belfast, I have seen British soldiers 
pointing guns at children. 53 
Despite these statements, the Northern Ireland Minister 
of State, Nicholas Scott, invited the delegation to 
discussions at Stormont. Scott gave a radio interview in which 
he said he wanted the group to hear the British perspective 
and show that they had "nothing to hide and Northern Ireland 
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was a just and fair society. 1154 Apparently, Scott reacted 
without specific instructions from James Prior or Margaret 
Thatcher. When his superiors heard of the offer they felt it 
was a bad idea. Prior believed that to invite Noraid to talks 
would compromise the government's policy of not negotiating 
with republicans and, therefore, confer legitimacy on the 
group. 
Consequently, when Galvin telephoned Stormont to organize 
the meeting with Scott, he was told the invitation had been 
canceled. British officials said their offer was rescinded 
because of the arrest of Stephen Lich. They claimed the 
incident showed Noraid was not concerned with finding out the 
facts or in constructive dialogue. Galvin immediately 
exploited the situation by giving interviews on B.B.C. 
television in which he accused the British of refusing to talk 
because they were ashamed of the "oppressive policies 
conducted against the nationalist community. 1155 
There was wide coverage given to the Noraid tour in both 
the Irish and British media but most editorials and 
commentaries tended to be critical. Predictably, British 
newspapers characterized- the group as "buffoons" and 
"ignorant, sentimental Irish-Americans. 1156 Some of the 
strongest condemnations, however, came from constitutional 
nationalist newspapers in Ireland. They criticized Noraid for 
listening only to Sinn Fein and not hearing the views of the 
Irish government and S.D.L.P .. An editorial in The Irish 
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Independent told readers "It is a matter of record that Noraid 
collects money which is used to buy guns in America. These 
guns then pass into the hands of men and women who are nothing 
more than self-appointed killers."57 The Irish Hews, Northern 
Ireland's largest circulating constitutional nationalist 
daily, commented: 
Their so-called "fact-finding" mission was an 
extremely curious one. Their failure to meet 
constitutional nationalists, who still represent 
most anti-Unionists, reveals the type of closed 
mind that has bedeviled Ireland for too long. 
Noraid appears to have been more interested in 
confirming their prejudices than in finding out 
anything new. 58 
Despite these critical comments, Martin Galvin regarded 
the tour as a great success. He felt the group had succeeded 
in its objective of attracting large coverage in the media. 
This publicized the fact that the I.R.A. had committed 
supporters in America. Galvin was pleased with the opportunity 
to infuriate Unionists by his statements and embarrass the 
N.I.O. over its decision not to have talks. He also felt that 
the presence of Irish-Americans in Northern Ireland had given 
a great boost to the republican movement by showing solidarity 
with their struggle and ensuring continued financial 
assistance. 59 
Noraid soon began preparations for a second tour of 
Northern Ireland in 1984. The group placed notices in the 
Irish-American press calling for people to enroll in the trip 
of a lifetime, to personally experience the great hospitality 
of northern republicans and the reality of British oppression. 
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Noraid headquarters in the Bronx was inundated with 
applications. The tour party ultimately had to be limited to 
one-hundred and thirty for logistical reasons. 
The British Information Service in New York monitored the 
preparations for the second tour and kept the Thatcher 
administration informed of its itinerary and objectives. News 
of the intended visit caused di visions within the British 
government. James Prior had been alarmed at the publicity 
Galvin attracted in 1983 and felt he should be prohibited from 
entering Northern Ireland. Oliver Wright, the British 
Ambassador in Washington, felt that such action would be 
counter-productive and impossible to enforce. The Ambassador 
won support from Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, who believed 
Galvin would exploit his exclusion for propaganda purposes. 
Prior and Howe tried to persuade Home Secretary Leon 
Brittan of the merits of their contrasting perspectives. 
Correspondence, later leaked to The Guardian, show Brittan was 
more impressed by Prier's arguments. He eventually signed an 
exclusion order against Galvin on July 28, 1983. The Home 
Secretary had been most persuaded by the argument that the 
1983 Noraid visit had increase sectarian tensions and led to 
increased levels of violence in Ulster. 60 
In New York, Galvin casually dismissed the exclusion 
order and announced he would fulfil his plans to attend the 
internment commemoration in Belfast. He led the Noraid group 
to Dublin on July 31 and remained there while they travelled 
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to Northern Ireland. British Army and R.U.C. patrols along the 
border were increased to prevent any attempt by Galvin to 
enter the province. 
The presence of the Noraid delegation again attracted 
continuous media coverage and controversy. When the group 
visited republican graves in Coalisland, Co. Tyrone, Owen 
Carron told them that the greatest need within the I.R.A. was 
for modern weapons and implied they could be sent from 
America. 61 British and unionist politicians were outraged 
when one Noraid official said "I would not discourage people 
from sending guns here .•• its probably the moral duty of every 
Irish-American to get them u. s. weapons to ensure 
democracy. 1162 Another member of the delegation when asked 
about Noraid funds replied "If they want to buy weapons with 
it, I say good 1 uck to them! 1163 
Members of the delegation again joined republican riots. 
On August 9, Brendan Judge from Gary, Indiana, was arrested 
while wearing a ski-mask and carrying a petrol bomb during 
disturbances in the Bogside area of Derry. At the court 
hearing he appeared wearing an I.R.A. T-shirt. Judge proudly 
displayed the garment to press photographers outside after he 
was sentenced to a fine and deportation. 64 
In the meantime, Martin Galvin had successfully breached 
border security. He entered Derry on August 9. As a 
provocation to the British Army and R.u.c., he posed for press 
photographers beside an I.R.A. commemorative plaque in the 
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Bogside and gave an interview to The Derry Journal. He said it 
had been easy to evade the security forces and again said he 
would attend republican demonstrations in Belfast. 65 
The cumulative effect of the Noraid tour and Galvin's 
evasion of security forces was to heighten tensions during the 
August 12, 1984, internment march in west Belfast. The R.U.C., 
intent not on being humiliated by Galvin, waited expectantly 
for his appearance. Police officers screened the Noraid 
delegation as it marched along the Falls Road but saw no sign 
of their man. When the procession assembled outside Sinn Fein 
headquarters to hear speeches, the R.U.C. began moving closer 
to the podium. They were determined to grab Galvin if he dared 
to appear. 
A large crowd· assembled around the podium forming a 
barrier between the R.U.C. and the speakers. As they listened 
to Gerry Adams conclude his speech, the Sinn Fein President 
called Martin Galvin to the microphone. The Noraid leader 
emerged from republican headquarters but before he could utter 
a word, the R.U.C. charged. A bloody riot developed in which 
police officers battoned and fired plastic bullets into the 
crowd. Ed Blanche of The Washington Post described to his 
readers how "police in jeeps fired repeated volleys into the 
crowd while club-wielding officers leapt from their vehicles 
and charged, trampling screaming protestors. " 66 
During the confrontation many people were hit with 
plastic bullets, including members of the Noraid group. One 
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protester, Sean Downes, was hit in the chest by a bullet fired 
at point blank range. He collapsed on the roadside and, 
despite successive attempts to revive him, died from the 
injury. The whole incident was captured by photographers and 
television camera crews. On the night of August 13, footage of 
the dying Sean Downes was broadcast on news reports on both 
sides of the Atlantic. It immediately created a political 
storm and generated intense controversy which lasted for 
weeks. 
Republicans immediately described the death of Sean 
Downes as a savage act of murder. They were joined in strong 
condemnations of the R.u.c. by the S.D.L.P. while the Irish 
government called for an official investigation. Nationalist 
reaction was epitomized by an editorial in Tbe Irish News 
which stated: 
Even the most moderate and genuinely peace loving 
nationalists, as well as far minded members of the 
unionist community, will have felt justifiably 
outraged at the wild and fatally brutal attempts by 
the R.U.C. to arrest Galvin. To be blunt, the 
police action was an unmitigated disgrace as well 
as being disastrously unproductive. In pursuit of 
Mr. Galvin they fired plastic bullets 
indiscriminately into a peaceful crowd, killing one 
man and injuring many others. They also wielded 
their batons without mercy on innocent 
demonstrations, as well as press photographers. 67 
The Downes affair was widely reported in America. The 
main television networks carried footage of the incident. They 
also ran interviews with Michael Flannery in which he 
castigated the R. U. c., described Galvin as a "brave and 
courageous young man, " and said the incident showed why it was 
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right to ship American weapons to the I .R.A .• 68 In the 
massive editorial response to the incident, some newspapers 
took the opportunity to condemn Noraid and blame Martin Galvin 
for the death and injuries. For example, The Tulsa World 
commented: 
Galvin and others like him fuel delusions of 
bravery by fermenting violence from the safety of 
America. Galvin doesn't have to live in the mess he 
helps create. And his actions are all the more 
despicable for the fact he is an attorney, sworn to 
uphold the rule of law. 69 
The more typical reaction from large metropolitan 
newspapers was to severely attack the actions of the R.U.C., 
while de-emphasizing Galvin's role. The Chicago Tribune 
compared the incident to Bloody Sunday, while The Richmond 
Times-Dispatch said the R.U.C.'s use of plastic bullets was 
"abominable. 1170 Many newspapers reached similar conclusions 
to the following editorial in The New York Daily News: 
Ignoring the fact that the street was packed with 
women and children, the cops waded into the crowd 
indiscriminately swinging clubs and opening fire 
with so called humane plastic bullets. The Thatcher 
government has a lot to answer for in this 
incident. It has made a bad situation worse. Those 
responsible must be punished with the same kind of 
vigor that is applied to the I .R.A.. Thatcher 
cannot condemn the I .R.A. as a bunch of. vicious 
killers with one voice and condone with another 
voice brutal behavior by her own policemen who ran 
roughshod over innocent people. 71 
In Britain, the death of Sean Downes produced a flurry of 
criticisms from politicians and the press. David Steel, leader 
of the Liberal Party, called the incident "an unacceptable 
police riot," while Clive Soley, Labor Party spokesmen on 
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Northern Ireland, condemned James Prior's decision to ban 
Galvin. Many ne.wspapers echoed Soley's comments and said the 
ban was impossible to enforce and only offered republicans a 
golden opportunity to secure a propaganda victory. 72 ~ 
Daily Mirror even suggested the incident was a clear 
indication that the British should make plans for withdrawal 
from Ulster. 
James Prior initially responded to the criticisms of his 
handling of the affair by def ending the decision to place an 
exclusion order on Galvin. As condemnations of the policy 
increased, however, Prior eventually admitted he had made a 
"bad mistake." He described the death of Sean Downes as, "an 
enormous setback for me personally in my efforts to try to 
improve relations between the two communities. 1173 
Prier's candid statement admitting responsibility for the 
Downes affair produced a heated reaction from unionists. James 
Molyneaux called his statement a great blow to the confidence 
of the security forces, while Jim Allister said Prier's action 
was "gutless" and "a demeaning and vain attempt to appease the 
I.R.A.'s anger through groveling regret."n Unionists called 
for an emergency debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
passed a vote of confidence in the R.U.C., and overwhelmingly 
voted against an Alliance Party proposal calling for an 
official inquiry. 
Nora id and Sinn Fein exploited the controversy 




re surf aced in Dublin to hold a press conference before 
returning to America. Flanked by Joe Cahill and Danny 
Morrison, the Noraid leader appeared with his hair dyed 
reddish brown. He said this was a disguise to get across the 
border and related how during his escape an R.U.C. officer had 
pointed a gun at him but failed to recognize his identify. 
Galvin promised he would tell Americans about the brutality of 
the R.U.C. when he returned and said that if he had a gun at 
the time he would have shot the officers involved. 75 
When Galvin returned to New York, he was greeted at 
Kennedy Airport by a pipe band and a large crowd of 
supporters. Within republican circles he was given a cult 
status as tales circulated about his daring escapes from the 
R.U.C .• Stories told how he was passed over peoples' heads to 
freedom during the R.U.C. attack and how he wore a policeman's 
uniform and used two look alikes to fool his pursuers. 76 
Galvin exploited this image and used the lavish attention of 
the American media to extol the republican cause. 
British press reports lamented that the American reaction 
to the Downes killing greatly benefitted republican groups. 
The London Times said it had, "provided Nora id with a stunning 
propaganda victory which would be successfully used to loosen 
Irish-American purses from Los Angeles to Long Island. 1177 The 
Economist complained that; 
The attack has brought a flood of favorable 
publicity for Nora id. It has also resulted i_n 
celebrity status for Martin Galvin, who could not 
have done more for the cause if he had planned 
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things himself ••• He is now a hero to Irish-
Americans for defying the ban and slipping into 
Ulster undetected. 78 
The political controversy caused in Northern Ireland by 
Irish-Americans did not end with Galvin's departure. On 
September 1, 1984, twenty-four members of the New York city 
Police Department pipe band led a hunger strike commemoration 
parade in Bundoran, Co. Donegal. The officers belonged to the 
Police Department Emerald Society and had been in Ireland for 
the Rose of Tralee festival and G.A.A. centenary celebrations. 
They marched in the hunger strike parade after requests from 
Sinn Fein and Noraid. 
The action of the New York policemen caused another 
political storm. Garret FitzGerald said their participation in 
the parade was "grossly insensitive." He was supported by 
senior Irish policemen. Afterwards, when members of the pipe 
band went to Dublin for a scheduled reception with Lord Mayor 
Michael O'Halloran, he refused to meet them and condemned 
their action as an insult to the Irish people. Ulster 
unionists issued outraged condemnations of the policemen for 
endorsing terrorism. Harold Mccusker said their action was as 
insulting to unionists as the R.U.C. attending a function of 
the Ku Klux Klan would be to Americans. 79 
The American government was extremely embarrassed by this 
fresh political controversy. It issued a statement pointing 
out that the Emerald Society was a private fraternal 
organization and did not represent the New York Police 
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Department. Robert Kane, the U.S. Ambassador in Dublin, also 
wrote to New York police commissioner Benjamin Ward and Mayor 
Koch strongly condemning the band members. 80 Pat Murphy, 
spokesmen for the Emerald Society, dismissed these criticisms 
and defended the band's right to participate. He claimed they 
wanted to register their concern over brutalities committed by 
the police force in Ulster. 
Despite the republican publicity coup caused by the 
Downes incident and the actions of the Emerald Society, the 
British government decided to continue its exclusion order on 
Martin Galvin. New Northern Ireland Secretary, Douglas Hurd, 
maintained the ban after intense pressure from Unionists and 
right-wing Conservative M.P.s. The decision gave the Noraid 
leader yet another opportunity to embarrass the government and 
win further publicity. 
Galvin again defied his prohibition from Ulster and led 
a Noraid delegation of one-hundred and twenty-five members to 
Ireland in 1985. On August 9, he appeared in Derry to act as 
pall bearer at the funeral of Charles English, an LR.A. 
volunteer who died in a premature grenade explosion. Galvin 
was only 100 yards away from R.U.C. constables observing the 
funeral and his photograph appeared on the front pages of most 
British and Irish newspapers the following day. 
Galvin said that he would not appear at the internment 
rally in Belfast because he didn't want to give th~ R.U.C. an 
excuse to kill more innocent civilians. His mere presence 
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again attracted continued controversy. In the Republic of 
Ireland, R.T.E. journalists held a one day work stoppage 
because the network refused to broadcast a· series of 
interviews with the Noraid leader. Those involved in the 
protest alleged the R.T.E. action was a flagrant censorship of 
information and claimed the ban was taken in response to 
government pressure." 
Following the 1985 Noraid tour, the Emerald Society pipe 
band again marched in the hunger strike commemoration in 
Bundoran, despite intense pressure from both the Irish 
government and u. s. State Department not to participate. 
Martin Galvin and Joseph Roche praised the police officers for 
their solidarity with the republican movement during speeches 
after the parade. Officer Daniel Danaher characterized the 
attitude of his comrades when he told reports; 
We' re playing for the ten young men who died on 
hunger strike. I've been told that they were 
terrorists, that they were murderers, but so were 
the leaders of 1916 until they were shot. I've been 
dealing with murderers all my life. I've never seen 
one of them who would put himself through that 
agony, through that kind of death, for what he 
believed in. 82 
The Noraid tours between 1983-1985 were very successful 
in achieving their desired objectives and in benefiting the 
republican movement on both sides of the Atlantic. They 
attracted massive amounts of media coverage in Britain and 
Ireland which tended to elevate the significance of Irish-
American power and influence in aiding the I .R;A.. Noraid 
capitalized on the American media attacks against the R.U.C. 
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after the Downes affair and used the incident to bolster its 
fund-raising appeals. The group brought Downes' wife over to 
the United States for even more publicity and to describe 
first hand the police brutality against the demonstrators.•3 
Republicans took further delight from the embarrassment 
the Downes incident caused James Prior. They relished the 
severe criticisms leveled against the Secretary of State and 
contend the affair hastened his replacement by Douglas 
Hurd. 84 Noraid and Sinn Fein also welcomed the damage caused 
to the R.U.C.'s image. For some years, the Northern Ireland 
Off ice had proudly claimed that there was a growing respect 
for the police in the nationalist community. After the events 
of August 11, 1984, British officials acknowledged that 
community relations had been seriously affected and confidence 
in the force had been shattered. 
Noraid continually emphasized that its visits gave a 
great morale boost to the I.R.A. and Sinn Fein. Most 
republicans in the North welcomed Noraid and acknowledged the 
positive results of its efforts. Members of the delegation 
always got loud cheers of support when they marched in the 
annual internment rally and were usually well received at the 
social functions held for their benefit in republican 
areas. 85 
There are some republicans, however, who remain ambiguous 
about the annual Irish-American visitors. They cl_aim that 
Noraid's presence forces the I.R.A. into ill prepared attacks 
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on the security forces. There is a feeling that Provo 
volunteers, lives are jeopardized byn attacks designed to 
impress the Americans. In one such instance, volunteer Kevin 
Watters died when a nail bomb exploded prematurely during the 
1983 Noraid tour. Charles English died in a similarly botched 
attack during the 1985 visit. 
There were some residents of West Belfast who condemned 
Martin Galvin's actions in 1984. They felt that if he had kept 
away from the internment rally, Sean Downes would still be 
alive. 86 Others resented members of the Noraid group spouting 
support for the armed struggle, yet not having to live with 
its consequences. Some also lampooned the Irish-Americans' 
political naivete after incidents in which they wandered into 
Belfast city center clad in T-shirts and baseball caps with 
pro-republican slogans on the front. 87 
These resentments were not extensive and participants on 
the Noraid tours universally praised the way they were 
received in republican areas. Noraid claims that the 
experiences their group had in the North served to strengthen 
commitment to the republican movement in America. Sinn Fein 
organized the itinerary of the tours to ensure participants 
would be presented with the republican political perspective. 
The results of this were predictable. Lillian Roche from 
Baltimore, who went on the 1985 tour, told The Washington Post 
on her return that "the things I've read didn't tell nearly 
the whole story I've seen how the catholic community is 
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totally oppressed and suffers constant harassment from the 
British. 1188 Another member of the tour, Jeanne Clarizio 
from Connecticut, told The Hartford Courant, "Before I went I 
almost had to apologize for the I.R.A •• After this I'm not 
going to do that anymore. 1189 
Many of those who went on the Noraid tours redoubled 
their republican activities when they returned to America. 
They spoke before Irish-American audiences to describe their 
experiences, wrote anti-British articles in the press, 
organized new fund-raising ventures for Noraid, and pressured 
their political representatives to support republican causes 
in Washington. The feelings expressed by Seamus Metress seem 
typical of those who travelled to Northern Ireland with 
Noraid: 
After staying in the six counties, my colleagues 
have a greater sense of the social and political 
obscenity that is British occupied Ireland. Many, 
including myself, have drawn a new sense of 
strength and dedication from the nationalist people 
they have come to know. Further, they have come 
away resolved to continue to work for the movement 
they now know more intimately. The revolution that 
continues daily in the six counties will not be 
forgotten by those who experienced it. 90 
The Noraid tours brought many benefits to the republican 
network in America and provided Sinn Fein with positive 
publicity for its political campaigns. These successes were 
matched by a number of important publicity victories in 
America. The Harrison/Flannery trial and the subsequent St. 
Patrick's Day controversies sustained a republican revival 
which was inspired by the success of the hunger strike 
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campaign. Older republican groups were revitalized while new 
ones emerged to conduct fresh publicity efforts. 91 
Despite all the positive developments for Irish-American 
republicanism in this period, its opponents also achieved 
significant successes. The U.S. Justice Department continued 
to pressure Noraid and secured a number of important 
convictions for gunrunning. Constitutional nationalists also 
achieved a new political initiative in Ireland, which received 
financial support from the Reagan administration and 
eventually blocked the political advances of Sinn Fein. 
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Martin Galvin continued to lead the Noraid tours to 
Belfast from 1985 onwards. In 1989 the R. U. C. eventually 
caught him and deported him back to the United States. 
Finally, in 1990 the British lifted its ban. Since then Galvin 
has entered Northern Ireland legally but still creates 
controversy. On December 7, 1990 he caused outrage among 
unionists when he was photographed sitting in the Lord Mayor's 
chair in Belfast City Hall. When asked by reporters to. comment 
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on the building he said, "The place would look much better if 
they removed the foreign flags (Union Jacks) and replaced them 
with tricolors." The Irish Echo, 19 December 1990. 
CHAPTER 10 
The Activities of tbe Friends of Ireland and U.S. Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 1981-1985. 
Irish-American republicans achieved a number of important 
successes in the years following the hunger strike. The U.S. 
government was particularly alarmed at the verdict in the 
Flannery /Harrison trial while the Friends of Ireland were 
dismayed by Noraid's publicity victories. Despite these noted 
set-backs, the forces working against the republican network 
did achieve their own successes. American law enforcement 
agencies continually harassed republican groups and eventually 
smashed a number of ·important gunrunning conspiracies. The 
Friends of Ireland continued to play an important role in 
Ulster politics and made a significant contribution to the 
Anglo-Irish Ag~eement in 1985. 
From 1981, the Reagan administration increased its 
activities against Irish-American republicanism. The Justice 
Department, in particular, intensified the F.A.R.A. court case 
against Noraid. Federal attorneys worked relentlessly to force 
the group to acknowledge the Provisional I.R.A. as its foreign 
principal. This legal action also had the objective of forcing 
Noraid to provide greater details about its fund-raising 
activities. The government hoped that success in the case 
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would bolster its contention that Noraid was bankrolling 
J.R.A. violence in Northern Ireland. 
Paul O'Dwyer and Frank Durkan provided free legal 
assistance to Noraid and fought the Justice Department for 
four years. But on May 1, 1981, Judge Charles Haight Jr. 
finally agreed with the government and declared the I.N.A.C. 
must register as an agent of the Provos. O'Dwyer immediately 
challenged this decision but again lost when a Federal Court 
of Appeals upheld the Haight verdict in January 1982. 
Noraid continued the legal controversy by refusing to 
file its returns under the F.A.R.A. The act stipulates that 
financial statements are made under penalty of perjury. 
Defense lawyers claimed that the I.N.A.C. was not an agent of 
the I.R.A. and if it filed as such it would be committing a 
criminal offense. The Justice Department then sued Noraid for 
contempt of court. In early 1984, the group was given ninety 
days to comply with the Haight ruling or risk a hefty fine. 
In this situation, Noraid lawyers began working a 
compromise. They agreed to register as an agent of the I.R.A. 
on condition that financial reports carried a disclaimer 
stating that the link to the Proves was forced by court order. 
Federal attorneys agreed to this and Noraid resumed filing its 
financial returns in July 1984. Michael Flannery included the 
following statement accompanying the report: 
Pursuant to a court ruling in 1981, made without 
plenary trial or evidentiary hearing, it has been 
judicially determined that the I.R.A. is a foreign 
principal of I.N.A.c •. Consequently, the I.R.A. is 
listed here as a foreign principal of I.N.A.C. only 
as a matter of legal compulsion and pursuant to 
court order. Its listing here does not reflect the 
views or beliefs of I.N.A.C. or its members, who do 
not subscribe to, believe in, or affirm the 
correctness of this judicially compelled 
declaration. 1 
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With the enforcement of the Haight ruling, the Justice 
Department could show that Noraid was officially registered as 
an agent of the I.R.A •. This was useful in adding emphasis to 
U.S. government claims that the I.N.A.C. supported violence. 
There is little evidence to show that this formal legal 
connection had any detrimental effects on the group. 2 
In conjunction with the F.A.R.A. case, the U.S. State 
Department also tried to weaken the republican network by 
tightening its visa denial policy. The most noted example of 
this was the continued refusal to permit Gerry Adams to enter 
the United States, despite his election to the British 
Parliament in 1983. Adams received numerous invitations to 
speak in America but each visa application was refused on the 
basis of his support of violence. His case became a cause 
celebre for Irish-American republicans. A Committee for Free 
Speech in Northern Ireland formed specifically to win a visa 
for Adams, while members of the Ad Hoc Committee continually 
appealed to the State Department to lift their ban. One of the 
most noted supporters of Adams' right to be heard was 
Geraldine Ferraro, the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate 
in 1984. 3 
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The visa denial policy undermined republican publicity 
because it blocked prominent members of Sinn Fein from 
presenting their views and raising funds in America. Yet 
republicans did reap some benefits from the fact that many 
prominent newspapers, especially The New York Times, strongly 
attacked the visa denials for "damaging America's reputation 
as an open society of intelligent, free citizens, capable of 
deciding for th ems elves whether to hear or ignore a speaker. 114 
American republican groups also exploited the British 
government's role in visa denials. Noraid won support for its 
contention that the State Department was denying freedom of 
information to the American public because of pressure from 
Whitehall. 
Numerous republicans chose to ignore the visa denial 
policy and entered the United States illegally. Republican 
sympathizers in Canada organized an elaborate system through 
which members of Sinn Fein and the I.R.A. would be provided 
with forged documents and escorted across the American border. 
Once in the U.S. , they participated in clandestine fund-
raising and weapons procurement ventures. Immigration officers 
began investigating this Canadian pipeline and conducted 
surveillance of republican suspects under "Operation 
Shamrock." Information received during this investigation that 
enabled the I.N.S. to apprehend Owen Carron and Danny Morrison 
in January of 1982. Shortly afterwards, agents also arrested 
Edward Howell and Desmond Ellis. The authorities.described 
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both men as top I.R.A. explosives experts. They were taken 
into custody while trying to enter the United states illegally 
at the Whirlpool Bridge near Niagara Falls. 5 
These arrests temporarily blocked the Canadian route for 
illegal entry but did not stop republicans from getting to 
America. For example, Joe Cahill and Jimmy Drumm were caught 
in New York City in May 1984 after using false immigration 
documents. The two men were suspected of organizing an arms 
shipment for the I.R.A .. While they were not formally charged 
with this conspiracy, they were quickly deported back to 
Ireland. 6 
Legal actions against Noraid and a tightening of the visa 
denial policy increased pressure on the Irish-American 
republican network. The most effective measures taken by U.S. 
law enforcement agencies were against I .R.A. gunrunning. 
Despite the failure and embarrassment of the Harrison/Flannery 
case, F.B.I. agents continued their undercover operations. 
These eventually brought important successes for the F.B.I. 
and significantly impaired I. R. A. arms procurement in America. 
One of the first successful convictions in the period was the 
"Barney McKeown case." 
In 1979 George Harrison acquired a large consignment of 
arms, including two M-60 machine guns, stolen from Camp Le 
Jeune, North Carolina. Before shipment to Ireland, the weapons 
were stored in a garage belonging to Barney McKeown -- an 
American citizen originally from Northern Ireland whom British 
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newspapers alleged that he was very active in Noraid. Before 
the arms shipment left New York, one of the conspirators 
telephoned I.R.A. contacts in Dublin and gave details of its 
arrival. Irish detectives recorded the call from a wire tap 
and immediately informed their counterparts in America of the 
gunrunning scheme. 7 
The weapons arrived in Dublin in late October 1979. Irish 
authorities then laid a trap for the I .R.A.. The Provos 
learned of the trap and no one appeared to collect the 
weapons. The Garda were forced to seize the arms on November 
2, 1979. Some of the weapons had serial numbers which were 
still intact. They were later traced back to George De Meo. 
Police also found a shipping document with the weapons linked 
to Barney McKeown •. Because of this inadvertent mistake, 
McKeown was convicted on June 24, 1983, of arms smuggling for 
the I .R.A •. He received three years imprisonment and a fine of 
$10,000. 8 
Although McKeown was jailed and the arms supply broken, 
the court case produced a huge controversy which greatly 
embarrassed American law enforcement agencies. During the 
first trial in December 1982, Stephen Rogers, a senior U.S. 
Customs official who had supervised gunrunning investigations 
in New York, testified on behalf of McKeown. Rogers said he 
did this because of illegal actions taken by the prosecuting 
agencies. He testified that Joe King, a U.S. Customs official, 
had perjured himself by telling the court he did not know of 
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the Garda telephone tap in Dublin. Rogers claimed that King's 
testimony was a lie and that in fact he was informed. 9 
This first trial ended because the jury was unable to 
reach a unanimous verdict. The second trial was aborted after 
prosecuting lawyers called for a lengthy adjournment. This was 
to contest the defense's request for confidential British and 
Irish government documents. The documents were to be used as 
evidence that Joe King perjured himself in the first trial. 
The prosecution eventually succeeded in convicting 
McKeown in the third trial but the conflict over Rogers' 
testimony continued. British and Irish officials were 
infuriated by Rogers' revelations. They were particularly 
incensed because he revealed the identity of a M.I.5 agent in 
open court. Newspaper reports claimed that both the British 
and Irish authorities began withholding information because 
they lacked confidence in the U.S. Customs Service. They 
believed the agency was riddled with I.R.A. informers. 
In light of the breakdown in trust, U.S. Customs 
officials recommended that Rogers be prosecuted for 
obstruction of justice. They only backed down from this action 
because some officers felt a court case would disclose too 
much about British and American intelligence operations. There 
was also an internal investigation of the customs service in 
New York to uncover alleged I .R.A. sympathizers. Later, 
William von Raab, U.S. Commissioner for Customs, traveled to 
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London and Dublin to reassure both governments that there were 
no republican informers within his service. 10 
On November 1984, Stephen Rogers was fired from the 
customs service because of his conduct at the McKeown trial. 
He immediately contested the action and brought unfair 
dismissal proceedings before the Federal Merit Systems 
Protection Board. British newspapers alleged the case created 
sharp divisions within the New York Customs Office with an 
anti-Rogers faction accusing Rogers of sabotaging I.R.A. 
investigations while a pro-Rogers group claimed he was 
defending the integrity of the service. Many of the officers 
were of Irish ancestry and began calling each other 
denigrating nicknames used during the Irish Civil War. 11 
The Federal Merit Systems Protection Board met in May 
1985. Rogers demanded that secret documents outlining the role 
of British and Irish agents in the McKeown case be made 
available for his defense. Reports allege that British 
intelligence made it clear to the U.S. authorities it did not 
want any more confidential information disclosed to the 
public. Without this information, which Rogers claimed was 
essential, the Board reinstated him with back pay. It also 
concluded Rogers' naming of the M.I.5 agent was "inadvertent 
rather than a result of I. R. A. sympathy. 1112 
Some U.S. law enforcement officials felt that the 
conviction of Barney McKeown was in some ways off set by the 
adverse consequences of the Rogers case. Government agents, 
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however, were conducting investigations of numerous other 
gunrunning operations to the I.R.A. which brought much more 
conclusive victories. One of these was the conviction of an 
arms conspiracy scheme led by Gabriel Megahey and involving up 
to eleven other republican sympathizers. 
Gabriel Megahey was born in Belfast and had a long 
connection with the republican movement. He worked in England 
for many years at the Southampton docks. In the mid-seventies 
he was expelled from the country because of his involvement in 
a scheme to import explosives and weapons from New York. 
Megahey then went to America and worked as a bartender in 
Queens. He maintained his republican connections and was 
alleged to be leader of the I.R.A. in the United States. 
Megahey was also involved in gunrunning and soon became the 
focus of F.B.I. surveillance. 13 
When Desmond Ellis and Edward Howell were arrested 
crossing the Canadian border in February 1982, Gabriel 
Megahey's name was found on their shopping list for weapons. 
Following this, the F.B.I. put a tap on Megahey's phone. They 
recorded his alarm at the arrest of the two men but were 
unable to get hard evidence linking him to I.R.A. gunrunning. 
The F.B.I. investigation of Megahey took an unexpected 
turn when Michael Hanratty approached government agents and 
offered to help smash the arms conspiracy. Hanratty, an 
electronics surveillance expert, was contacted by Andrew 
Duggan in June 1981 for help in purchasing sophfsticated 
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technical devices for remote control bombs. Duggan, an Irish-
American active in Noraid, was a main figure in the Megahey 
network. He told Hanratty they wanted to send a large 
consignment of military material to the I.R.A. 
Hanratty claimed he turned informer for "patriotic 
reasons" and immediately began cooperating in an F.B.I. sting 
operation called "Hit and Miss." He and agent 
Enrique Ghimenti, who posed as an arms dealer, arranged a 
meeting with Duggan in New York. The F. B. I. had the room 
bugged and also installed a video camera. The operation was 
only partly successful because Duggan sat down in the wrong 
place so only his voice was recorded. 
Duggan was interested in the arms sale Enrique proposed 
and they arranged a second meeting in New Orleans. The F.B.I. 
successfully recorded this meeting. Agents filmed Duggan and 
two I.R.A. fugitives agreeing to buy five Redeye missiles at 
$10,000 each. The I.R.A. men also asked for a whole range of 
automatic rifles, machine guns, and even a mini-submarine. 14 
Throughout these negotiations, the F.B.I. was frustrated 
because it could not get direct evidence against Megahey. At 
a third meeting he did appear and the agents got the 
incriminating material. They filmed Megahey affirming the 
order for Redeyes and proposing mutual hostage taking until 
the arms deal was complete. 15 
The F.B.I. operation reached a climax in June 1982 when 
Megahey and his co-conspirators tried to send a consignment of 
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fifty-one rifles and remote control devices to Ireland. The 
weapons were packed into a container labeled, "roller skates 
and comforters." United States agents began working in close 
cooperation with their British and Irish counterparts. They 
seized the arms at Port Newark but allowed a small consignment 
to travel on to Limerick on board a cargo ship. When the 
weapons arrived in Ireland, Garda agents engaged in a brief 
gun battle with two I.R.A. men sent to pick up the container. 
The men, Patrick Mcveigh and John Moloney, were later jailed 
for seven and three years respectively for possession of 
Armalite rifles and I.R.A. membership. 16 
On June 21, 1982, the F.B.I. arrested Megahey and Duggan 
at a construction site in Manhattan. They also apprehended two 
brothers from Northern Ireland, Colm and Eamonn Meehan, who 
were also involved in the conspiracy. The four immediately 
received legal aid from the Irish-American republican groups 
and a panel of lawyers began investigating ways to thwart the 
prosecution. 
Lawyers for the Meehans based their defense on the fact 
the brothers had been held as internees in Long Kesh. They 
claimed that the two suffered from post-trauma distress 
disorder because of their experience in prison, and entered a 
plea of not guilty because of insanity. The Meehans were then 
examined by a psychiatrist who concluded their claim to 
insanity was "only a diagnostic possibility." Following this 
diagnosis, Judge Charles Sifton denied their defense.~7 
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When this line of defense collapsed, the lawyers for the 
four men copied the tactic used in the Flannery trial. They 
claimed the defendants thought Michael Hanratty was a C.I.A. 
agent and therefore that their gunrunning scheme had U.S. 
government approval. Assistant U. s. Attorney Carol Amon 
counteracted this move by producing C.I.A. affidavits stating 
that Hanratty was no.t one of their operatives • 18 Defense 
lawyers then tried to break the prosecution by focusing on the 
involvement of British intelligence in the case and forcing 
F.B.I. witnesses to divulge classified information. 
The trial lasted for nine weeks. On May 13, 1983, after 
five days of deliberation, the jury found the men guilty on 
most charges. As Gabriel Megahey was the leader of the arms 
conspiracy, he received seven years imprisonment. Andrew 
Duggan and Eamonn Meehan both got three. Colm Meehan received 
two, following his acquittal on some of the conspiracy 
charges. 
The F.B.I. was delighted at the verdict. Many American 
newspapers also hailed the conviction and claimed it was a 
shattering blow for I.R.A. gunrunners. The Chicago Tribune 
typified the general reaction in the following editorial 
praising the jury: 
The courtroom was packed with friends and 
sympathizers of the accused. They interrupted 
proceedings with tearful outbursts and shouted 
I.R.A. slogans and anti-British propaganda. But the 
jury ignored these spurious distractions and 
concentrated on the basic issue .•• The burned _and 
mutilated bodies of scores of innocent Irish 
victims of the I.R.A. over the years - many women 
and children among them - provide more eloquent 
testimony than do shouted slogans . 19 
499 
Just two weeks after the Megahey conviction, the F.B.I. 
won a second victory when a Federal Court in Brooklyn found 
Vincent Toner and Colm Murphy guilty of gunrunning. The two 
men were both from South Armagh and were involved in a scheme 
to send armalite rifles to the I.N.L.A •• Federal agents 
infiltrated the operation by posing as mafia arms dealers. 
They arrested the two men after the weapons were exchanged 
outside a White Castle hamburger shop in Queens, New York. 
Colm Murphy, the mastermind of the conspiracy, received a five 
year sentence and a fine of $10,000. Vincent Toner, who was 
involved in transporting the weapons, got eighteen months and 
was fined $7,500.~ 
Following their victory in the Murphy /Toner case, federal 
agents continued to investigate others who were suspected of 
involvement in the Megahey conspiracy. Their attempts to 
secure further convictions had mixed results. Patrick 
McFarland, an associate of Megahey, fled to Ireland when he 
heard of the F.B.I. sting. After months on the run he decided 
to give himself up at the U.S. Embassy in Dublin and 
voluntarily return for trial. McFarland's lawyers successfully 
argued that although he had transported boxes of weapons for 
the Meehan brothers, he did not know their contents. In 
November 1983, he was acquitted on all charges. 21 
In April 1985, the F.B.I. arrested Liam Ryan and charged 
him with using false documents to purchase three armali te 
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rifles which were part of the Megahey consignment. Ryan was a 
naturalized American citizen originally from County Tyrone. He 
had associations with Irish-American republican groups and was 
a close personal friend of Martin Galvin. Agents matched 
Ryan's fingerprints with those found on the armalites and 
obtained purchase certificates in which he used the name of 
Robert Power as an alias. In September 1985, he pled guilty to 
making fraudulent statements in buying the weapons and 
received a suspended sentence. 22 
By far the largest and most intriguing gunrunning 
operation to be uncovered in this period was organized by John 
Crawley in Boston. Crawley was born in New York in 1957 but 
later moved to Dublin with his family as a teenager. In 1975, 
he returned to the United States to join the Marines. After 
four years of service, Crawley went back to Dublin and became 
involved with the I.R.A •• In 1984, he traveled to Boston and 
began assembling a huge arms cache for the Proves which 
consisted of one-hundred and thirty-six heavy Browning machine 
guns, grenades, night sights, and flack jackets. 
On September 23, 1984, Crawley loaded the arsenal on 
board a fishing vessel called the Valhalla and sailed out of 
Boston bound for Ireland. Unknown to him and his associates, 
an informer had alerted the authorities about the conspiracy. 
This initiated a surveillance operation involving full-scale 
cooperation between American, British and Irish authorities. 
As the Valhalla sailed across the Atlantic, it was tracked by 
501 
an American satellite which closely monitored the ships 
progress. Some reports allege that the trawler was also 
followed by a British submarine. 23 A crack force of Garda 
detectives joined to monitor the Irish end of the operation. 
TWO Irish navy corvettes, the Emfil: and Aisling, followed a 
rendezvous ship, the Marita Anne, as it left port in Kerry. As 
the arms were transferred between the two trawlers in mid-
Atlantic, a Royal Navy Nimrod aircraft photographed the 
operation with special magnified cameras. 24 
Irish authorities intercepted the Marita Anne as it 
sailed back to its home port laden with weapons. on board, 
they found five crew members including Crawley and Martin 
Ferris, a prominent Kerry republican and suspected member of 
the I.R.A. Army Council. The men were tried and convicted in 
the Special Criminal Court on December 11, 1984. Crawley, 
Ferris, and Nick Browne, the ship's captain, were each given 
ten-years imprisonment. John McCarthy and Gavin Mortimer, who 
testified they were only crew members and didn't know about 
the operation, received five-year suspended sentences. 25 
The entrapment operation was a great success due to the 
high level of cooperation between authorities on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Patrick Noonan, Irish Minister for Justice, took 
the opportunity to attack Noraid by claiming its money was 
used to purchase the arms. He also said the interception of 
weapons was a massive blow to the I.R.A. which intended to use 
them in a new offensive designed to undermine Anglo-Irish 
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negotiations. In America, government officials similarly 
claimed a significant victory over the gunrunning network and 
many major newspapers used the incident to attack Irish-
American republicans. The Baltimore News-American commented: 
The I.R.A., which is in league with such scum as 
the P.L.O. and the killers employed by Libya's 
nutty Colonel Khadafy, are terrorists pure and 
simple - and some factions are hot to replace the 
British with a Marxist government. How long will it 
take for all this to sink in to those Americans 
whose dollars helped buy the North Korean hand 
grenades stashed aboard the Marita Anne ?26 
The Valhalla slipped past U.S. authorities on its 
homeward voyage and docked in Boston. The trawler was in port 
for three days before its discovery by Customs officers on 
October 16, 1984. Federal agents began an investigation which 
eventually linked the gunrunning operation to organized crime 
in Boston and to drug trafficking. It was not until April 
1986, however, that a grand jury indicted a group of men 
accused of involvement in the conspiracy. 
The leading figure in the indictment was Joseph Murray, 
an Irish-American from Charleston M.A., who had worked for 
years as a compositor with The Boston Globe. Murray had strong 
links with organized crime and was associated with a group of 
Irish mobsters called the Winter Hill Gang. 27 When police 
raided Murray's home, they found a consignment of weapons and 
over 10,000 rounds of ammunition. He was charged with 
conspiracy to supply guns to the I.R.A. and with smuggling 
thirty-six tons of marijuana into Boston to pay for them. 28 
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Among others indicted were Patrick Nee, who was accused 
of playing a major role in acquiring the weapons. Nee was born 
in Ireland and, like Murray, had strong links to organized 
crime in Boston. 29 Robert Anderson, captain of the Valhalla, 
was also charged with gunrunning and was allegedly paid 
$10,000 by Murray for undertaking the voyage. Anderson was 
noted for his swashbuckling lifestyle and heavy drinking and 
had used the Valhalla for a number of illegal ventures. 30 
During the trial in May 1987, the three men pleaded 
guilty to gunrunning. This confession was part of a plea 
bargain with prosecutors who dropped the drug charges and 
recommended sentences for lower than the twenty-two year 
maximum. Murray was sentenced to ten years while Patrick Nee 
and Robert Anderson got four years each. 
The trial was widely reported on both sides of the 
Atlantic because of its exposure of links between I .R.A. 
gunrunning and organized crime in Boston. It also uncovered 
links between Murray and Dr. William Herbert, an Ambassador to 
the United Nations for the Caribbean islands of st. Kitts and 
Nevis. The trial revealed that Murray used Herbert to launder 
money he made from drug deals. The Ambassador resigned in 
April 1987 when the F.B.I. produced documents showing his 
connections with Murray. 31 
A controversy also developed over the case of John 
Mcintyre, one of the crewmen on the Valhalla. He was 
questioned by police after the ship's seizure in Boston. 
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Mcintyre disappeared soon afterwards and has never been found. 
At the beginning of the grand jury investigation, John Loftus, 
the Mcintyre family lawyer, implied the man had cooperated 
with authorities and that he was the one who informed the 
F.B.I. of the gunrunning scheme. Loftus claimed Mcintyre was 
murdered by the I.R.A. because of his actions. 32 
John Loftus later wrote a book entitled, Valhalla's Wake 
in which he reversed his earlier allegation against the I.R.A. 
and claimed Mcintyre was assassinated by the Special Air 
Service of the British Army. He says that they murdered 
Mcintyre because he was about to discover the real informer 
within the gunrunning network. Loftus also claimed members of 
the U.S. Coast Guard passed information to the gunrunners on 
how to avoid coastal patrols. The British Embassy and U.S. 
Coast Guard both say these charges are completely false. 33 
A controversy also developed surrounding the involvement 
of Boston police officers in the Marita Anne affair. When the 
ship was seized, Garda detectives discovered eleven bullet-
proof vests. Ten of these vest were subsequently traced to 
Charles Tourkantonis and Michael Hanley, both officers with 
the Boston Police Department. An internal investigation 
revealed that the two officers had bought the vests for John 
Crowley. No disciplinary proceedings were taken, however, 
because the officers claimed they did not know the flack 
jackets were to be used illegally. One jacket was also traced 
to officer Michael Flemmi, a member of the bomb squad. He 
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claimed the vest was stolen from his car and that he didn't 
know how it ended up on the Marita Anne. Flemmi was similarly 
cleared of any charges of misconduct. 34 
The series of successes achieved by U.S. law enforcement 
agencies against the gunrunning network in the mid-1980s 
represented a serious problem for the I.R.A •. Patrick Bishop 
and Eamonn Mallie contend that after the seizure of the Marita 
Anne, the Provos began to concentrate their arms procurement 
ventures on Europe. Al though the I. R. A. continued to ship 
weapons from America, U.S. authorities successfully reduced 
the trans-Atlantic arms pipeline. The continued conviction of 
Noraid members for gunrunning further diluted the credibility 
of the group's claim to be solely involved with humanitarian 
aid. 35 
In addition to these problems, Irish-American 
republicanism continued to suffer from the adverse publicity 
generated by I.R.A. bomb attacks. One of the worst of these 
explosions occurred in July of 1982. The I.R.A. detonated two 
remote control devices in London's Hyde Park and Regents Park, 
killing eight bandsmen from the Royal Green Jackets Regiment. 
The military musicians were giving an open air concert and 
many civilians were injured by flying nails which had been 
packed around the bombs. 
In December 1982, the I.N.L.A. exploded a bomb in the 
Droppin' Well Inn near Ballykelly, Co. Derry. Eleven British 
soldiers and six civilians were killed. In October of 1984, an 
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I .R.A. bomb killed five people at the Conservative Party 
Conference at Brighton. The explosion only narrowly missed 
killing Prime Minister Thatcher. 
All these attacks were given prominent coverage in the 
United States and initiated a wave of criticism against the 
I.R.A •• The strongest reaction against the Provos, however, 
came after the bombing of Harrods department store in London 
on December 19, 1983. An I.R.A. unit drove two cars packed 
with explosives and parked them outside the store. They phoned 
a warning which was hopelessly late for police to clear the 
streets. The bombs ripped through Christmas shoppers, killing 
eight and severely injuring many others. Kenneth Salvesen, a 
businessman from Chicago, was among the dead and three other 
Americans were injured. 
The bombing caused outraged reactions in Britain and 
Ireland while the death of Salvesen brought some of the 
strongest attacks on Noraid ever launched in the American 
press. Numerous editorials alleged Noraid money had directly 
financed the bombs, and, therefore, brought death and injury 
to Americans. Martin Galvin, recognizing the disastrous effect 
the bomb had in America, issued statements that the action was 
taken without the Army Council's authority and that a warning 
beforehand "showed a principled morality that divides the 
freedom fighter from the terrorist. 1136 
Galvin's defense of the I.R.A. only led to greater 
condemnations of Noraid in the American press. The shallowness 
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of his statement was exposed later when evidence showed that 
the I.R.A. team were on an official mission which had indeed 
been approved by the Army Council. 37 The American Ambassador 
in London attacked the I.R.A.'s "savage bestiality" while the 
Friends of Ireland called the attack "despicable and 
deranged." The Chicago Tribune's reaction to the Regent's 
Park attack was representative of most American editorial 
opinion on I.R.A. bombings: 
Americans who, out of sentiment or ignorance, give 
money to Noraid and other I.R.A. front 
organizations should take a good look at what their 
contributions can do .•. Look at the blood spattered 
young bandsmen in Regents Park, look at the 
carcasses of horses strewn in bloody heaps across a 
London road. And they should read the eyewitness 
accounts of arms and legs and musical instruments 
flying through the air; of horses' screams and the 
pop of pistols putting them out of their misery; of 
the young soldier with the bottom half of his body 
blown away, reaching out in a futile dying 
gesture •.. That is where the I.R.A. and its front 
groups spend their money. They claim that they are 
raising funds for the families of slain or 
imprisoned I.R.A. men. They lie. The money goes for 
arms, ammunition, and bombs. It buys the high 
explosives and the remote control detonators that 
blew up in London. The money bank rolls the sort of 
sub-humans who can pack six inch nails around a 
bomb and put it in a place where women and children 
and tourists will gather. 1138 
Constitutional nationalists used every I .R.A. atrocity to 
convince Irish-Americans of the futility of violence. The 
Friends of Ireland also fought hard to contain the publicity 
successes achieved by republicans after the hunger strike. 
They continued to use their influence on Capitol Hill. 
Eventually, through close cooperation with the S.D.L.P. and 
Irish government, the Friends played an important role in the 
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Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Pressure and influence from 
these Irish-American political leaders was, at certain stages, 
vital in bringing the Agreement to fruition. It marks the most 
significant achievement of the Friends of Ireland. 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement was very much a consequence of 
the political changes in Ulster after the hunger strike. Sinn 
Fein electoral victories, during and after the prison dispute, 
created intense pressure on the S.D.L.P •• John Hume realized 
that his party needed to achieve some political success if it 
was to resist the challenge from republicanism. He hoped to 
secure political concessions from the British government 
through direct Anglo-Irish negotiations. Yet the likelihood of 
this objective seemed extremely remote. In 1982, the British 
were intent in pursuing an internal solution by devolved 
government through the establishment of James Prier's 
Assembly. They were consequently ignoring the Anglo-Irish 
dimension. 
Hume's hope of achieving a political breakthrough was 
further eroded by the serious deterioration in Anglo-Irish 
relations. This diplomatic chill began after Charles Haughey's 
electoral victory in March 1982. The new Taoiseach antagonized 
Margaret Thatcher with his nationalistic rhetoric and strong 
attacks against the Prior Assembly. 
Anglo-Irish relations reached their lowest ebb during the 
Falklands War. Haughey gave the Thatcher government only 
limited and grudging support to economic sanctions enforced by 
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the E.E.C. on Argentina. After a British submarine sank the 
Argentinean battleship Belgrano, Irish Defense Minister, 
Patrick Powers, said that "Obviously the British are the 
aggressors now." In Maggie ; An Intimate Portrait of a Woman 
in Power, Chris Ogden claims that the British Prime Minister 
considered Irish actions as an "unforgivable betrayal." He 
says it reinforced her, "natural antipathy towards the Irish, 
whom she considered, in large part, shiftless, sniveling, and 
spineless. 1139 
These Anglo-Irish antagonisms greatly concerned the 
Friends of Ireland. The group was alarmed at positive 
republican publicity over the Fl~nery trial and the st. 
Patrick's Day parade controversy. Senator Edward Kennedy and 
Tip O'Neill were frustrated that they could not counteract 
Irish-American republicanism by pointing to some political 
advances by constitutional nationalists in Ireland. Their 
frustration was compounded by the deterioration in relations 
between London and Dublin which seemed to block fresh 
political initiatives in Ulster.'0 
In this unpromising situation, the Friends of Ireland 
worked for a political breakthrough. In their 1982 st. 
Patrick's Day statement they appealed for greater dialogue 
between the Haughey and Thatcher administrations. In May, the 
Friends sent a delegation to Ireland led by Congressman Tom 
Foley and Senator Chris Dodd. They helped form a counterpart 
to the Friends of Ireland in the Dail called the Irish-u.s. 
Parliamentary 
strengthening 







constitutional nationalists in order to coordinate political 
action on Capitol Hill. 41 
The Friends of Ireland delegation also traveled to 
Belfast and met Lord Gowrie of the Northern Ireland Office. 
Tom Foley and Chris Dodd told him they were concerned about 
the lack of political progress in Ulster and endorsed the 
Anglo-Irish approach as the best way foreward. In order to 
show the British their commitment, key members of the Friends 
tabled joint-congressional resolutions calling for a ban on 
the use of plastic bullets and the outlawing of the Ulster 
Defense Association. 42 
Despite the efforts of the Friends of Ireland, 
constitutional nationalism suffered a major blow following 
Sinn Fein's success in the October 1982 Assembly elections. 
The results confirmed John Hume's view that a new initiative 
was imperative to consolidate the S.D.L.P. 's position and 
counteract the rising republican threat. He began to press 
Garret FitzGerald, elected Taoiseach in December of 1982, to 
embark on a new political drive aimed at defining the 
objectives of constitutional nationalists. Fi tzGerald was 
intensely aware of the threat posed by Sinn Fein and quickly 
announced the formation of a New Ireland Forum. 
The New Ireland Forum began discussions in May 1983. All 
constitutional nationalist parties submitted proposals on how 
to unify Ireland while still protecting 
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the 
Protestant/unionist identity. Sinn Fein was not asked to 
participate because of its support of violence while all 
Unionist parties rejected the exercise as "obviously biased" 
against their interests. Despite frequent disagreements 
between the parties involved, the Forum continued to take 
testimony and discuss political alternatives throughout the 
year. 
John Hume and the FitzGerald administration were 
committed to getting support for the Forum from the Friends of 
Ireland. Before the discussions began, Hume contacted all his 
associates on Capitol Hill and asked for a firm endorsement of 
the new initiative. Together they formulated a "United 
Ireland" resolution which was sponsored by twenty-eight 
Senators and fifty-three Congressmen. The resolution was 
issued on st. Patrick's Day 1983 and gave strong support to 
the New Ireland Forum, describing it as a great sign of hope 
for the peaceful unification of Ireland. The Friends re-
emphasized their attack on James Prier's "unworkable" Assembly 
and maintained that a real solution would require," the bold 
cooperation of both the British and Irish governments jointly 
pursuing, at the highest levels, a new strategy of 
reconciliation."u 
The Irish Times described the resolution as, "the most 
important Irish initiative to be put to Congress since 
1920. 1144 John Hume and Irish Foreign Minister, Peter Barry, 
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traveled to Washington to support the resolution. Barry also 
held extensive discussions with Ronald Reagan and asked for 
support for the New Ireland Forum. The President was impressed 
by the new initiative. Although he emphasized that the United 
States would not chart a course for Ulster, he acknowledged 
that "we do have an obligation to urge our long-time friends 
in that part of the world to seek reconciliation. 1145 
As the New Ireland Forum discussions progressed, the 
Friends of Ireland were kept informed of the latest 
developments. On July 27, 1983, a delegation from Dail Eireann 
traveled to Washington and met with their American 
counterparts. Members of the Friends considered the visit so 
important they suspended confirmation hearings for Paul 
Volcker, as Federal. Reserve Chairman, to meet the Irish 
politicians. 
The discussions concentrated on a growing conflict within 
the Forum between Charles Haughey and Garret FitzGerald. Press 
reports in Ireland and America suggested Haughey was using the 
Forum as a means to embarrass the Taoiseach. This political 
maneuvering alarmed the Friends. Journalist Michael Kilian 
contends that they asked the Dail delegation to advise Haughey 
not to disrupt the discussions. Tip O'Neill emphasized that 
the Forum needed to present a united front in order to win the 
support of the United States government and to enhance 
constitutional nationalist efforts on Capitol Hill. 46 
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The Friends of Ireland tried to aid the Forum by 
continuing to encourage meaningful dialogue between the Irish 
and British governments. In October 1983 they sponsored a 
resolution calling on President Reagan to appoint a special 
U.S. envoy to Northern Ireland. In an accompanying statement, 
Senator Edward Kennedy said an American envoy could play an 
important role in encouraging Anglo-Irish talks. Although the 
proposal was rejected by the Reagan administration, it did 
give the British yet another indication of Irish-American 
concern in seeing a new political move in Ulster. 47 
Following the special envoy resolution, the Friends were 
greatly encouraged by the resumption of Anglo-Irish summits. 
In November 1983, Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald met 
in London. These were the first major discussions since the 
dispute with Haughey over the Falklands War. FitzGerald was 
optimistic that the proposals being formulated in the New 
Ireland Forum would lay the basis for a bold new political 
initiative in Ulster. 48 
The Forum Report was finally released in May 1984 and 
offered three political options as possible solutions to the 
Ulster conflict. After strong pressure from Charles Haughey, 
it proposed that "the most favored solution" was a united 
Ireland, safeguarding unionist rights. The report also 
suggested a highly complicated federal-confederal system. 
Under this formula, both parts of Ireland would have their own 
assembly, presided over by a national government. The final 
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option proposed that Northern Ireland could be ruled jointly 
by both the Dublin and Westminster governments. 49 
The Friends of Ireland immediately supported the Forum 
Report and began working for the endorsement of the Reagan 
administration. To enhance this effort, Peter Barry flew to 
Washington on May 4, 1984, and held top level discussions with 
State Department officials. The talks proved successful and 
the U.S. government later issued a statement praising" the 
Irish statesmen for their courageous and forthright efforts 
embodied in the New Ireland Forum. 1150 
The American press also welcomed the Forum Report • .'.1'..b.§ 
Christian Science Monitor described it as a "measured step 
forward in eff arts to end the political deadlock." The New 
York Times and The Washington Post similarly praised the 
Report and urged the British government to make a positive 
response. 51 
The British Parliament debated the Forum Report on July 
2, 1984. There was considerable praise for its attempt to 
accommodate Unionist aspirations and its strong condemnation 
of terrorism. The Thatcher government refused to give an 
official reaction until the next scheduled Anglo-Irish summit 
in November. There was wide scale anticipation on both sides 
of the Atlantic that the British Prime Minister would make a 
magnanimous gesture towards constitutional nationalism. 
The Anglo-Irish summit was held at Thatcher's retreat, 
Chequers, on November 15, 1984. Since the release of the Forum 
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Report, both governments had conducted private discussions 
which achieved considerable progress. At Chequers, Garret 
FitzGerald tried to move these talks to a higher level. He 
suggested a political formula under which his government would 
amend articles two and three of the Irish constitution --
which claim sovereignty over Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach 
hoped that in exchange Britain would agree to a formal 
political role for Dublin in Ulster affairs. 52 
Douglas Hurd, the recently appointed Secretary of State, 
opposed FitzGerald's offer. He felt the constitutional 
amendment was too much of a gamble and would be extremely 
counter-productive if it failed. Consequently, the British 
delegation tried to retard the pace of discussions. Although 
both governments continued to work toward an Anglo-Irish 
agreement, FitzGerald recalled that "The British were tending 
to pull back from what had been discussed already. It was a 
somewhat disappointing meeting because the negotiations were 
moved to a lower and subtractive level. 1153 
Following the meeting at Chequers, Margaret Thatcher held 
a press conference. For the first forty-five minutes she gave 
a very positive appraisal of Anglo-Irish negotiations. When 
she was asked about the three political options advanced in 
the Forum Report, however, she dismissed them all in her now 
infamous "Out, out, out" remarks. 
Thatcher's seemingly insensitive dismissal of the efforts 
of constitutional nationalists caused an immediate .political 
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storm in Ireland. The normally restrained Irish Times said the 
Prime Minister was "as off-hand and patronizing as she is 
callous and imperious." The Irish Press said Thatcher's 
vehement delivery had an element of rudeness usually reserved 
for bitter enemies and that she made "Out" sound like a four-
letter word. The newspaper concluded her statement was a 
devastating rejection of all the hopes and efforts that went 
into the Forum. 
Thatcher also received strong condemnation in the 
American press. There were over fifty editorials on her 
remarks which generally reaffirmed support for the Forum and 
attacked the British government's failure to make political 
progress in Ulster. The Boston Globe said Thatcher had "a mind 
choked with prejudice," while commentaries in The Washington 
Post attacked her "stone cold intransigence" and "graceless 
self-indulgence."~ 
Relations between the London and Dublin governments 
entered a period of confusion and misunderstanding following 
Thatcher's press conference. Many Irish politicians believed 
the British Prime Minister was deliberately trying to 
humiliate Garret FitzGerald and scuttle Anglo-Irish talks. 
They persuaded the Taoiseach to issue a counter statement 
describing Thatcher's reaction as "gratuitously offensive." 
Constitutional nationalists were greatly concerned that 
the deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations would destroy the 
prospects for a new political move in Ulster. The S.D.L.P. was 
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particularly alarmed at this development because they would 
have no political breakthrough with which to counteract Sinn 
Fein. Faced with this aituation, John Hume and Irish 
government officials began to enlist the services of their 
Irish-American supporters. They contacted the Friends of 
Ireland and urged them to get Ronald Reagan's assistance. 
Constitutional nationalists hoped they could persuade the 
President to pressure Thatcher into a more conciliatory 
position. 55 
Among the key figures in this attempt to get Reagan's 
support was William Clark, U.S. Secretary of the Interior. 
Clark was a long-time friend and confidant of the President. 
He also had a close relationship with the Irish diplomatic 
corps in Washington, especially Sean Donlon. Clark became very 
supportive of the constitutional nationalist position. While 
he was Deputy Secretary of state in 1981, Clark conducted a 
tour of Ireland. He caused a political storm among Unionists 
when he admitted his membership of the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians and told a reporter that "it is the hope and prayer 
of all Americans" that Ireland will be united. " 56 
Irish government officials contacted Clark following 
Thatcher's "Out, Out, Out" remarks. He agreed to use his 
influence with Reagan to assist the constitutional nationalist 
cause. The President was scheduled to meet the British Prime 
Minister at Camp David on December 22, 1984. Before the 
meeting, Clark asked Reagan to discuss Anglo-Irish relations 
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with the Prime Minister and express his desire for political 
progress. The Friends of Ireland backed Clark in a telegram to 
the President on December 21. They also told Reagan of their 
"disappointment at Mrs. Thatcher's public peremptory dismissal 
of the reasonable alternatives put foreword in the Forum 
Report. 1157 
American press reports which appeared after the Camp 
David meeting said the two leaders only discussed Western 
European reaction to the Star Wars Defense Initiative. It was 
not until January 17, 1985, that the Reagan administration 
officially acknowledged that Anglo-Irish affairs was one of 
the topics on the agenda. In a letter to Mario Biaggi, the 
White House stated the President and Mrs. Thatcher "exchanged 
views on Northern Ireland" during which he "stressed the need 
for progress and the need for all parties concerned to take 
steps which will contribute to a peaceful resolution. 1158 
Garret FitzGerald believes William Clark's intervention 
was the crucial factor in persuading Reagan to discuss Irish 
affairs. The President raised the issue against specific 
advice from the State Department. During the meeting, it seems 
that Reagan expressed a desire to see progress in the Anglo-
Irish talks. He also said he would like to discuss the issue 
further with Thatcher when she was due back in the U.S. in 
February 1985. 59 
Reagan's concern with Anglo-Irish relations, and his 
desire for further discussions, put Thatcher under a certain 
519 
amount of pressure. She was encouraged to make some new 
proposals to the Irish government before her return to 
Washington in February. Garret FitzGerald believes that it was 
partly due to this American pressure that Thatcher offered a 
new Anglo-Irish package on January 21, 1985. This new deal was 
a significant advance on what had been discussed at Chequers 
and opened the way for the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 
November. 60 
Although American pressure was a significant factor in 
Thatcher's more positive proposal of January 21, she was also 
influenced by her political colleagues in Britain. Members of 
her cabinet and staff emphasized that her "Out, Out, Out" 
remarks had damaged Garret FitzGerald's political position in 
Ireland and would give encouragement to Sinn Fein. They 
advised Thatcher to compromise and offer more significant 
concessions to the Irish. 61 
Despite Thatcher's new proposal, the FitzGerald 
administration continued to use its influence in America. Sean 
Donlon and John Hume contacted Tip O'Neill before the British 
Prime Minister was due to address a joint session of Congress 
on February 20, 1985. They asked the House Speaker to ensure 
that Thatcher discuss the Northern Ireland problem in her 
speech. O'Neill conveyed this request to Sir Oliver Wright, 
the British Ambassador. To emphasize his concern, O'Neill also 
met Thatcher when she arrived in Washington and again asked 
her to include the Ulster conflict in her address. 62 
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O'Neill's pressure produced results. When Thatcher 
addressed Congress, she not only discussed Northern Ireland, 
but was also extremely conciliatory towards the Irish 
government. She said that relations between her and Garett 
FitzGerald were "excellent" and that she would cooperate with 
his administration to find a political solution in Ulster. She 
also expressed hope that joint efforts to launch new political 
dialogue would receive full support from America. 63 
As a complement to using its influence with Tip O'Neill, 
the Irish government also tried to get support from the State 
Department. On February 15, 1985, Garret FitzGerald and Sean 
Donlon met with Rick Burke, Assistant Secretary for European 
Affairs. They asked the State Department to include the Ulster 
problem in talks with Thatcher following her Congressional 
address. 
Burke agreed to the Irish request and succeeded in 
reversing the State Department's traditional avoidance of the 
Northern Ireland conflict. He met with Secretary of state 
George Shultz and convinced him to raise the question with 
Thatcher. At a meeting in California, Shultz and Reagan told 
the Prime Minister of their desire to see progress in Anglo-
Irish discussions and offered American financial support in 
the event of an agreed political initiative. 64 
There was considerable speculation over the nature of 
American governmental involvement in the Anglo-Irish process. 
Some unionists alleged it was all part of a sinister 
521 
conspiracy under which the British would withdraw from 
Northern Ireland. Enoch Powell M.P. believed the U.S. was 
encouraging an Anglo-'Irish agreement in order to establish a 
united Ireland. This new state would end its neutrality, enter 
the N.A.T.O. alliance, and permit the establishment of 
American military bases. Powell claimed this would greatly 
enhance the strategic defense of Western Europe. 65 
Enoch Powell never produced any solid evidence for this 
conspiracy theory yet it was supported by a number of 
prominent Unionists. The fact that the Republic of Ireland 
still remains neutral seems to confirm that the theory was a 
misinterpretation of U.S. intentions and was based on 
incorrect assumptions. 
Perhaps a more plausible explanation of U.S. involvement 
was Ronald Reagan's personal interest in Irish affairs. The 
President continually emphasized his Irish roots and was 
informed of the latest political developments by William Clark 
and other Irish-Americans in his administration. These 
included Robert McFarlane in the National Security Council, 
Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, Secretary of Labor 
Donovan, and C.I.A. Director William Casey. 
Irish government ministers took every opportunity to 
convince the Reagan administration of the threat posed by the 
rise of Sinn Fein. When Vice-President George Bush stopped in 
Dublin for talks with Garett FitzGerald in July 1983, the 
Taoiseach warned him that Sinn Fein political success could 
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destroy democracy in Ireland. 66 Irish officials reemphasized 
this point when Reagan himself visited Ireland in June 1984. 
They tried to convince the President that the only way to stop 
Sinn Fein was through a new political agreement achieved 
through Anglo-Irish discussions. 
Reagan, as a self-proclaimed champion against world 
terrorism, sympathized with 'the Irish government and strongly 
opposed the I.R.A .. Each St. Patrick's Day he issued vehement 
attacks against the organization and urged Irish-Americans not 
to fund violence in Ulster. He therefore had a concrete reason 
for supporting an agreement which offered the prospect of 
stifling the republican movement. 
From these various influences, Reagan encouraged Anglo-
Irish talks. His contribution was considerable. Following the 
February 20 meeting with Thatcher, the British government 
intensified negotiations with the FitzGerald administration. 
Chris Ogden implies that Reagan offered to increase activities 
against the Irish-American republican network if the British 
were more conciliatory towards the Irish. He says that 
Thatcher partly accepted the Anglo-Irish Agreement because "If 
she did not, she knew she would get precious little help 
stopping the flow of guns and money from America to the I.R.A. 
or in getting I .R.A. suspects extradited from the U. s .. 1167 
Throughout the final stages of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 
the Irish continued to enlist the assistance of their American 
supporters. In early March 1985, Tip O'Neill led a delegation 
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of the "Friends" to Dublin. The held discussions with Garett 
FitzGerald and Peter Barry on the progress of Anglo-Irish 
talks. O'Neill also went to London and assured British 
officials he would use all his influence to secure American 
financial support for a political agreement. He convinced them 
that, as Speaker of the House, he was in a unique position to 
guide a financial assistance bill through Congress. 68 
On March 25, Northern Ireland Secretary Douglas Hurd 
traveled to America to discuss the financial aid package in 
greater detail. He met Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, 
and held extensive discussions with Tip O'Neill and Edward 
Kennedy. Hurd gave them full details of the Anglo-Irish 
discussions and received further assurance of America's 
commitment to back a political agreement in Ulster. 69 
In early May 1985, Garret FitzGerald traveled to 
Washington for further talks about the United States aid to 
Ireland. He discussed the practicalities of getting the bill 
through Congress with Tip O'Neill and Edward Kennedy. 
Fi tzGerald also went to Ottawa for a meeting with Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney. The Taoiseach told him the Anglo-
Irish agreement was near completion. Mulroney was so delighted 
he promised Canadian financial assistance. 70 
On May 17, 1985, Anglo-Irish discussions were given an 
added sense of urgency. Sinn Fein consolidated its political 
success by taking twelve percent of the vote in local 
government elections. The vote showed British officials. that 
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the S.D.L.P. needed some sign of political success to resist 
the challenge from Sinn Fein. Consequently, talks between both 
governments were intensified in the summer of 1985 in an 
attempt to achieve an early agreement. 
As the Anglo-Irish discussions reached their final 
stages, there was a flurry of activity to arrange the American 
financial contribution. On August 9, Tip O'Neill again met 
with Peter Barry and Garret FitzGerald in Dublin. He attempted 
to smooth out final issues of contention between the Irish and 
British governments. In September, William Clark also traveled 
to Ireland. He learned that the agreement was near completion. 
When Clark returned to Washington he began to work with Robert 
McFarlane to finalize details of the American aid package. 71 
The final hurdle to the Agreement came in late October 
1985. Charles Haughey was dissatisfied with the Anglo-Irish 
discussions, believing that they were a "sell-out" to British 
interests. He dispatched Brian Lenihan to Washington in an 
attempt to convince the Friends to oppose the Agreement. Tip 
O'Neill and Edward Kennedy immediately rejected Haughey's 
contentions. The Irish-American political leaders, therefore, 
saved the Agreement from a potentially serious challenge and 
muted Haughey's opposition. 72 
The contacts between American politicians and those 
involved in the Anglo-Irish talks were widely reported in the 
media. There was intense speculation over the extent of 
Reagan's financial contribution. The Sunday Times reported the 
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AJllerican aid package would be $1 billion. 73 Unionist 
newspapers ran reports that the Republic of Ireland had agreed 
to enter N.A.T.O. and that U.S. missile bases would soon be 
established. 
All the press speculation finally ended on November 15, 
1985, when Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald met in 
Hillsborough Castle and finally signed the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. The key element of the new accord was the 
establishment of an Intergovernmental Conference at which 
British and Irish officials would meet regularly to discuss 
matters relating to the government of Northern Ireland. An 
Anglo-Irish secretariat was also established at Maryf ield, in 
Belfast, to support the work of the Intergovernmental 
Conference. These provisions meant that the Republic of 
Ireland was given a formal role in Ulster for the first time 
since the formation of the state in 1921. 74 
Under the Agreement, Dublin formally acknowledged the 
right of the unionist community to remain within the United 
Kingdom. This was affirmed under Article One which stated, 
"any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come 
about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland." Other provisions expressed a desire "to protect 
human rights and to prevent discrimination." The Accord also 
promised much greater levels of cross-border security 
cooperation. This would be coordinated by the Chief Constable 
of the R. U .c. and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana .• 
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The unionist reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement was 
immediate and hostile. No unionist politician had been 
consulted during the negotiations and they saw it as an 
attempt by the British to sell them out. The leaders of the 
Official Unionist Party and Democratic Unionist Party embarked 
on a series of mass rallies and days of protest. All unionist 
M.P.s withdrew from their seats at Westminster and eventually 
forced an election over the Hillsborough accord. 
The American reaction, in contrast, was extremely 
positive. The Agreement received massive political and 
editorial support. All the major newspapers characterized it 
as a major step towards reconciliation in Ulster and praised 
Thatcher and FitzGerald for their political courage. The New 
York Times described the Accord as "creative and ingenious" 
and warned unionists that the only group which would benefit 
from their opposition was the I.R.A .• 75 The Washington Post 
suggested that the strong American support for the Agreement 
would lead to a significant erosion of Irish-American support 
for the Provisionals. 76 
The major Irish-American newspapers were more reserved in 
their reaction. All welcomed the fact that Dublin was given a 
formal role in Northern Ireland but questioned the unionist 
right to remain in the United Kingdom. 77 Mario Biaggi and the 
Ad Hoc Committee were also ambivalent. While their statements 
seemed to support the Agreement, they were phrased in such a 
527 
way as to open the possibility of disagreement in the 
future. 78 
There was no such indecision in Noraid's reaction. The 
group followed Sinn Fein's lead in describing the Agreement as 
a sham and a betrayal of Irish national sovereignty. Martin 
Galvin emphasized that the only way peace would be achieved 
was through British withdrawal.n 
On the day the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, Ronald 
Reagan and Tip O'Neill held a press reception in the Oval 
Office. They praised the new initiative and gave a concrete 
assurance that the United states would provide financial aid. 
Reagan also condemned I.R.A. supporters in America. 80 On 
December 9, the House of Representatives passed a resolution 
supporting the Agreement by a vote of 380 to 1. The resolution 
received a similar endorsement in the Senate one day later. 81 
Following these votes, the Reagan administration began working 
on a "Northern Ireland and Ireland Assistance Bill." It 
promised to provide $250 million over five years for economic 
development in the form of loans and guarantees. 
In January 1986, Sean Donlon and Ken Bloomfield, head of 
the Northern Ireland Civil Service, held intense discussions 
with Rozanne Ridgeway, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs. The talks involved details of how United 
States financial aid would be used. Press reports said the 
meeting was "highly successful" and that U.S. Ambassador to 
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Ireland, Margaret Heckler, would be traveling to Ulster to 
assess the best way to spend the cash contribution. 
Despite the early optimism, the aid package became 
embroiled in a series of internal political disputes within 
Congress. Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, began to use the aid bill as a lever to 
pass an updated extradition treaty between the United States 
and Britain. The Reagan administration also threatened that 
the Irish Bill would suffer if Congress resisted a new 
assistance program to aid the Nicaraguan Contras. 82 Some 
politicians also questioned the logic of sending aid to 
Ireland at a time when the United States deficit was reaching 
astronomical proportions. Newspapers also suggested U.S. 
foreign aid would be better spent in the Third World. The Los 
Angeles Times, for example, commented: 
Even as Reagan speaks of a five year Irish aid 
program at $50 million per year, he has proposed 
cutting the worldwide contribution to the immensely 
effective United Nations Children's Program from 
$46 million to $34 million per year. Reagan's 
priorities of need are as skewed as his Third World 
geography! 83 
In response to this deadlock, the Friends of Ireland 
drafted their own Bill. It proposed the United States should 
give $50 million to boost the Ulster economy, in consecutive 
payments over five years. There was overwhelming support for 
the measure in the House. Yet it was not until August 1986 
that a bill was finally passed with the approval of the Reagan 
administration. The final measure approved $120 million in aid 
529 
over a three-year period. It granted $50 million for 1986 and 
two payments of $35 million for each subsequent year.a• 
The Canadian government joined America and donated $10 
million to the Agreement. New Zealand later sent $300,000. The 
British and Irish governments quickly established an 
International Fund to administer and distribute this cash. 
Both governments appointed a seven member Board of managers 
while the donor countries were represented by observers 
nominated by their respective governments. 
In 1987 the International Fund began supporting a wide 
range of economic and social programs. In accordance with the 
wishes of donor countries, the Fund spent three-quarters of 
its cash in Northern Ireland and the remainder in border 
countries of the Irish Republic. Supporters of the 
International Fund claim that its efforts have generated 
significant economic growth and provided thousands of new 
jobs. as 
The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement brought great 
hope to constitutional nationalists. The political benefits 
promised by Dublin's role in Ulster affairs seemed to suggest 
a new era in which Sinn Fein's influence would be minimized. 
The Agreement could be used by the s.D.L.P. to win support and 
reestablish its leadership of the nationalist community. 
Furthermore, the provisions for extensive cross-border 
security cooperation seemed to imply a new commitment which 
would severely hamper I.R.A. operations. 
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In America, the Friends of Ireland considered the 
Agreement as their most significant intervention in Irish 
politics. Tip O'Neill and Edward Kennedy firmly believe their 
efforts played an extremely important role in securing the 
Accord. Without their sustained pressure and influence the 
British government would have been much less inclined to 
engage in serious discussions. 
Most significantly, the Friends and the Irish government 
persuaded President Reagan to add his support to the 
Agreement. The U.S. contribution to the Ireland Fund marked 
the first time the American government became officially 
involved in the Ulster conflict. Reagan also used his "special 
relationship" with Margaret Thatcher to further the process of 
Anglo-Irish discussions. Journalist Alex Brummer therefore 
concludes: 
Without the encouragement and prodding of the 
Reagan administration and the sustained pressure 
for political reform from the United states 
Congress, Mrs. Thatcher and Garett FitzGerald may 
never have made it to Hillsborough. 86 
The Friends of Ireland emphasized that all the 
breakthroughs of the Agreement were achieved through political 
discussion. They hoped that this example would persuade Irish-
Americans of the futility of supporting violence and that 
constitutional action was the only way to bring change in 
Ireland. The Friends were filled with optimism that, as the 
benefits of the Anglo-Irish Agreement became increasingly 
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CONCLUSION 
In the nineteenth century Irish-Americans played a key 
role in providing political and material support for both 
constitutional and physical force nationalists in Ireland. 
They also made a significant contribution to the 1916 Easter 
Rising and the War of Independence from 1919 to 1921. Despite 
this long history, Irish-American nationalism diminished after 
the establishment of the Irish Free State. The degree of 
independence achieved by the twenty-six counties satisfied 
most of the diaspora. Others were sickened by the bloodletting 
and fratricide during the Irish Civil War. 
The decline of Irish-American nationalism further 
accelerated after World War II. Increasing socio-economic 
success produced a flight to the suburbs and an erosion of 
ethnic solidarity. Most Irish-Americans became more concerned 
with their position in the United States than with political 
events in Ireland. The election of President John F. Kennedy 
in 1961 symbolized their assimilation into mainstream American 
society. Consequently, when the current Ulster troubles 
erupted in 1968, the vast majority of Irish-Americans remained 
passive and uninvolved. 1 
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In The Irish in America, William Griff in claims that 
despite the movement towards assimilation, a small minority of 
Irish-Americans retained an interest in their cultural 
heritage. They contributed to the growing popularity of 
college courses in Irish literature and history in the 1970s. 
Groups of these Irish-Americans also encouraged a revival of 
interest in traditional music and the Gaelic language. 2 
For some Irish-Americans, concern with their ethnic roots 
stimulated an interest in the Ulster conflict. Most supported 
Irish unification and the goals of constitutional nationalism. 
In the mid to late seventies their views were represented by 
the "Four Horsemen" of Irish-American politics -- Senators 
Edward Kennedy and Daniel Moynihan, Speaker of the House 
Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, and Governor Hugh Carey of New York. 
During the initial stages of the Ulster crisis these 
leading Irish-American politicians inclined towards the 
militant nationalist perspective. In 1971, for example, 
Senator Kennedy caused considerable political controversy by 
demanding the immediate withdrawal of British troops. Such 
statements concerned not only the British government, but also 
constitutional nationalists in Ireland who felt Irish-American 
political leaders were giving encouragement to the. I.R.A .. 
John Hume of the S.D.L.P. and high ranking Irish government 
officials contacted Kennedy and convinced him to adopt a more 
moderate approach. Eventually, the Four Horsemen became an 
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important source of support for constitutional nationalism on 
Capitol Hill. 
On St. Patrick's Day in 1977, the Four Horsemen issued 
their first joint annual statement. They endorsed political 
dialogue as the only way to achieve a solution to the Northern 
Ireland problem and strongly condemned Americans who supported 
the I.R.A •• Many political analysts contend that this action 
contributed to a general decline in Irish-American 
Republicanism during the late seventies. The "Big Four" also 
showed the extent of their political influence by persuading 
President Jimmy Carter to promise U.S. financial and economic 
support in the event of a political agreement in Ulster. 3 
In subsequent St. Patrick's Day statements the Four 
Horsemen combined their denunciations of violence with strong 
attacks on British government policy. They used their 
influence in Washington to increase pressure on the British to 
launch a new political initiative in Ulster. Edward Kennedy 
and Tip O'Neill specifically called for a movement towards 
power-sharing under which the s.D.L.P. would have considerable 
leverage. Analysts such as Adrian Guelke maintain that this 
American political pressure was the main reason for the Atkins 
Conference in early 1980. Although this initiative produced no 
agreement between the S.D.L.P. and unionists, it was the first 
major example of Irish-American political pressure effecting 
British policy in Northern Ireland.' 
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In March 1981 the Four Horsemen consolidated their 
position on Capitol Hill by forming the Friends of Ireland. 
This Congressional group contained some of the most 
influential politicians in America. They greatly overshadowed 
the activities of Mario Biaggi's Ad-Hoc Committee on Irish 
Affairs, which was more inclined towards the militant 
nationalist position. 
The Friends of Ireland soon had an opportunity to test 
the extent of their political influence. In May 1981, after 
the death of Bobby Sands, they sent a telegram to Margaret 
Thatcher urging a compromise with the hunger strikers. While 
the British Prime Minister tried not to offend the Irish-
American politicians, she rejected their appeal and blamed the 
continuing death of prisoners on I.R.A. leaders outside the H-
Blocks. 
Following this failure with Margaret Thatcher, the 
Friends of Ireland tried to secure the involvement of Ronald 
Reagan. In July 1981 they backed an appeal from the Irish 
government to the President which asked for American support 
in pressuring Britain. Taoiseach Garret Fi tzGerald wanted 
Reagan to persuade Thatcher to negotiate directly with the 
hunger strikers. Al though the President did discuss t.he prison 
protest at the Ottawa Economic Summit on July 20, he flatly 
refused to get involved. 
The failure to get Reagan's intervention in the hunger 
strike was a blow to the prestige of the Friends of Ireland. 
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Yet despite this setback, they continued to support the 
initiatives of constitutional nationalism in Ireland. The 
"Friends" gave strong encouragement to the New Ireland Forum 
and appealed to the British government to make a positive 
response. Their efforts achieved their greatest success with 
the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. 
The contribution of the Friends of Ireland to the 
Agreement was most influential following the summit between 
Margaret Thatcher and Garett FitzGerald in November 1984. The 
British Prime Minister's blunt rejection of the Forum Report 
seemed to signal a deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations. 
Faced with this possibility, the FitzGerald government 
appealed to the Friends for assistance. On this occasion the 
Irish-American politicians succeeded in getting Ronald 
Reagan's support. 
During a December 1984 meeting at Camp David, Reagan 
discussed Anglo-Irish relations with Margaret Thatcher. He 
took this initiative on the advice of Secretary of the 
Interior William Clark, against the wishes of the State 
Department. Clark, in turn, had been influenced by the Friends 
of Ireland and the Irish government. 
Garret FitzGerald, although acknowledging the influence 
of other factors, believes that this American pressure 
encouraged Thatcher to be more conciliatory. She therefore 
presented the Irish government with a comprehensive political 
proposal in January 1985. When Thatcher came to the United 
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States in February to address a joint session of Congress, Tip 
O'Neill insisted that she discuss Northern Ireland. In her 
speech the British Prime Minister described her relationship 
with Garret FitzGerald as excellent and implied there would be 
renewed Anglo-Irish efforts aimed at solving the Ulster 
conflict. 5 
After January 1985 the pace of Anglo-Irish discussions 
greatly intensified. During these talks leaders of the Friends 
of Ireland traveled to Dublin and gave assurances of 
substantial U.S. financial support for a political settlement. 
They also blocked a potentially serious challenge to the 
provisions of the Agreement from Fianna Fail leader Charles 
Haughey. When the accord was finally signed at Hillsborough 
Castle on November 15, 1985, it represented not only a major 
achievement for Garret FitzGerald and the S.D.L.P. but also 
for the Friends of Ireland. The role played by these Irish-
American political leaders in the agreement enhanced the 
prestige of constitutional nationalism in the United States. 
It marks their most significant intervention in the Northern 
Ireland problem to date. 
Most Irish-Americans who were interested in the Ulster 
conflict supported the Friends of Ireland. Some gave financial 
donations to reconciliation groups such as the American-
Ireland Fund and co-Operation North. Others organized summer 
holiday programs in America for children from Belfast and 
Derry. There was, however, a small minority of Irish-Americans 
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who supported violence as a means to achieve political change. 
They formed organizations to assist the Provisional I.R.A.'s 
armed struggle and developed an extremely militant strain of 
Irish nationalism. 
Since its formation in 1970, the Irish Northern Aid 
Committee (Nora id) has been the most prominent and 
controversial group in the Irish-American republican network. 
One of its principal objectives was to win positive publicity 
for the republican cause and highlight British injustice in 
Ulster. This Nor aid campaign constantly suffered from the 
negative American public reaction to I .R.A. atrocities in 
Ireland. The group's publicity efforts were further impaired 
by the State Department's denial of U.S. visas to Sinn Fein 
leaders. Noraid also claimed there was a pro-British bias in 
the American media. 
Despite the various factors working against the Irish-
American republican network, Noraid did achieve a number of 
important publicity victories. In 1972 it capitalized on 
American revulsion at the killing of thirteen Catholic 
demonstrators during Bloody Sunday. Noraid membership 
increased and financial receipts rose to their highest level 
of the entire 1970s. 
The greatest breakthrough for Noraid's publicity efforts 
came during the hunger strikes of 1980-81. Irish-American 
republican activists organized large public demonstrations 
after the death of Bobby Sands. Influential American 
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newspapers characterized Margaret Thatcher's attitude as 
intransigent and called for concessions on the prisoners' five 
demands. Noraid fund-raising reached unprecedented heights and 
it formed twelve new chapters nationwide. 
Noraid's rejuvenation during the hunger strikes convinced 
its leaders to organize annual tours of Northern Ireland. 
Beginning in 1983, Irish-American activists traveled to the 
province to directly experience life under "British 
oppression." They stayed with republican families, 
participated in pro-I.R.A. demonstrations, listened to 
political speeches from Sinn Fein leaders, and some even took 
part in riots against the British security forces. 
These annual Noraid tours became important publicity 
events for the Republican Movement in Ireland. Sinn Fein 
claimed they showed widespread Irish-American support for the 
I.R.A. and exposed British oppression. Martin Galvin, the 
leader of the tours, caused considerable embarrassment to the 
British government by his continual evasion of the exclusion 
order against him. When Northern Ireland authorities tried to 
arrest him in 1984, a police officer killed Sean Downes. This 
incident brought extensive international condemnations of the 
R.U.C. and further undermined its image within the nationalist 
community. 
Although Noraid has achieved some notable publicity 
successes, its principal function is fund-raising. From 1971 
to 1981, Justice Department records indicate that the 
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organization sent $1,889,607 to the Republican Movement in 
Ireland. This figure does not include Noraid's disbursements 
between July 1981 and 1984. The group refused to file 
financial records in this period because of a legal dispute 
over its relationship to the I.R.A •• 6 
Nora id has continually claimed its funds go to the 
families of imprisoned I.R.A. members for welfare purposes. 
British, Irish, and American authorities dispute this and 
allege that most donations are used to buy weapons. All three 
governments further claim that Noraid financial reports under 
the Foreign Agents Registration Act are significantly 
understated. 
American law enforcement officials have never uncovered 
a direct link between Noraid funds and the purchase of 
weapons. The group's disbursements are almost impossible to 
trace because they are delivered to Ireland in cash amounts by 
trusted couriers. There is, however, strong circumstantial 
evidence supporting the claims of U.S. authorities. In 1982 
the F. B. I. foiled a major gunrunning conspiracy which was 
partly funded by Michael Flannery. The Noraid leader, rather 
unconvincingly, claimed that his organization had not provided 
the money but that it was part of a separate I.R.A. fund. 
In The American Connection Jack Holland correctly points 
out that the dispute over the use of funds is purely academic. 
The money Noraid sends is extremely important to the I.R.A. 
"simply because it frees other funds which are in turn used in 
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the purchase of arms. 117 It is also true that even if all 
Noraid cash· does go to republican families, it still performs 
a vital role in sustaining morale. I.N.A.C. leader Matthew 
Higgins once remarked "We have to take care of the needs of 
the dependents. If that fails, everything fails. If the 
dependents become dissatisfied then the whole thing collapses 
like a house of cards. 118 Michael Flannery put this more simply 
when he commented, "An I .R.A. soldier freed from financial 
worries for his family is a much better fighter!" 9 
The most direct way in which Irish-American republicans 
have helped the I.R.A. is through trans-Atlantic gunrunning. 
In the early 1970s, George Harrison was one of the principal 
arms suppliers. He sent the first consignment of American 
rifles to Ireland in 1~68. They arrived in Belfast in the 
summer of 1969 and proved vital to the I.R.A.'s defense of 
republican areas during the bloody sectarian riots of that 
year. 
In 1969 the Provisionals sent Sean Keenan to America to 
co-ordinate the gunrunning network. He contacted a group of 
Irish-Americans in Philadelphia who supplied the first batch 
of Armalite rifles. This weapon was ideal for the I.R.A.'s 
guerilla campaign. Continual supplies of the Armalite 
modernized the Provo's firepower and provided the means to 
conduct their military operations throughout the seventies. 
By 1977, the British government claimed that 80% of the 
I .R.A. 's weapons came from the United States. The Royal· Ulster 
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Constabulary released figures showing that American guns were 
used in 70% of Provo killings. American authorities also 
acknowledged the importance of trans-Atlantic gunrunning but 
denied it was as extensive as British estimates. 
In the 1980s the I.R.A. extended its arms procurement 
ventures in Europe and also received military supplies from 
Libya. Despite this trend, Irish-American gunrunners continued 
to play an important role. They supplied the Provisionals with 
more sophisticated weapons including remote control bombs and 
heavy M-60 machine guns. 
Irish-American republicans also tried to provide the 
I.R.A. with surface to air missiles to shoot down British Army 
helicopters. Since 1981 the F.B.I. has uncovered four of these 
conspiracies. Federal agents infiltrated the latest scheme in 
Florida. In 1989 three I.R.A. weapons experts were arrested 
while trying to ship a consignment of Stinger missiles to 
Ireland. The men were convicted by a federal court in Fort 
Lauderdale and their sentencing hearing is currently pending. 
Although the F.B.I. has broken a large number of 
gunrunning conspiracies, most analysts agree that the I.R.A. 
only needs a small supply of weapons to continue its 
operations. Irish-American republicans still claim that more 
guns get through to the Provos than are detected. It therefore 
seems certain that the trans-Atlantic arms pipeline will 
continue to be significant for the foreseeable future. Michael 
Flannery once made the prophetic remark, "It will _go on 
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forever. As long as the Brits are in Belfast, there will be 
someone like me in America! 1110 
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NOTES 
1. L.J. Mccaffrey, The Irish Diaspora in Ainerica 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1976), chapter 
nine. The development of an exclusivist Gaelic Irish-Ireland 
element in post-Treaty Irish nationalism also tended to weaked 
Irish-American nationalism. 
2. W.D. Griffin, The Irish in America : A Chronology and 
Fact Book (New York: Oceana, 1972). See also Sean Cronin 
"Irish-America : Vast Majority Now Assimilated," The Irish 
Times, 10 October 1984. 
3. See Mary Holland, "Carter, Kennedy, and Ireland : The 
Inside Story," Magill, (October 1, 1977). The 1977 St. 
Patrick's Day statement probably influenced those Irish-
Americans who were less committed to the militant nationalist 
cause. It is unlikely that it had much effect on the hard-core 
activists within the Irish-American republican network. This 
group generally viewed the actions of the Four Horsemen as yet 
another example of the abandonment of the oppressed 
nationalist community in Ulster by the "lace curtain Irish" in 
America. 
4. Adrian Guelke, "The American Connection to the 
Northern Ireland Conflict," Irish Studies in International 
Affairs, 1 no.4 (Spring, 1984). 
5. Garret FitzGerald, interview by author, 19 December 
1990. Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Schultz also 
discussed the Northern Ireland problem during an official 
meeting with Thatcher following her Congressional address. 
6. All Noraid figures from reports made under the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act. 
7. Jack Holland, The Ainerican Connection : U.S. Guns, 
Money, and Influence in Northern Ireland (New York: Viking, 
1987), 60. 
8. Matthew Higgins quoted in Bernard Weinraub, "I. R. A. 
Aid Unit in the Bronx Linked to Flow of Arms," The New York 
Times, 16 December 1975. 
9. Flannery quoted in Linda Charlton, "Fund-Raising by a 
Group in U.S. Called Vital to I.R.A. Operations," The New York 
Times, 23 September 1979. 
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10. Flannery quoted in Jimmy Breslin, "The Fighting 
Irish," The Los Angeles Times, 13 February 1983. 
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